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DEFENSE MINISTER ENGELL: PEACE MOVEMENT USED BY SOVIETS

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 18 Jul 83 p 8

[Article by Dan Axel]

[Text] Defense Minister Hans Engell is convinced that the Danish and other western peace movements are being used for pro-Soviet agitation.

"The peace movements claim that their actions are aimed against both East and West. But this claim does not seem very convincing when it is consistently followed up by very onesided criticism, primarily of the western countries and the United States," Hans Engell said yesterday at the national meeting of the Danish Brothers of Defense in Aalborg.

"I have no doubt that the western peace movements have a broad composition and that in the main they have pure motives for their agitation. But I would like to warn people against thinking they are not being used," said the defense minister in something resembling a greeting to the Nordic Peace Festival, which concluded yesterday in Silkeborg.

Around 6,000 participants left the square in Silkeborg with this appeal: "The arms race must come to a halt now. Life must go on. Stop the arms buildup now!"

Former Prime Minister Anker Jorgensen, who also attended the peace rally, put it succinctly: "We want peace, for God's sake. We are heading for collective suicide and it must be stopped."

There were peace greetings from Soviet leader Yuri Andropov and from Finland's Mauno Koivisto. Former Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky also sent greetings.

A statement from the peace rally touched on topical problems: "The most important thing at this time is to prevent the deployment of the new American medium-range missiles in Europe. That would bring the nuclear catastrophe even closer. We want all nuclear weapons out of Europe and a world totally free of nuclear weapons. An important step in that direction is the formation of a Nordic nuclear-free zone, which we would like to see implemented now."

Defense Minister Hans Engell says that in this way the peace movements are helping to challenge the cooperation that has guarded Denmark's peace interests, along with those of others, for over 30 years. "We must not overlook the decisive historical and political background, which shows that it is chiefly the massive Soviet military buildup over many years that has been the cause of anxiety and unrest in the West and has contributed to the arms buildup," Hans Engell told the Brothers of Defense.

The Brothers of Defense held their meeting of delegates later on Sunday at Norre Uttrup barracks in Aalborg. Here KTAS [Copenhagen Telephone Company] administrative director Per Amnitzboll, a major in the reserves, was elected president for the first time. He replaced former Defense Minister Knud Ostergaard, who is now chairman of the Conservative Folketing group in Christiansborg.

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CSO: 3613/154

DEFENSE MINISTER ENGELL ON EUROMISSILES, LOYALTY TO NATO

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 13 Jul 83 p 7

[Article by Defense Minister Hans Engell]

[Text] During the Folketing debate on 26 May, it was demonstrated that there is still a large majority in favor of NATO's dual decision of December 1979. The decisive factor in this was that the Social Democrats joined this majority, as expressed very clearly by the party's foreign policy spokesman, Lasse Budtz. Of course the government noted this with satisfaction. At a time when the traditional broad security and foreign policy cooperation is occasionally questioned, this confirms that it is viable after all.

Of course there is no reason to hide the fact that the government and the Social Democrats do not agree on the interpretation of the dual decision. Otherwise the government would hardly have voted against the Social Democratic resolution. But it is equally certain that the goal for both the government and the Social Democratic Party is the same--the largest possible reduction of the landbased INF weapons in Europe.

Thus it is primarily the position on the tactics and negotiation plans of both sides that divides us.

For the sake of order, I would like to first call attention to a fact that is occasionally overlooked in the heat of battle, namely that the current government has simply based its policy and its position on the decision that the Social Democratic government made in NATO in December 1979, without any reservations or any kind of footnotes. It was--as is the case in NATO--a democratic decision, made unanimously by all the NATO lands. Thus the government's position is a continuance of the previous government's position in this area.

The parties currently forming the government fully agreed with the Social Democratic support of the dual decision in 1979 and the negotiating tactics it involved and we have not subsequently changed our opinion of the correctness of the line adopted then. However the Social Democrats--in

the period after Anker Jorgensen's withdrawal--have changed their stance, as expressed on several occasions in statements by Lasse Budtz, among others.

The background for this is scarcely that the 1979 dual decision was fundamentally wrong, for in that case the government at that time would not have approved it and the Social Democrats would not have placed themselves behind this decision in principle today. When Social Democrats now put forth a different evaluation, they maintain that the reason is that conditions have changed since then. They say it has nothing to do with the fact that the Social Democratic parties over most of Europe have assumed an opposition role or have deliberately lined up with the peace movements. No, the reason is more solid than that and is a result of in-depth analysis of the methods and possibilities involved in the arms negotiations in Geneva and a responsible recognition of the consequences of continuing the arms race.

This analysis is supposed among other things to show that there is no military need at all for the deployment of the 372 missiles, because every target they can be aimed at is already covered by other nuclear weapons. This does not seem a good argument for the Social Democratic members or others who in 1979 followed the preliminaries of the dual decision. The military need--then as now--was not the primary factor. Now, as before, NATO's nuclear weapons are not regarded as means with which to fight a war but as a means to deter war. Therefore it was chiefly for political reasons--as part of NATO's strategy of deterrence--that the NATO countries wanted to have a reaction capability to the possible use of SS-20's against western Europe and, please note, a reaction that did not consist of the existing intercontinental (strategic) missiles which those making the decision, including Denmark, did not feel would be a credible response because they could so easily lead to an all-out nuclear war.

When the Social Democrats now assign with great conviction greater emphasis to the arms control decision than to the modernization decision and call for a halt to deployment preparations and an extension of the negotiations deadline, this is--as probably no one would deny--a different view of negotiating tactics than the one that was used as a basis for the 1979 decision by the former government. Of course it is part of the picture that at the final meeting of the NATO Council, the Social Democratic government proposed postponing the decision on modernization for half a year, but when there was no support for the suggestion, the Danish representatives accepted making the two decisions in parallel, because this was seen as a very necessary incentive to an arms control result. I do not think this tactic was ever questioned then or later, especially by the nations that are conducting the talks and are after all the first to feel the effects of Soviet negotiation tactics. The consequence of this was that the modernization aspect was to be implemented in accordance with the production plans presented--plans with which the decisionmakers were familiar--under which the first missiles could become operative by the end of 1983. The NATO communiques of subsequent years can also be read as a general (including Danish) acceptance of this tactic.

It is understandable that the Social Democrats are concerned about the arms race, especially in the nuclear sector. So is the government. That is why we are supporting in every way possible the current negotiations on both INF and strategic weapons.

It is also the government's desire to reduce the number of such weapons as much as possible. But with respect to the 572 INF weapons that will be deployed under the dual decision in the absence of concrete negotiating agreements in Geneva, one can hardly regard this as a typical arms race--and the Social Democratic ministers did not regard it as such in 1979. It is generally known that the number of existing American nuclear weapons in Europe has already been reduced by 1,000 warheads and this will continue in line with future new deployments.

I cannot reproach anyone for having different ideas as long as they are better. After all it is a democratic right to change one's mind, whether it is because one forgot at the start to make the necessary analyses or because conditions have changed.

But respect for the democratic rules means something more than the right to change one's position via a new majority. It also involves--and one should not forget this--respect for the decisions once reached in conjunction with others, in this case the unanimously decided dual decision, as long as this has not been changed by a NATO decision. Democracy involves both rights and obligations. Therefore if we Danes cannot convince our allies of the importance and correctness of the new views, the dual decision will naturally remain in effect, as it was arrived at with unconditional support from the Social Democratic government that was in office in 1979. Our hope is that an agreement can be reached at the negotiating table that can secure the reduction and detente that must be the goal of all of us--on the right and on the left, in the East and in the West.

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THIERSCHMANN ON ROLE OF AIR FORCE IN 1990's

Bonn WEHRTECHNIK in German Jul 83 pp 36-46

/Article by Claus Thierschmann/

/Text/ In connection with the tactical requirements for new weapons systems and the associated problems of "follow-on thinking" - that is substitution of one weapons systems by a similar more advanced one - the question occurs again and again whether and how the "look" of the Air Force, especially its component fighting forces, may change in the foreseeable and more long-term future. Will the Air Force have manned fighter aircraft, and how long; will their tasks be implemented by missiles or by unmanned, remote-controlled aircraft? During the Working Congress of the German Society for Defense Technology in April 1983, the commanding general of the Air Force Support Command, Lieutenant General Eng. (grad.) Claus Thierschmann, sketched a probable picture of the Air Force in the nineties. The time interval up to that time is certainly too brief for decisive changes. According to the view of the lecture, the Air Force will fly the weapons systems that have just now been introduced (with enhanced combat value). A new fighter aircraft and a new air defense rocket system will probably be added. Emphasis will be placed on air defense, on renewing the reconnaissance units, and on a larger number of individual improvements.

The topic requires a few preliminary remarks.

The attempt to look ahead 15 years naturally is subject to some uncertainties and one can only extrapolate into the future developmental trends that are recognizable today.

The topic is conjoined with a cycle that concerns defense technology. Consequently, these explanations likewise emphasize questions of technology and armament.

The lecture is based on my personal opinion and need not in all respects represent the real intended plans of the Air Force.

To deal with the topic, I will try to sketch the threat in the nineties, will subsequently address the structure of the background, will subsequently elucidate the determinative factors of personnel, costs, and technology, and from this will derive the forecast for the area of air attack, air defense, reconnaissance and command, as well as deployment support for the Air Force in the nineties.

This "forecast" not least of all has the character of far-reaching requirements, a character which extends beyond the currently valid federal defense plan not only in a temporal aspect but which especially is intended to keep open the view to what is actually attainable with the most strenuous efforts.

The Threat: Increase of Offensive Power

The potential opponent, who forms the basis of the threat, is primarily a land-based force. His military potential is still being largely determined in this way. The expansion of the naval fighting forces in the sixties and seventies together with the intercontinental nuclear systems merely marks a turn towards a worldwide projection of his power.

With the shift of emphasis from conventional efforts towards air fighting forces, a shift which has been observable for several years, the air fighting forces of the Warsaw Pact are in process of developing from a role of support force for land-based fighting forces to a wide-area and independently operating air combat force.

This development is directed towards the gapless coverage of the spectrum of means for air war. However, especially those forces are being strengthened which make possible an increase of offensive power. Besides the increase of combat force for the direct support on the battlefield, in home air defense, and with strategic bombers, especially the potential for the fighter bombers is increasing. These are characterized by:

- considerably increased useful loads
- considerably greater action radii
- all-weather capability
- capability for fighting under conditions of electronic battle command
- significantly improved low-flight characteristics and
- equipment with proximity weapons

These will be introduced in large numbers during the nineties, but in addition also new fighter planes, reconnaissance planes, and systems for support on the battlefield - and quite particularly here the combat helicopters. Furthermore, the expansion of ground-supported air defense will release fighter planes for offensive tasks.

The Air Forces of the Warsaw Pact are thus capable of moving the operational focus into the very depth of the NATO area. Even in a conventional interchange, they can carry out intensive operations from the very beginning, and can threaten the air bases of NATO, the landing places for reinforcements, as well as atomic deployment means.

Besides this increased offensive power, air defense will also continue to improve. Protection of facilities and installations with antiaircraft rocket systems or antiaircraft systems having a high reaction speed, target accuracy, and freedom from interference will be expanded, so that the overflight of facilities and installations will be subject to high risk.

The air defense in the units of the ground fighting forces will be consistently further developed. High mobility, coupled with all-weather capability, high reaction speed, and target accuracy of the deployment means are to be expected.

Our Focal Point: Air Defense

For the air fighting forces of NATO, this means the following:

The focal point of endeavors during the years before us and in the nineties will be air defense. We are forced to replace the existing means of air defense or, where it is still sensible, to modernize them, so that we can meet the opponent weapons systems with a reasonable risk, and so that we can reduce the conventional defense weakness of NATO during the nineties.

Combat against ground targets is determined by the improved defense of the opponent. Combat against bases of the air fighting forces and destruction of their potential on the ground, combat against the following echelon of the army, battlefield interdiction, and close air support require new attack methods and weaponry for the introduced systems and new considerations for combating fixed targets with conventional ammunition.

The German Air Force is following up the development of this threat over its entire width and is analyzing it. However, in the future it will not be able to develop the entire spectrum of countermeans. It is involved in an alliance and is planning for its share of tasks, which is oriented by the given structure of the Federal Defense and of the Air Force, which is delimited by available personnel and available budgetary means, and which uses equipment that can be developed from technology that is now available or will be available in the foreseeable future.

Step-by-Step Modernization of the Structure.

Under the collective concept of structure, I understand the scope of forces, the personnel structure, the equipment, and the organization. The structure of the Federal Defense is based on basic decisions during the fifties, which determine our contribution to the Alliance. The continued development of the structure since that time can best be characterized as "step-by-step modernization".

This means: Planning always builds on what exists at the present time, and the equipment planning is a supplementation plan in its very character.

What is involved here is always a structurally optimal supplementation in terms of the following:

The number and types of units are political variables of our alliance contract and can be changed only platoon by platoon.

Weapons systems must be conformable to the system; in particular, they must harmonize with reconnaissance and command means.

The personnel structure, the training system, the logistical system, especially the infrastructure must allow inclusion of the planned equipment.

In summary, this means: Requirements on the deployment means cannot be derived solely from the threat alone. They can be made specific only with consideration of our own contingencies. Integration into the Alliance and the structure are here decisive factors for the Federal Defense.

Personnel Position: Certain Worries

The personnel of the Air Force is currently characterized by a lack of long-service career soldiers, also noncommissioned officers, especially those with technical qualifications, of the order of about 4,000 soldiers. Thus, the prescribed scope of long-term servicemen in the Air Force is not fully reached, despite the current high rate of unemployment.

The existing bottleneck with technically qualified personnel will become worse beginning in 1986, because then the first low-birth years will enter into employment age, and the Federal Defense will have to cover its personnel needs in severe competition with industry and other public services.

This means that, right into the nineties, one can expect a worsening of present circumstances, especially as regards personnel with high qualifications.

Consequently, this imposes on the deployment means a requirement for low-maintenance units of high reliability and for automated, user-friendly test equipment.

Medium-Term Real Zero Growth

The financial condition of the Federal Government is stamped by currently unfavorable economic framework conditions, and by business conditions which promise an improvement only in the long term. For the Federal Defense, this means that, at least in the medium term, it must expect real zero growth of the defense budget. Since the price index for armaments of the Air Force, however, lies above the price index of the gross social product, the currently assumed financial expectation will entail a reduction of real available investment means for the Air Force.

This means that the Air Force in the future will have to examine every investment still more meticulously, whether it contributes cost effectively to the fulfillment of the task. The life cycle-cost thinking will move still more conspicuously into the foreground. There will no longer be any money for "ornaments". In every case, an increase of the means used for research and development is deemed necessary, so that, especially in the area of component

development is deemed necessary, so that, especially in the area of component development and in the reduction to use of new technologies, the already existing gaps can be closed again, and these technologies can again be made available for new deployment means.

Use of New Technologies

Advances in technology, which promise the greatest performance gain in the military-technical area, and which would be decisive for the Air Force in the nineties, are to be expected from the increased use of microelectronics and from the use of special materials.

These key technologies consequently must flow into future-oriented component development and must be taken into account at an early stage in the development of weapons systems.

Progress by Microelectronics

The specific application of microelectronics leads to the miniaturization of components, to space and weight savings, to less energy consumption and to higher system performance. The most important aspect of the development is the further increase of the integration density and speed with logical switching functions. The special interest in this connection belongs to the development of very high speed capacity information processing integrated circuits (VHSIC).

Special consideration should also be given to the fact that, with increasing miniaturization, the further reduction of prices per logic function is to be expected.

Because of this trend, progress is expected in the following sectors:

Development of multi-sensors for all areas of the electromagnetic spectrum and, building on this, of combat guidance systems and economical sensor heads and control units for the end-phase guiding of missiles and submunition.

Implementation of long-range, accurate proximity weapons, which work according to the fire-and-forget principle, and which furthermore implement the lock-on-after-launch principle. This is achieved by displacing more and more "intelligence" from the carrier to the weapon.

Here, the problem of optimizing the intelligence distribution between the carrier and the weapon will play an essential role.

New development in device equipment from head-up display up to laser-gyro stabilized platforms.

Flight control systems, which make possible flight behavior and flight motions in combination with novel control surfaces, which offer decisive advantages for weapons deployment.

Sensor linkage in the Air Defense System, where the majority of existing sensors can be collected together. With high redundancy, a comprehensive air-position picture is generated and maintained, which is indispensable especially for air-space management.

Interference- and camouflage-proof friend/foe identification devices.

Freely programmable ECM units, which can react flexibly to every change of threat.

Digital propulsion unit control systems, which will lead to an optimization of fuel consumption.

Built-in test equipment, which will minimize maintenance effort and which will reduce the dependence on BPS.

Automatic test units, to minimize maintenance labor and to make highly qualified specialists dispensable.

Finally I expect decisive progress by the availability of large computers to optimize command processes, where these computers of the nineties will no longer be pure data processing systems but will be self-learning systems or, expressed in other words, information processing systems which are operated with user-friendly programming.

Here, it should be remarked that developments on the hardware side are foreseeable along wide problem areas. However, the development of software remains difficult. In my opinion, the production and management of software will have decisive significance in the future.

It should also be noted that we should not expect too much from microelectronics. Here too, there are limits. The thought and command process will also belong to the military commander in the future. Here, too much information can certainly confuse the insight into what is essential and can impede decisions.

Progress with Materials

Progress with materials will lie, on the one hand, in the area of highly heat-resistant steels and sintered materials. This will lead to improvements in the construction of propulsion systems. Higher turbine entry temperatures will become possible and will lead to improved performance. Longer lifetime and special heat expansion properties of materials will improve operating behavior. In connection with digital control technology, a reduction of specific fuel consumption, better power density, and longer lifetimes will be achieved. This will influence not only flight performance but will also reduce operating costs.

On the other hand, the increasing use of light special materials in fuselage construction, such as e.g. glass fiber or carbon fiber reinforced plastics for aircraft and missiles can be expected to yield major increases of fluid dynamic performance and to improve the aerodynamics.

The use of stealth principles will also make radar acquisition more difficult. Thus, the penetration capability, that is the effectiveness, sortie capacity, and survivability will be increased. A special area associated with materials is the use of glass fiber light conductors, which must be pursued further in all systems. This will bring decisive progress in transmission technology and will simultaneously increase the EMP strength.

An Advantage: Bus Systems and Modular Construction

Finally, I would like to cite two design principles which are becoming more important for every new development and which will be implemented in the nineties: the distribution of information by bus systems and construction according to the modular principle. This makes it possible to include, already in the basic design, possible and foreseeable innovations and further developments in component areas.

In this way, follow-on equipment, e.g. for increasing combat effectiveness, will be facilitated without relaying the cables and by system-conformable modules, without design changes. Such steps will thus become possible with little effort. In parallel to this, planning foresight over the entire lifetime of the systems is required, which will include the time development and the expenditures for modification, and which will form the basis for life cycle management, which again is a precondition for minimizing lifetime costs.

The Contribution of the Air Force

The threat, the obligations within the Alliance, the given structure, the available personnel, and available budgetary means, as well as the possibilities of technology will determine the equipment of the Air Force during the nineties and thus the contribution of the Air Force to the task of the Federal Defense.

This contribution must be internally balanced, and the component tasks must be fulfillable in such a way that altogether an optimum of combat capability is reached.

This will be endeavored for the nineties, by the Air Force pursuing in parallel the further development of its equipment in the following areas:

- Air attack
- Air defense at the same time
- Reconnaissance and command
- Deployment support

Air Attack: TORNADO and ALPHA JET

In the area of air attack, introduction of the TORNADO weapons systems will achieve all-weather combat capability in the conventional air attack role. The sortie effectiveness will be considerably increased by the multipurpose weapon MW-1 and its associated submunition types. Combat in depth against the opponent air potential and the "following echelons" of the ground fighting forces can thus be carried on more effectively in the future than has been the case previously.

The weapons system ALPHA JET will have the role of "air support" for the ground fighting forces, and will support them directly in their defensive combat. It will also contribute to defense against combat helicopters.

Both the TORNADO and the ALPHA JET must be equipped so as to meet their expected threats over the duration of their use time. For this reason, combat effectiveness maintenance and combat effectiveness enhancement programs are provided for both weapons. The programs have as their objective the improvement of survivability, the penetration power, and weapons effectiveness.

With the TORNADO, the following are anticipated within the framework of technical development:

- Improvements in the capability for electronic battle command
- Gradual power increase of the propulsion system
- Adaptation to future proximity weapons

In the case of the ALPHA JET, thought is being given to the following:

- Increase of the thrust of the propulsions system

- Production of a restricted night-combat capability, e.g. by forward looking infrared (FLIR) or low light level TV, as well as furthermore

- Laser range measurement for increasing the hit accuracy with the existing dropping ammunition

- Integration of MAVERICK as the first proximity weapon of the Air Force against armored forces on the battlefield and AIM-9L for combat against helicopters and for self-defense

- Finally, improved radar warning systems to increase the penetration power and survivability.

New Proximity Weapons

The efficiency of the air attack forces must be secured against the increasing threat from ground supported flying air defense systems of the Warsaw Pact. This will be done by increasing the capabilities for electronic combat command, and especially by the proximity weapons such as

- Maverick B
- Maverick D
- Air Defence Self-Protection Missile (ARM) and
- Long-range stand-off missile (LRSOM).

With the procurement of these weapons, both the survivability of the carrier is increased and its sortie effectiveness is also considerably enhanced. Furthermore, a high combat intensity will be made possible during the first days of combat, which probably will be decisive in warfare due to our defense dispositions.

Especially by development of long-range proximity weapons (LRSOM), new perspectives are opened up for combat against the air fighting forces on their bases - even, looking far to the future - for the development of future carrier aircraft in tactical air war. Possibilities are also being discussed in the USA concerning the combating of fixed targets in the depth of space by means of missiles. These are also being studied within the NATO framework. However, they require a very precise analysis.

Here, special care will have to be taken that comprehensive cost/use calculations and effectiveness studies will be set up, and that superficial data and arguments, whose objectivity is not free from doubt, will not be used as a basis.

Furthermore, a precise analysis is required of the fixed targets themselves - and only for these would missiles be suitable, since their combat priority could change rapidly, especially taking into account the capability of the Warsaw Pact air fighting forces, to move with little delay to alternative sites.

The combat against fixed targets with change in priority and the combating of mobile targets do not have the same degree of difficulty. These make up about 90 percent of our target set within the NATO framework. To a large extent, they lie in the depth of the opponent space. For these, TORNADO is tailor made and is supplemented by ALPHA JET and F-4.

Air Defense: Weak Points of our Defense

The Air Defense in the eighties originally was supposed to be the armament focus of the Air Force. Through the financing phase of the years that have just passed and the years that lie before us, this focal point had to be weakened by the deletion of the ROLAND weapons systems and especially by the time shift of PATRIOT.

The consequences are well known: Air Defense is the weak point of our defense. In view of the growing offensive power of the air fighting forces of the potential opponent, and in view of NATO's intention to conduct defensive combat in such a way that the first strike of the opponent is expected and is then intercepted, this will continue to hold true until the nineties and can be improved upon only step by step.

The area of protecting facilities and installations in the medium term can be covered only with intermediate solutions. These can consist of a sensor with combat guidance capability and a SIDEWINDER AIM-9L on simple starting structures or e.g. a Bofors 40 mm L/70, with enhanced combat effectiveness, and with an integrated firing guidance radar. In this way, a connection should be found towards the implementation of solutions which comprise a mix of modern multi-sensors, guns, and guided missiles, and which are also effective against proximity weapons. The vulnerability of our forces on the ground will furthermore be met by the increased use of civil airports of all types and emergency landing places for temporary dispersal and thus by multiplication of targets for the opponent.

In the long term, the point is to improve thoroughly the space protection by ground-supported and flying Air Defense weapons systems, and by intermeshing this with effective protection of facilities and installations. This will be the central task of the nineties.

The weapons system PATRIOT, which is supposed to be deployed beginning in 1988 according to the plans of the Air Force, is intended as the main weapons system of the ground-supported air defense. It will replace the outmoded weapons system NIKE-HERCULES. It can be used in the zone together with the IHAWK weapons system, whose combat effectiveness will again be increased.

By implementing this armament project,

- the reaction time of the Air Defense systems under ECM conditions will be considerably shortened,

- the action range of the weapons will be extended,

- firing power will be increased, and

- the saturation limit will be raised.

At the End of the Nineties: MFS-90

Towards the end of the nineties, the weapons system IHAWK will be replaced by the medium Air Defense system (MFS-90), which is intended for use in the protection of spaces as well as facilities and installations.

Essential requirements for future ground support weapons systems of the Air Defense are the following:

- short reaction time,

- capability to defend against missiles (air/ground missiles, ARM, RPV, unmanned aircraft),

- multipurpose target fighting capability

- all-weather capability

- very interference-proof, e.g. by multisensor technique of radar, possibly even with acoustic equipment,

- high mobility and deployment flexibility

- interference-resistant and camouflage-proof electronic friend/foe detection.

These requirements can be fulfilled both by Air Defense rocket systems and by barrel weapons with electronic or optronic firing guidance, in dependence on the necessary range; the solution will lie in an object-related optimized mix of both types of weapons systems.

On the basis of the very scarce financial means and of the high unit requirement for Air Defense systems for space and object protection, economical and affordable solutions are striven for.

The Need: Fighter Aircraft 90

This statement naturally also holds for the considerations concerning the fighter aircraft 90. It is undisputed that the Air Force needs a high-power fighter aircraft with modern avionics, gunnery, and powerful air/air guided missiles, for short and medium range, as long as it is not certain that the mass of the opposing air attack potential can be destroyed on the ground during the first hours of an engagement.

Since this would contradict NATO doctrine, and since all experience in the decision making process of the Alliance goes against this, that a "border crossing authority" will be granted at the proper time, this promise is unrealistic, and also will not be evaluated differently during the nineties.

Since protection of facilities and installations cannot by itself intercept the force of the expected attacks, the fighter aircraft of the future will close the gaps in space protection and will have to fight for air superiority in central defense points.

In this connection, air combat would first be opened up over a wider range, and then, on the basis of the largest supply of targets would be conducted dynamically over medium and short ranges. To this extent, the deployment of long-range air/air guided missiles as well as AMRAAM is not a pure stand-off problem, but is based on the sequence of a future air combat. In combination with air/air guided missiles of short range and gun weaponry, it will lead to the desired deployment effectiveness.

For this reason, the requirements in avionics and weaponry for the fighter aircraft 90 have the highest priority. The flight and maneuvering performance, appropriate to the given threat, nevertheless cannot be given up. Criteria for this are set by the new generation of fighter aircraft of the potential opponent. By the beginning of the nineties, these will largely have replaced the current generation of fighter aircraft. From this perspective, an Air Defense version of TORNADO is not suitable to fulfill future Air Defense tasks of the German Air Force in the deployment area of central Europe. This has been demonstrated by simulation and by studies.

Whether a further increase of the combat effectiveness of the F-4F in the Air Defense role will still be implemented depends on the expected time of introduction for the fighter aircraft 90.

Reconnaissance and Command

The first further development of equipment concurrent with air attack and air defense concerns the improvement of the capability for reconnaissance and command.

To reconnoiter the situation and the intentions of the opponent, the Air Force, within the framework of the Federal Defense and of NATO, contributes to

- the monitoring of the air space
- air reconnaissance
- telecommunications reconnaissance

The air space and monitoring system of NATO will be effectively supplemented, beginning in the middle of the eighties and extending into the nineties, by AWACS.

In the area of air reconnaissance, the technical-logistical lifetime of the reconnaissance plane RF-4E will have expired by the middle of the nineties.

At this time, ideas are being developed how and by what means the task of tactical air reconnaissance can in the future be fulfilled in connection with the telecommunications reconnaissance, in the most suitable manner.

Tactical air reconnaissance of the future will have to have the following characteristics:

- all-weather capability
- covering the space
- comprehensive.

Sensors will make possible a direct interpretation. The resolving power should permit location, identification, and weapons deployment. The information obtained by reconnaissance sensors must be transmitted in nearly real time, through a data network, to the users on the ground and in the air.

The sensors, data transmission and processing equipment here have priority with respect to the quality of the carriers. Both available systems as well as drones or manned and unmanned systems will here be investigated for distance reconnaissance: e.g. RPV or TR-1. Satellite reconnaissance is also being carried out within the framework of the Alliance.

The reconnaissance creates the presupposition for reactions appropriate to the position, and for command actions. If the already abundant supply of information is to be used fully, however, a time shortening of the transmission and command process as well as the quality improvement of decisions under time pressure is required. To fulfill this objective, powerful data processing systems as well as rapid, safe, and powerful telecommunication linkages will make an essential contribution.

Command Systems

Because of the expected rapid combat sequence in a war conducted with modern weapons, the operational value of information associated with a command process will in the future depend even more strongly than previously on its age. To this extent, the planned investments of the Air Force in command and technical

information systems as well as in digital and automated telecommunication networks will lead to an increase of combat capability. High-priority tasks here are the quantification of the dependencies between combat capabilities and command capabilities. This quantification is the presupposition for answering the question how much command support is actually required through technical means. Even with the given cost framework for investments, this therefore forms the decisive basis for allocating budgetary means to weapons and to command means.

After quantifiable dependencies are available, the adaptation of means deployment will lead to the optimization of combat capability.

Reductions in peripheral equipment - as has often been seen in the past - without the quantification of dependencies can lead to losses of combat strength. The best weapons systems are less useful if they are not deployed in a manner appropriate to conditions.

Deployment in a manner appropriate to conditions also includes effective electronic battle commands. This requires great effort, so that in this area one can react as rapidly as possible to the developments of the opponent, and to prevent the appearance of gaps, since the generation change of the devices for electronic battle commands occur much more quickly and rapidly than e.g. in the case of flying weapons systems.

Another important presupposition for the effective deployment of weapons systems is an interference-proof and camouflage-proof electronic friend/foe detection system, by means of which all NATO fighting forces on water, land, and in the air will be equipped, at least in central Europe. The introduction of this NATO identification system should be concluded by the beginning of the nineties.

A thorough-going improvement of command capabilities of the NATO air fighting forces should be attained by the creation of an air command and control system (ACCS). The Air Force endeavors to concentrate NATO planning to what is actually finactable, to use as much as possible existing methods and structures, and on this basis to implement the air war command system step by step.

The objective is:

- to establish a command linkage between air attack and air defense

- to improve and to interlink the sensor base

- to intermesh the telecommunication systems and to automat them

- to achieve a functional and informational linkage for all component fighting forces in the area of the air space management.

The introduction of the NATO identification system (NIS) will be considered in all plans for this ACCS. The national plans for improving or innovating computer-supported command information systems, such as e.g. EIFEL 2, will be introduced as components into the NATO ACCS project.

Sensor linkage and telecommunication linkage are especially costly projects. On the basis of already existing redundancies in air space monitoring, primarily the expansion of telecommunication linkages will therefore be pursued, in order to make possible effective operations command.

Improvements of deployment support leads to new requirements for armaments. Indeed, the transport aircrafts and helicopters, with the exception of lifetime-based modifications and improvements, will continue to operate until the end of the nineties.

For every newly introduced system, however, there is the requirement that new technologies not only may be used to attain performance increases in weapons efficiency. Rather, we will try, in the sense of life-cycle-cost thinking, to take into account still more than previously the following factors, from the very beginning of their generation as defense materials:

- reliability
- ease of maintenance
- availability
- lifetime
- the possibility for subsequent increase of combat effectiveness.

In addition, the path will consistently be pursued, to minimize the number of required high-qualification personnel, by using built-in self-testing test units, and by automated test units on the ground, such as with the TORNADO. Finally, by organizational measures, by using new computer-supported analytical methods, and in combination with status-dependent materials maintenance measures, the expenditure for repair in shipyards and in the industry will be reduced. The objective of these measures and requirements is, by means of deployment support, to secure the maximum utilization of combat potential even in the nineties. For this reason, the operating costs during peacetime must be minimized - without suffering a penalty in the case of a defense situation. With a given plan-cost framework, one must keep open not only the means for investments, but one must also create the necessary room for play for research and development.

In the nineties, the Air Force will go with the second armament generation - RF-4E and F-4F with further developed proximity weapons and the modernized HAWK - and with the weapons systems of the eighties, of the third generation: ALPHA JET, TORNADO, and the NIKE-HERCULES successor PATRIOT.

During the nineties, we expect the introduction of the fighter aircraft 90. The two PHANTOM weapons systems will reach the end of their technical and economic lifetime during the nineties. HAWK, too, after about 30 years of service, will then no longer be maintainable.

After structural improvements, TRANSALL will continue to fly beyond the nineties as a transport aircraft. Likewise, the helicopter UH-1D will still be operational. Only at the end of the nineties, it will be replaced by a medium helicopter. The radar command service will continue to operate with the GEADGE beyond the year 2000.

The focal point of the foreseeable air weapons planning for the nineties must be and will be Air Defense with the introduction of new systems, accompanied by a renewal of the reconnaissance association (air reconnaissance, Fm/Elo reconnaissance, processing and transmission systems). In other areas, measures must take care to extend the lifetime and to increase combat effectiveness for the introduced systems. In this way, the mission of the Air Force will continue to be fulfilled beyond the nineties.

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NAVY COLONEL ANALYZES DEFENSE, DETERRENCE STRATEGIES

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[Article by Marine Colonel Cebe: "The Spirit of Defense--Reflections on Defense, Strategic Misconstructions and Common Sense"]

[Text] In view of their structure--essentially the mobility one tries to give them, it is possible that in all situations, they would be called upon to produce a battle which would end in retreat. This is the most dangerous type of battle that can be imagined, and we have experienced quite a bit of it in the past, to our misfortune.

But skirmish or not, aggression test or total pitched battle, in all of the type cases we would be waging the same kind of battle that the enemy has carefully prepared for, with means of the same kind as his but very inferior, and in accordance with a tactic closely similar to his.

This is where the intellectual misconception lies. It is even a twofold one: anticipating the enemy's desires, accepting his conditions, and doing so without reason--worse, against our own interest as clearly indicated by simple logic.

The presumed enemy, for his part, is logical with himself. He has chosen, on any hypothesis, an offensive military strategy; as regards us, a charge in our direction. He has therefore built for himself an air-land battle corps, nuclearized, armored, mechanized, airborne, etc, capable of overcoming all obstacles in the shortest times. He has added a navy capable of carrying out sizable landings and interventions of all kinds far away.

But can we set up such an organization? We whose ambition can reasonably be limited only to defending our territory: of what use would an offensive battle corps be to us--one such as would be indispensable for hitting Smolensk but that obviously would be more embarrassing than anything else to create--and quite ruinous, of course--in the face of an invasion on the Meuse, the Marne or the Loire?

The Misconstruction

The French government rejects the slot that NATO would like to see our army fill on the borders of the Warsaw Pact countries. But it seems to want to

wage a forward battle, while what would follow would be only a "battle of the remnants."

The French command, reorganizing its Army in the 1970's, has practically eliminated operational defense of the territory. It has visibly wanted to make all its forces available for launch into battle. According to the official doctrine, it is not a matter of attempting to stop an invasion--there could be no pretense of that--but rather only of being certain of the enemy's aggressive intention, testing his aggression against public opinion and measuring its extent before using tactical, then strategic, atomic weaponry, if the aggression continued despite our reaction. Would all our air-land forces be engaged in this mission? That would then be "the" battle. If not, those not engaged would certainly be destined for another battle.

It is to be feared that, in the working-out of our strategic concept, we are making some serious errors of perception.

The first one could derive from the subtlety that we have introduced into the handling of our deterrence. Originally, it was sharp, massive, automatic, absolute, intended to discourage any attempt at aggression. It has become so graduated, in the American manner, that it presents the risk at least of having to guarantee to the adversary such an advance warning before using nuclear weapons that he could, without serious damage, take some important objectives and reach his final objective by stages. But this subject has been so thoroughly debated that these reflections will not dwell on it.

They will, by preference, dwell on the more circumspect misconception that we seem to be making in our operational strategic doctrine, that of battle--whether the battle is the unfortunate preliminary to the use of strategic nuclear weapons, or rather if we are obliged to fight because deterrence has failed and it would obviously be out of the question to suffer invasion without reacting. Indeed, the hypothesis of a failure of deterrence cannot be seriously discarded; which means that, as the most unfavorable hypothesis, study of it should be given priority.

On any hypothesis, if there is battle, the misconception would be to accept it as it is "offered" to us by the adversary and on the terms that he has set: with materiel, structures and doctrine of use of the same kind as his, and which he consequently has mastery of.

It would be a suicidal misconception, for the relationship of forces--just the numerical one, and taking NATO into account--is heavily unfavorable to us. Under these conditions, our only chance of survival seems, on the contrary, to be to reject the battle that the presumed aggressor has prepared and to reply to him with the warfare that we have chosen, in accordance with our criteria, in function of our objectives, our interests and the characteristics of our enemy, by means of a little logic, imagination and common sense.

It is often posed as axiomatic that one must reply with the same weapons as the attacker's. That may be true in certain cases; in other cases, it is absurd. Who would say that the citizen defending his house and his money should equip himself with keys, a cutting torch, explosives, like the burglar who wants to crack his safe? In such a case, it is quite obvious that the appropriate countermeasure consists mainly of solid locks and bolts, alarms, traps, the thickness and weight of the safe.

There is also the question of whether, in our imitation of the enemy, we are capable of just equalling him. But everyone knows that he yields nothing to us in quality and that he overwhelms us in quantity. The misconstruction becomes a fatal one.

How have we been led into it? Would we be like those worthy villagers who, envious of their neighbors' bridge, wanted one too, even though no river went through their village? Sacrifices are made to the military mode, to the attraction of the gadget, nostalgia for the past, envy of the fine toy, so beautiful, so "modern," of one's colleague over there or opposite. Added to these, perhaps, are some branch rivalries; in any case, a lack of imagination and logic--that is, common sense.

Common Sense

Possible Design of a Defense

I. Principles

Everything in a military organization, down to the composition and armament of the infantry combat unit, should be a function of the missions assigned to the armed forces by the political authorities.

Since our policy has no external aim, external action should be only an entirely secondary mission for our armed forces. France should be realistically, if not bitterly, aware that it is no longer an international power of the first rank, capable of taking action with force anywhere in the world. Such awareness seems necessary in order for it to be able to fill, appropriately, its role as an important second-rank power. From this point of view, French external military action should be limited in space and in time. It is hard to see, for example, what large French nuclear-powered missile-carrying ships would go off to do in the Indian Ocean. It would be illusory to pretend to protect our remote lines of communication effectively in wartime. After having abandoned our entire colonial empire, it would be unreasonable for us to make a commitment again for a few small surviving islets of French presence. It is also to be desired that we disengage from any exotic military alliance which, in the long run, presents the risk of compromising us without compensation.

Our political strategy therefore has the essential aim, if not the sole one, of ensuring the independence of the country and the liberty and life of its citizens. Defense of the continental national territory, where the totality of our "vital interests" lies, should therefore be the object of nearly all

our concerns in the matter of defense and should constitute the principal mission, and almost the sole one, of our armed forces.

Our military strategy should therefore be strictly defensive and conceived in function of defense of continental France.

This defense rests on deterrence. At the limit, it could be ensured solely by our strategic nuclear force, the use of which does not enter into the present discussion. In all cases, it can be credible only if it is subtended by the clearly expressed will of the chief of state and, behind him, the entire people, to defend ourselves and use our nuclear weapons against any aggression. Popular deterrence is therefore indispensable to the credibility of nuclear deterrence. Furthermore, it constitutes a deterrence in itself. The French people should therefore be sufficiently instructed about the threats to which they are subject in order to support fully the eventual decision by the chief of state. And the best way of obtaining their support is certainly to get them to participate directly and physically in defense.

Thus does one have a popular defense. Such defense is indispensable, for quite obviously, the hypothesis of failure of deterrence, no matter how real and well-managed it might be, cannot be ruled out. In such case, our defense must be ready. The nation under arms that was the guarantee of nuclear deterrence, and a deterrence in itself, then becomes the instrument of defense. The strategic weapons become the weapons of massive reprisal; they destroy a part of the aggressor's warmaking potential.

If he continues his attack, though....

It is known fairly well how the enemy offensive would develop in the most unfavorable case.

It has to be postulated that the invader would use atomic weapons. They should be weapons of limited power, so as not to destroy totally the desired objective. If it were totally destroyed, conquest of it would make no sense. In any case, if our country were totally destroyed, there would no longer be any question of its defense. Study of its defense can be continued only on the hypothesis that the destruction is limited--the limit being, for that matter, impossible to define, but, reasonably, such that installations and people could be available again after a few months.

In the conventional domain, the most probable and most dangerous enemy is mainly armored, mechanized, airborne, air and naval. He has prepared his battle corps in such a way as to be capable of hitting as fast as possible despite the obstacles--watercourses in particular--at night as well as in daytime. His armored and "motorized"--i.e., mechanized--divisions would rush into the breaches made by the nuclear strikes. He would transport important elements by air to various points on our territory. It may be thought that his navy would make landings on our coasts. His air forces would ensure mastery of the air, to take action at any time or place against strategic objectives or in support of troops on the ground. The pace of the attack, made by surprise, could approach 100 kilometers per day in daytime, at least in the beginning, from the first breakthrough.

The chemical and biological threat--weapons that the adversary will not hesitate to employ--must also be taken into account.

In the face of this enemy, our strategy should naturally make use of our advantages and counter his. The key idea would be not to make the misconception of going along with his desires and accepting his war--i.e., the confrontation of mechanized masses, but, on the contrary, of imposing our war on him--warfare conceived in function of our means, which are of quite a different kind from his.

A defensive strategy entails disadvantages, to be sure. The main one is that of having to accept war on one's territory; the second is having to suffer the enemy's initiative, at least at the beginning, for the situation can evolve fast in this regard. It also entails some major advantages, which must be seized and exploited in the best way possible. The two most important ones appear to be terrain and numbers. Use of them should inspire all of our defense.

Fighting on one's own terrain gives the advantage of knowing it perfectly and the possibility of organizing it at one's leisure before combat--i.e., in peacetime--which, from the angle of the war envisioned, is essential. Finally, numbers can always work in favor of the side attacked. The invader can align only one relatively limited battle corps. The side attacked can draw an almost unlimited number of defenders from among its population. It is still necessary, though, in order for them to have combat value, for them to be animated by the spirit of defense, organized in advance, equipped with weapons and instructed in the tactics appropriate to their mission.

Strong in these common-sense principles, we would therefore reject the battle that the adversary has prepared. We would engage him in an infinite number of battles in which we would strive to exploit all our advantages.

Against the atomic threat, there is only one response, so long as we have not found a means for destroying missiles in flight: digging in. The country's vital organisms, such as nuclear power plants, should be buried at the time of their construction. The entire population, whose national defense has the aim of "ensuring their life," per the terms of the ordinance of 7 January 1959, should have shelters available in which it could survive for several days. Underground combat positions should also be prepared throughout the entire national territory. This is not a time for throwing out the Maginot line but rather for reactivating it and extending it. This digging-in is also the passive aspect of reply to the threat from the air in general and a protection against the chemical threat. Then, as hostilities are prolonged, the friend-enemy imbrication becomes the best protection against the atomic, chemical and biological dangers.

The conventional threat on land is represented by a battle corps entirely covered by armor. Our response would therefore have to be an antitank one above all. In this regard, the axiom that the best antitank weapon is the tank must be abandoned. Even if that axiom were technically true, which remains to be demonstrated, use of the tank solely as an antitank weapon is,

since in the present hypothesis we reject armored battle, entirely prohibitive, in view of its cost/effectiveness ratio. On the other hand, our technology has developed some excellent antitank weapons of nearly absolute effectiveness and of relatively very low cost. They would doubtlessly be even better and less expensive if they had been given priority, as common sense would have dictated. But in view of the slow pace of placement in service of those whose prototypes have existed for such a long time, it is obvious that they have been considered with reticence; the attraction of armor is still being exerted, to the point of making us destroy our infantry before the combat. The advantage of the antitank missiles should not be distorted by mounting them on expensive tanks or helicopters. Their rightful use is to be fired from a camouflaged hole and transported on a man's back, on a bicycle, a mule, a 2CV, etc. As an essential weapon for the combatant, one that should be constantly improved, it should saturate the battlefield--that is, the entire country. Just consider that the theoretical effectiveness of a tank against another tank can be, mathematically, only 50 percent, other things being equal, whereas that of a missile is something like 90 percent!

The so-called "neutron" nuclear weapon should be used if its cost/effectiveness ratio proves acceptable. In view of its nature, it could be equipped with an elaborate environment: target-acquisition system, transport by helicopter or appropriate artillery in small, precise tactical charges onto sizable concentrations of enemy armor.

The threat is also from the air. In addition to passive digging-in, the response should be furnished by the most effective antiaircraft weapons, essentially missiles, which have long been neglected and on which our scientific and technical research should make an all-out effort.

The threat is everywhere, from all directions. This means that defense must be organized on all our land and sea borders and throughout the territory, in anticipation of airborne and naval landings and breakthroughs by mechanized columns. In order to hold all these positions, a massive mobilization is obviously indispensable.

II. Possible Design of a Defense Organization

What type of organization of defense do the above-stated principles demand? Let us present a possible design.

Founding our defense on deterrence, we will have to improve our strike force constantly, without building it up out of proportion, until we find a more radical and more subtle deterrence--chemical, for example--that affects the adversary's very will to fight; and that type of weapon becomes, at the limit, a procedure for disarmament, and the only realistic one. With rejection of battle, a useless and expensive battle corps will gradually be abandoned.

Ready to fight on all fronts, we will have to organize all our borders. Coastal defense, extension of the surveillance of the 200 miles of our maritime economic zone, will rest essentially on small submarines and ultrafast torpedo-launching or missile-launching patrol boats, to the exclusion of big ships that are useless for this mission and very expensive.

Forewarned of the possibility of airborne and armored action against any point of the national territory whatsoever, we would prepare a defense of the totality of the territory. Its passive component, which would come under a specific organism, would consist of underground shelters in which the means for national survival would be permanently installed; in the event of crisis, the command and logistics would go into them, and during alerts, the population and certain troops would take shelter in them.

The active defense would be founded on a mass army raised by mobilization. At least a tenth of the population could be armed, while a large part of the rest would receive a defense assignment. Mobilization should be almost immediate--that is, the combatants should be mobilized on the spot, in their town, their arrondissement. They should have their clothing, bedroll and equipment at home. They should receive training constantly.

This strategic concept entails a very different national-service system from what we are doing now--or from what we are going to do.

The system recommended would be divided into active service and service in the reserves. Service would be really universal, taking in all young people, men and women, without exemptions. Medical exemptions would be limited to extreme cases. The least strong and the conscientious objectors would be assigned to an auxiliary service.

The service would be done at the time of the legal cut-off age provided for in education only--that is, at the end of obligatory studies, at the age of 16, for which age the physical-exercises norm would be established, without difficulty. It would last for about one school year. It might not be exclusively military, or be in the charge of the armed forces only; it could have an important part in physical, moral and civic education, with training and civic-information courses on farms, in factories, offices, perhaps in big construction projects. It could also be shorter. Its military part would be devoted entirely to instruction, with the recruit not assigned to an operational unit at any time. It would be strictly regional service, performed in the recruit's city or canton, and as much as possible, in the school form of a semi-boarding school, possibly a day-school. It would not be paid. The infrastructure needs and the operating costs would thus be reduced to the useful minimum, mainly munitions.

The draftee's military instruction would be provided by career personnel, who would also be the mobilizing organ and the regular-army nucleus at the time of mobilization. After their active service, the young people would be recalled for several years, at least once a year for 2 or 3 weeks for periods of training and maneuvers in units--operational ones this time--on the very terrain where they would have to fight. The basic units would be local battalions or regiments intended to be used on the spot within the framework of their town, arrondissement, canton, village, etc--at the most remote, their department. Regional reserve units intended for action within the bounds of the theater of operations would be the exception.

Service, training and then combat in Paris and the big cities raise special problems that need to be studied with great care--all the more so in that

battle would be concentrated in them, which would enable us to make maximum use of our advantages (knowledge of the ground and large battalions), ensuring the greatest possible security to us because of the friend-enemy imbrication and causing the adversary the greatest difficulty in deployment of his forces.

Resistance warfare would begin at the points of enemy breakthroughs, then would continue throughout the extent of the country invaded, in the most decentralized way possible, without any spirit of submission.

No battle, but an infinity of combats. Guerrilla warfare, if one likes, but well thought-out, organized, conducted by regular troops, specially trained and prepared. Not an improvised maquis operation, episodic, armed at random and only becoming effective later on; rather, warfare conducted within the appropriate structures and with the appropriate weapons, which might be very elementary or very elaborate, depending on the needs. Within the framework of a defensive strategy, a constantly offensive tactic that keeps the initiative, makes strong surprise attacks against weak positions, rejects uncertain combat, harasses the enemy, prevents him from concentrating his forces usefully, denies him objectives proportionate to his most highly perfected massive means, yields ground to him when there is no means of doing otherwise and without suffering excessive losses, and seeks not to halt him but rather to destroy him piece by piece, materially and, especially, morally. Recent history demonstrates quite well that this is not fiction.

In the present circumstances, we cannot do entirely without an intervention force. In all cases, moreover, it seems advisable for the government to have a general reserve force available in addition to the Gendarmerie, on condition that it be suited to its possible missions and proportionate to our means.

In practice, the organization of French defense could take the following design:

--Command--a ministry composed essentially of the following major directorates: organization, control, plans, national intelligence, mobilization of the country, civil defense, armaments, general staff;

--Forces, articulated as follows:

1. a strategic-deterrence and reprisal force;
2. a small interbranch intervention force;
3. a defense infrastructure managed by career military personnel: antiaircraft alert and defense; fortifications of land and maritime borders; naval coastal defense; defensive organizations put underground; underground depots of munitions, foodstuffs, fuels, various materiel; medical corps; territorial command and regular-army core units responsible for instruction, mobilization and officering of the defense force;
4. an armed defense force of territorial mass, composed of reservists officered by professionals, organized in very flexible and extensible units corresponding to the territorial organization.

It remains to give figures for what is proposed. By its nature, it should not exceed the cost of the system currently in force. It should even be considerably more economical, for the new expenditures that it entails would be largely compensated for by the economies achieved by abandoning the present system of national service and the expensive materiel not adopted: nuclear artillery more dangerous for the populations than for the enemy, heavy ships busied mainly about their own survival, the greater part of the bombers and tanks, perhaps the piloted interception aircraft.

Its cost would be more on the psychological and intellectual levels. And here, it must be recognized that it is high. The French as a whole, and on a good many levels, are not ready to participate in such a defense. But are the majority of them prepared to really fight in other conditions? If the spirit of defense is not sufficiently developed in our country, our responsible authorities, instead of just deploring the situation, have, on the contrary, the duty--as they formerly had, and apparently fulfilled poorly in the 1930's--to prepare the French in all areas for taking on their defense totally, showing them that it involves their survival as a people and as free men.

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RAMUSINO'S REPORT ON 'EUROMISSILES, COMPREHENSIVE DETERRENT'

Rome RINASCITA in Italian 24 Jun 83 pp 25-27

[Text] Editor's Note. The biased use of data and evaluations to justify the reestablishment of parity through the installation of new weapons systems. What can the answer be to certain NATO schemes? The impossibility of limiting a nuclear conflict renders the strategy of flexible response and "comprehensive deterrent" meaningless. Political tensions and repercussions within the Atlantic Alliance. The catastrophic risks of the armaments race of the superpowers.

We publish extensive excerpts from the report given at the International Conference on the Dangers of Nuclear War and on Disarmament (Bologna 16-18 June 1983) on the subject "Euromissiles and Comprehensive Deterrent" by Professor Paolo Cotta Ramusino of the Institute of Physics of the University of Milan and a member of the Union of Scientists for Disarmament.

Why "No" to Euromissiles

In December 1979 the Defense and Foreign Ministers of the NATO countries decided to set in motion a "modernization" program for the nuclear weapons in the European Theater.

This modernization consists of the installation of 464 surface-to-surface Cruise missiles and the replacement of 108 Pershing I missiles with an equal number of Pershing II's.

The goals which NATO is aiming to achieve with this modernization are: 1) to oppose the modernization of the Soviet forces in the Theater and thus reestablish the parity which, according to NATO, had been lost with the installation of the Soviet SS20's; 2) to reinforce the so-called "comprehensive deterrent." By comprehensive deterrent is meant the capability of a superpower (in this case, the United States) to establish a deterrent sufficient to prevent attacks not only against its own territory, but against attacks on the territory of allies (in this case, Western Europe); 3) to show the political cohesion of NATO; 4) to have "trump cards" to use advantageously in negotiating the armaments control on a European "theater" level with the Soviet Union.

Let us examine these subjects one at a time, beginning with the subject of the reestablishment of parity. Let us begin with the question: How can it be determined, in general, whether or not parity exists between the two pacts? What is usually done is to identify some parameters, such as the number of warheads, the number of launch systems, etc.; to establish some allocations (such as theater weapons, strategic weapons, weapons launched from land-based ballistic missiles as opposed to weapons launched by other systems, etc.) and to proceed in making a comparison. It is evident, however, that, if the chosen parameters and allocations are changed, the result of the comparison between the two pacts changes considerably.

Let us take the number of nuclear weapons in Europe, for example. If we consider all the nuclear weapons assigned to the European Theater, we find that NATO has at its disposal more than 7,000 warheads (including the bombs on the Poseidon SLBM [Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile] assigned to NATO-SACEUR, the French and British warheads and the tactical nuclear warheads). When it comes to the Soviet Union, it is difficult to verify what types of nuclear weapon are assigned to the European Theater; however, reasonable estimates give a picture which indicates a substantial numerical parity between NATO and the Warsaw Pact nations.

The situation changes drastically if tactical (battlefield) weapons and weapons carried by short-range missiles and aircraft are excluded from the NATO and Soviet nuclear weapons assigned to the European Theater. Then, the Soviet position appears to be by far the dominant one. The situation changes again (in the opposite direction) if strategic weapons are included in the nuclear weapons assigned to the European Theater. And, in view of the often asserted fact that American strategic forces are to remain attached to the NATO forces in Europe, it is not unreasonable to maintain that the count of the weapons systems must be made on a global level.

It is then clear that the choice of considering only certain weapons systems and not others, the choice of some parameters useful in establishing the comparison between the two pacts, should be justified in a convincing and the least subjective way possible. On the contrary, during the entire debate on the Euromissiles, many politicians, and above all many Italian politicians, have given the impression that the criteria in determining the comparison between the military potential of the two pacts had been chosen "ad hoc," in order to justify the decisions already reached at NATO level, presenting falsely simplistic and "convincing" arguments to the public. We have thus seen officials and the mass media present to us, repeatedly and with disconcerting monotony, a chart showing, on one side (that of the USA), zero missiles and on the other side (USSR), many missiles. Very rarely was an attempt made to explain why, in view of the fact that such a chart could have been made in 1965, NATO had waited until 1979, after the installation of the SS20's, to decide to equip itself with long-range Theater missiles

or why the other weapons assigned to the European Theater should not be included in the "chart." (Since 1965, when the last medium-range, ground-based American missiles had been dismantled, the USSR has a virtual monopoly on such weapons systems).

It is clear that the choice of considering only certain weapons systems and not others and the choice of using certain criteria in establishing the comparison between the two pacts should instead be justified by more substantive military arguments. They should, for example, explain the relevance (or presumed relevance) of certain weapons systems in the dynamics of an exchange of nuclear warheads, that is, in the dynamics of a conflict. We face then this kind of rapport. The flexible response strategy of NATO foresees that NATO will be in a position to face all types of enemy attack in such a way as to: a) repel the attack on the level chosen by the attacker; b) make it clear to the enemy that any possible escalation would encounter in NATO an equal level of determination, and, therefore, c) end the conflict on conditions favorable to NATO.

The flexible response strategy requires, therefore, that NATO not be inferior to the Warsaw Pact in any category of nuclear weapons; that is, it requires parity, if not superiority, along the entire spectrum of nuclear armaments. Not only numerical parity (or superiority): the NATO weapons must be sufficiently flexible in order to be able to perform a wide range of missions and they must certainly be, qualitatively, not inferior to the Warsaw Pact weapons. Thus, from the point of view of NATO strategy, the need to oppose the greater counterforce capability of the Theater's Soviet forces (the SS20's, as a matter of fact) is explained. By counterforce capability we mean the capability of using nuclear weapons to destroy military objectives (possibly reinforced) and not only civilian ones. As is known, the counterforce capability of the SS20's is enormously superior to that of their predecessors, the SS4's and SS5's, because the SS20's are more accurate and have three warheads instead of one.

The problem with the flexible response strategy is the fact that it assumes that, in some way, the nuclear conflict will be kept limited. The impossibility of keeping a nuclear conflict limited would render useless, from a strictly military point of view, for NATO (or for the Warsaw Pact), the enormous effort being made to balance at all levels the nuclear weapons systems of the opposing side. If a nuclear war cannot be limited and, therefore, cannot be fought as wars have been fought heretofore, that is, bearing in mind political objectives which are somewhat different from those of complete and mutual annihilation, then it is probably wiser, from a purely military point of view, to have a reduced nuclear deterrent potential (sufficient deterrent, as has often been mentioned) and it does not make any sense to seek to acquire always greater counterforce capabilities for the impossible purpose of

forcing, in the case of a confrontation, the enemy to interrupt hostilities, prior to total destruction. If a nuclear war cannot be kept limited, it does not make any sense to pretend to compensate for, as NATO has done, real or presumed inferiorities in the area of conventional armaments in Europe with tactical nuclear weapons or generally of Theater capability. After all, a nuclear war cannot be limited, the military reasons for the installation of Euromissiles become largely irrelevant.

Now, it is certain that in a nuclear war there are less foreseeable things than unforeseeable: One thing that can be reasonably asserted is that it is extremely difficult that a nuclear war can remain limited. There are various reasons for this: It is practically impossible to limit the damages to the civilian population in any nuclear confrontation. A recent estimate of Arkin-Levi-Von Hippel on a "limited" war in Germany foresees the number of dead in the order of 10 million, the famous 1955 military operation, "Carte Blanche," which forecast the explosion of 335 tactical nuclear weapons in Germany, also forecast the death of 1.7 million civilians and the injuring of 3.5 million. Estimates of the Office of Technology Assessment foresee millions killed by various types of limited nuclear attacks, which are not actually directed against the civilian population. It is obvious that the millions killed would not be conducive to establishing that climate of "collaboration" between the two warring pacts, which is indispensable in order to avoid an uncontrolled escalation of the conflict.

In addition to these considerations, the Soviet Union has always rejected the possibility of collaborating in keeping a nuclear conflict limited; the fact that collaboration in a nuclear conflict in actuality involves, at some given point during the conflict, the refusal by the losing side to use more violent means, which, however, could be viewed as an instrument capable of reversing the situation. Finally, a nuclear war is an extremely complex operation where operations take place at an extremely fast rate, where command, control and communications systems must operate in an extremely disturbed environment (where nuclear explosions are occurring, as a matter of fact), which would place their functioning in crisis. It therefore becomes difficult to imagine the management of belligerent activities in a nuclear conflict being coordinated by the two belligerent parties in a nuclear conflict.

Hence, the few forecasts we can make on the dynamics of a nuclear conflict lead to the belief that the will of each of the two superpowers to catch up, and possibly to overtake the other, in all categories of arms and to acquire an always greater counterforce capability is not justified, on a strictly military level. It is difficult, therefore, to find a military reason in the desire of NATO to reestablish parity between the forces of the European Theater in the intermediate range. The second reason for the 1979 decision is the need to reinforce the comprehensive deterrent.

With regard to the comprehensive deterrent, there are those who believe that the introduction of the new NATO Euromissiles would strengthen the deterrent because, according to the strategy of flexible response, a new rung would be inserted in the escalation ladder. In essence, it is maintained that, in the face of a Soviet attack, the Euromissiles will allow the delay of the use of the strategic forces, allowing NATO a greater possibility to respond to the enemy in a flexible manner. Others sustain, with opposing arguments, that the introduction of the Euromissiles would strengthen the comprehensive deterrent because the use of American missiles against the territory of the USSR would immediately unleash a Soviet reaction against the USA and would thus bring on total war. In essence, according to them, the Euromissiles would be a kind of insurance policy against the possibility of a nuclear war "limited to Europe."

Thus, we have two completely opposed points of view which justify, however, the same choice. Actually, what transpires is that the theory itself of the comprehensive deterrent has a limited credibility. Those who maintain that the deterrent (comprehensive or not) is strengthened, increasing NATO's capability to deliver a flexible response must take into account the credibility problems of the flexible response. However, those who maintain that the Euromissiles are useful in averting the possibility of a limited nuclear war in Europe must consider a situation of this kind: Let us imagine the hypothetical situation where a confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact is taking place or is about to take place in Europe and let us suppose that the United States is attempting to confine the conflict to Europe as much as possible. This premise is being considered only because it forms the basis of the reasoning of those who wish to strengthen the comprehensive deterrent as a guarantee against the threat of a limited war in Europe. To do so, the Americans believe that they will not use the Euromissiles because their use would unleash the reaction of the Soviet strategic forces. On the contrary, the Europeans would like to use, or threaten to use, the Euromissiles. The dilemma is soon resolved because the control of the nuclear warheads is in the hands of the Americans. Then, who is the one who must exclude the possibility of a limited war in Europe? Where is the credibility of the comprehensive deterrent? One could argue (and with good reason, probably) that, in any case, it is impossible to think of limiting a war to Europe (we are talking not of a war limited to damages to the civilian population, but of a general war in Europe which would be a limited war, in a geographical sense, for the USA and the USSR).

Well, if a conflict cannot be limited to Europe alone, then what reason is there to talk about a comprehensive deterrent? This would be automatic, so to speak. It must be said that the entire history, not altogether brief, of NATO has been characterized by debates on subjects of this type. It has never been possible (it is obvious) to find a system that would protect or satisfy everyone.

To consider the Euromissiles as an instrument to strengthen the comprehensive deterrent is a non-solution to an old problem. And how old this problem is becomes evident if one skims through the articles written on the problems of NATO, beginning in the 50's. One will often find the cyclical presentation of subjects previously discussed and on the theme: Will NATO be able to survive until the end of the century? The conclusion we can reach from the considerations arrived at so far, is that the installation of the NATO Euromissiles has no specific military significance whatsoever in the sense that the new Euromissiles do not give NATO the capability to resist a Soviet attack more effectively and do not reinforce NATO's deterrent potential.

Thus, we arrive at the third reason for the installation of the Euromissiles: The need to demonstrate the political cohesion of NATO.

Robert McNamara said recently that there is no justifiable use of nuclear weapons in any situation; they only serve to guarantee the deterrent. It is certainly true that nuclear weapons cannot be used militarily and, as we have seen, the Euromissiles are no exception. It is, however, equally true that the nuclear weapons have an important political significance. They represent strength, prestige; they are an important instrument for the intimidation of adversaries and allies. The role of nuclear weapons as instruments of international policy is still conditioned somewhat by their apparent military significance. The paradox is exactly this: For nuclear weapons to have credibility on a political level they must be somehow justified as military instruments.

Finally, it must be observed that if NATO, in the 1979 decision, had the intention of showing a greater political cohesion, it certainly has not brought about particularly brilliant results. As we all know, the December 1979 decision has generated a strong wave of protests all over Europe and has thus shown that the installation of the new missiles, instead of strengthening the political prestige of NATO, increases its internal dissensions.

The fourth reason for the installation of the NATO Euromissiles is that of the need to have "exchange currency" to conduct, in an advantageous manner, the arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union on a European level. The history of the arms race shows that the so-called "exchange currency" has a tendency of becoming weapons systems permanently installed. Already installed weapons systems are almost never dismantled as a result of negotiations; the introduction of new weapons systems is never conducive to calm council with the opponent; on the contrary, it creates the phenomenon of immediate reaction.

LABOR PARTY YOUTH WING CHAIRMAN: CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE USEFUL

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 20 Jul 83 p 3

[Article: "AUF: Civil Disobedience to Stop Missiles"]

[Text] The Labor Party Youth Organization [AUF] is ready to support different forms of civil disobedience to prevent the deployment of new nuclear missiles in Europe, said AUF chairman Egil Knudsen in his opening speech at the organization's summer camp on Utoya yesterday. He said that several of AUF's sister organizations in the countries which will have missiles will consider the use of civil disobedience if the politicians and the military press through the deployment despite the popular majority.

AUF's leader also repeated his criticism of party members who support a limited deployment of new nuclear weapons in West Europe. "The Labor Party's national congress has clearly made demands on the ongoing negotiations. Reductions in the East and no deployments in the West is the clear position of the national congress. AUF will fight for that position, and will oppose any solution which includes the deployment of new missiles," said Knudsen.

On a possible intermediate agreement, Knudsen said that a reduction of the number of SS-20 missiles to 75 would be excellent.

"But it is inconceivable that people who have supported the Labor Party's missile position will agree to a further Western deployment despite such a significant Soviet reduction," said the AUF leader.

Otherwise Knudsen concentrated his attention on the employment situation, among others.

"The solid input made by counties nationwide to create more student jobs is being completely undermined by the catastrophic Conservative employment policy. It probably exceeded Willoch's most optimistic expectations that the spokesmen for the middle parties so quickly forgot their own party programs, and instead acted like Conservatives," said Knudsen.

"It helps little to create thousands of new school jobs when double that many are sent out to unemployment. Youths in the age group 20-25 are looking for further education as an alternative to unemployment. The younger ones in the age group 16-19 for whom the further education is mainly intended, are losing in the competition and are without places in school," said the AUF chairman.

He also spoke of Johan J. Jakobsen's reaction to the Labor Party's alternative railroad report. "Jakobsen has turned down the report as a high bid policy, although the main points are mostly identical to the Center Party's jobs program. His statement agrees with the Conservative program."

Egil Knudsen also criticized Kare Kristiansen's idea of making the oil company NOROL private. "That idea by the new Minister of Oil and Energy is not included in the Christian People's Party program, but it is a central part of the Conservative Party's," said the AUF leader.

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LABOR PARTY'S FORDE URGES CALM IN PROTESTING EUROMISSILES

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 22 Jul 83 p 3

[Article by Bibi Vance: "Forde Says Actions Against Missile Deployment Are No Solution"]

[Text] "The only solution for all the social democrats in Europe is to take to the streets together with the Christian and peace movements, if missile deployment is pressed forward," said the vice chairman of the Labor Party, Einar Forde, in his speech at the AUF [Labor Party Youth Organization] summer camp on Utoya yesterday. "But if we are forced to take to the streets, we have lost. Taking such actions is not the solution--we must take up the discussion of the medium range missiles," said Forde.

"Street actions will not create any problems for the policy or the military," he said. "We must not choose a form of action which the voters do not understand, we must use all of our forces in this vital issue which demands all of our inputs," said Einar Forde, who said that first there must be a party treatment of the issue, and thereafter a Storting debate on the missile question.

Forde left no doubt that the missile issue is the most important issue for the Labor Party, together with disarmament and other security policies. "Instead of making compromises we can push the issue even harder. But then we will still have a split party. The most important goal is for us to come through this together, and not choose the easiest way, as the government has done. Namely being the European government which follows Reagan the farthest. And which does not express new viewpoints before Reagan has raised them," said Forde.

"In Norway we have a Storting resolution which automatically rejects this. The Labor Party must get together if we do not want the deployment of missiles, and we should put other issues aside. The Labor Party's most important task will be to contribute to the discussion of nuclear weapons in the Storting, and disarmament is the most important political election theme. We must ask all the voters in the middle parties, and not just let the Conservative Party's servile attitude on the missile question dominate and cut

off Starting discussion until we have deployment. There is a specter over Europe, and we feel the gust of wind from this historic specter," said Einar Forde, vice chairman of the Labor Party in his speech at the AUF summer camp on Utoya in Tyrifjord on Thursday.

"In Europe and the United States there are conservative governments, and we do not need to look far into the future before we see that it is part of an international model.

"In Norway some of the social pillars have already been moved, and what will happen if the Conservatives hold office for a longer time? We must therefore win the election in 1985. We must never forget that the election is completely decisive," he said.

"The Conservatives claim that we are on the right track. The biggest proof is supposed to be that price increases have now begun to be less. But anybody can do that if there is a willingness to accept unemployment.

"The point of departure for practical Labor Party policies is therefore that we are on the right track. But on the track toward something which will have social consequences which make many people squirm when thinking about. The most important result of conservative policies is to move welfare from those who have rather little to those who have rather a lot. We can therefore not be satisfied that we are on the right track! It is the wrong answer for you youths. If developments continue, many of you can see a life ahead of you in which you never can expect to get permanent jobs. That will be a rule rather than an exception--as things are going in these European countries which have the specter of the conservative 80's overhead," said Forde.

When Einar Forde, Thorvald Stoltenberg and the entire press corps went from Utoya to the mainland in AUF's old lifeboat "Reiulf," the outboard motor pushed the boat ashore. It grounded so hard that everybody had to get out of the boat, while the vice chairman of AUF and other helpful and laughing AUF members waded into Tyrifjord and pushed "Reiulf" off. The second attempt succeeded, and everyone came safely ashore, where the Lorenskog rescue squad stood on the pier!

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CONSERVATIVE PAPER COMMENTS ON FORDE'S SPEECH ON MISSILES

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 23 Jul 83 p 2

[Editorial: "Timely Warning"]

[Text] Labor Party vice chairman Einar Forde is not one of those who make a habit of being praised in this column. That is perhaps best--both for him and for us. However, that can be a reason to emphasize one of his statements at the AUF's [Labor Party Youth Organization] summer camp the day before yesterday. He warned his party, and especially its youthful adherents, against "choosing a form of action that the voters do not understand." This warning is especially timely since Egil Knudsen, chairman of AUF, previously had decided in favor of the idea of civil disobedience in the struggle against deployment of American medium range missiles in Europe.

Einar Forde also made it clear that the social democratic parties in West Europe have great doubts about carrying out the second part of the dual resolution which both the West German Social Democrats and a government of the Norwegian Labor Party favored in 1979. The doubts are correct. But it is not certain that Forde can back up his claim that deployment will eventually take place contrary to public opinion.

Not much more than one month ago an election was held in Britain. And the Labor Party's brother party there, which should have had an easy contest against the consequences of the Conservative Government's policy of unemployment, suffered a crushing defeat. An important cause for the defeat was probably the defense policy. One can disagree with the outcome, but free elections have the valuable trait of expressing public opinion. The election in West Germany in March, which confirmed the Christian Democrats' position as the leading party and strengthened the foundation of the Kohl Government, points in the same direction.

This is not the same as claiming that deployment of the new medium range missiles is the best thing that could happen in West Europe. The best thing that could happen is that there would be agreement in Geneva so that this deployment would not be necessary. But if there is no agreement, to

refrain from deployment would mean that NATO would come to terms with a Soviet development of strength which far exceeds any reasonable need for defense, and says that is how it is going to be. That also means returning to a resolution which contains an offer of negotiations which the Soviet Union rejected six months ago.

That would be a performance which the Soviet Union would not misunderstand. The men in Moscow will just continue building up their strength without danger of counteractions from the West. The buildup of strength which has taken place and continues to take place can clearly only be seen as having two intentions. It will either be used for a massive military attack against the West, which would be suicidal madness, and nobody believes that the leaders in the Kremlin think this way. Or this military strength is expected to be used for political and military pressure to attain political advantages. That is not only conceivable. It is probable, based on what both Czarist Russia and the Soviet Union have previously demonstrated in their foreign policy behavior. And the differences in social structure and basic values are such that political advantages for the Soviet Union are not advantages for West Europe. So then in the last instance it is not a matter of taking to the streets--whether the incompetent voters would understand it or not.

Otherwise we see, without surprising anyone, that Forde is worried about the conservative wave in West Europe, and that he wanted to give the speech of the year a test before the 1983 election. That conservative wave is certainly not a specter, on the contrary it appears rather close to earth. And compared with most specters, it is not likely to frighten the voters. We believe that it is a problem for the Labor Party. But it was naturally a good try which was made on Utoya this week, both by the Labor Party vice chairman and the chairman of AUF.

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CHRISTIAN PARTY CHAIRMAN ON INTERNAL DIVISIONS ON DEPLOYMENT

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 22 Jul 83 p 3

[Article by Alf B. Godager: "KrF Committee on Disarmament and Security Policy--Bondevik Says Not Moving"]

[Text] "The Christian People's Party [KrF] is not moving on security and disarmament policies. That Norwegian policies in this area are not moving does not mean rejection of conducting a running debate and updating the viewpoints of individual parties. There is nothing in the proposals from the party's committee on disarmament and security policy which should cause anyone any concern, especially among the coalition parties." It was the party chairman, Minister Kjell Magne Bondevik who said that when the committee's recommendations were presented at a press conference yesterday.

As reported in yesterday's evening edition, the committee was divided on two points. One was the position on what signals should be given to the West's continued negotiating if no agreement is reached in the missile negotiations this year. And the other was the so-called first use of nuclear weapons. The committee was unanimously positive toward the idea of the American "freeze" movement for a ceiling on nuclear weapon arsenals as the first step toward disarmament. In the next phase the freeze must create a basis for negotiations on reductions. The committee is positive toward a 300 km wide nuclear weapon-free zone in central Europe. That means there can also be a nuclear weapon-free zone in the Nordic countries. The Nordic countries must obligate themselves not to use, station or produce nuclear weapons. The nuclear powers must guarantee that they will not use nuclear weapons against the zone countries. The Soviet Union must remove all nuclear weapons which can be used against the zone.

At the press conference the first vice chairman, Storting representative Jakob Aano, complained that the words supporting the freeze were not clear. Bondevik emphasized that first there must be a balance before there can be a real freeze. Aano agreed with that.

At the press conference it was stated that the majority in the committee believes that a first use of nuclear weapons can take place if one side becomes too superior in a conventional war. A statement that both sides will not use nuclear weapons first is therefore of limited value without a reasonable balance in conventional forces.

The majority also believes that the goal of the current negotiations on medium range missiles must be a result which will make it unnecessary for the West to go to deployment. If such a result can not be reached this year, there should be an effort toward a balanced result which can protect the interests of all sides through the lowest possible strength level.

At the press conference Bondevik said he agrees with the committee majority on both points. He emphasized that the recommendations do not come from the party leadership, and they represent the views of the committee and not the party. He said that the recommendations now go to a hearing in the party organization, and it is necessary that there be more debate on these questions in the KrF.

Minister Asbjorn Haugstvedt, who was chairman of the committee, did not participate in the final work this spring. Neither did his government colleague, Kare Kristiansen. The final phase was therefore led by Jakob Aano. Bondevik did not participate in the committee. The initiative for the investigation was taken by the national congress 2 years ago.

"The balance of terror can not be a final solution. It is therefore necessary to work further for reduction of tensions, disarmament and peace," said Aano. He said that the committee believes that Norway should still have conventional defenses, and that NATO membership should continue. "The only security against the use of nuclear weapons is preventing a war from breaking out."

"It is not a great problem that there is a majority and a minority in the committee," said Bondevik. He found that there were no more defectors in the Storting group when deployment was to be discussed. And he said that there is nobody who wants to prevent the elected representatives from debating deployment in the fall. The aim of saying no to continuous debating and voting in the Storting has been to prevent the Soviet Union from drawing the wrong conclusion that strong Western pressure for a negotiated settlement is weakened by the opponents."

Bondevik said that peace, defense and security questions must be included in school education, but said that there is no basis for our own peace movement. Both the two KrF leaders were critical of the approval in the congress of the appropriation for production of the MX missile.

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ANALYSIS, FUTURE OF NATIONAL FUEL PRICES

Lisbon TEMPO ECONOMICO in Portuguese 7 Jul 83 pp 1, 11

[Article by Horacio Piriquito: "Fuels--Burning up the Consumer"]

[Excerpts] "We cannot continue to put up with increases of this kind," said Professor Veiga Simao, minister of industry, when he announced a new rise in fuel prices--the second one this year--on television.

The recent devaluation of the escudo, the prolonged drought, and the need to continue to channel fuel earnings to the Supply Fund (whose liabilities at the end of 1982 came to 126 million contos) might justify this deterioration which once again made Portugal the record holder in the price on "super" gasoline in the Old World.

In these times of trouble, the minister however did point to a ray of hope: "We are going to institute a new energy management policy in an effort to establish a relationship between fuel prices and the cost of the factors involved which is why they must be updated at the proper time, avoiding abrupt increases which are increasingly difficult to take."

According to Veiga Simao, we will move progressively toward the elimination of the subsidy for city gas and other gas fuels so that all consumers will have to bear identical costs for the same service received.

In the near future, the price of gas-oil will be quite close to the price of gasoline and that, by the way, was also the intention of the last two administrations. We will thus eliminate the special tax on vehicles of this type, making it possible to arrive at a strict quantitative determination of the subsidies to be allocated to agriculture, fishing, and mass transportation.

The rise in fuel prices had been reported in all newspapers since Wednesday of last week according to what they called absolutely confirmed and reliable sources. While it is true that many mass communications organs were just probing around in the dark, following the others, it is also true that news from those "others" had minimum foundation. Veiga Simao confirmed that on Saturday on the television screens as Ernani Lopes had done on the occasion of the devaluation of the escudo; just the same, both were topped by information leaks.

Statistics and Intentions

"Super" gasoline is today 700 percent more expensive than it was on 25 April 1974 whereas gas-oil now commands a price that is 1,000 percent higher than it was at that time.

City gas went up 32 percent (about 4 escudos) compared to its last price now, which is 165.0, as against 12.50 in the past.

According to statements made by Veiga Simao to RTP [Portuguese Radio-Television System], about 80 percent of the energy the country consumes is derived from petroleum. "Last year we imported 240 million contos worth of petroleum, petroleum products, and electric energy." The directorate-general of energy in turn disclosed that we imported 206 million contos worth in petroleum products alone whereas exports did not exceed 18 million. The petroleum balance sheet thus shows a deficit of 188 million contos and that signifies a budget deficit of 54 percent.

In the meantime, the current pattern of subsidies for gas-oil prices, in which the last administration became involved recently was temporary even at that point in time.

Continuing the intentions of the prior administration, the executive branch and Mario Soares intends to implement the so-called "green gas-oil," exclusively for agricultural and fishing activities. There is every indication that "green gas-oil" can "become functional" at the start of next year. The new colored gas-oil will naturally sell at a lower price than ordinary gas-oil and will easily be spotted by virtue of its color if it were to be used in vehicles or machinery not covered by the law on its utilization.

We all know and we feel that we cannot continue with increases of that kind. Now, what options will the future bring? Either the increases will be less "aggressive" and more frequent or--at best--there will be a drop in petroleum prices, along with a check on the accumulated shortages of the Supply Fund, and, we believe, a substantial improvement in the country's economic and financial situation, meaning that prices will be frozen and, perhaps platonically, giving us a price of 84 escudos per liter of gasoline which today is simply too much for the consumer's pocketbook although it has for quite some time become a regular expenditure and nobody says much about it any more even though it is a big item in family spending.

(1) PRODUTOS	(2) PREÇOS (5)	(3) VARIACÕES		
(4)	Anterior	Actual	Esc.	%
Gasolina super (6).....	74.00	84.00	10.00	14
Gasolina normal (7).....	70.00	81.00	11.00	16
Petróleo iluminante (8).....	40.00	46.00	6.00	15
Petróleo carburante (9).....	41.00	47.00	6.00	15
Gasóleo (10).....	40.00	46.00	6.00	15
Fuel-óleo, 1% (11).....	19.00	21.00	2.00	11
Fuel-óleo, 3,5% (12).....	17.50	19.50	2.00	11
Fuel-óleo, a 1% p/ EDP (13).....	17.00	19.00	2.00	12
Gás butano, em garrafas no revendedor (14).....	39.00	49.00	10.00	26
Gás propano, em garrafas, no revendedor (15).....	40.00	49.50	10.00	25
Gás butano, em garrafas, no consumidor (16).....	40.30	50.50	10.20	25
Gás em garrafas no consumidor (17).....	41.50	51.00	9.50	23
Gás canalizado, garrafas (18).....	41.50	51.00	9.50	23
Gás canalizado, granel (19).....	41.50	51.00	9.50	23
Gás butano, a granel (20).....	39.00	45.00	6.00	15
Gás propano, a granel (21).....	39.00	45.00	6.00	15
Gás de cidade (22).....	12.50	16.50	4.00	32
Subsi. gás agric. (23).....	5.00	9.50	4.50	

Nota: (percentagens arredondadas).

Nota: (percentagens arredondadas).

Key: 1--Products; 2--Prices; 3--Variations; 4--Prior; 5--Current; 6--Super Gasoline; 7--Regular Gasoline; 8--Petroleum for Lighting Purposes; 9--Petroleum for Fuel Purposes; 10--Gas-Oil; 11--1-Percent Fuel-Oil; 12--3.5-Percent Fuel-Oil; 13--1-Percent pl Fuel Oil, EDP [Portuguese Electric Power Company]; 14--Butane Gas, in Bottles, Retailer; 15--Propane Gas, in Bottles, Retailer; 16--Butane Gas, in Bottles, Consumer; 17--Gas in Bottles, Consumer; 18--Piped Gas, Bottles; 19--Piped Gas, Bulk; 20--Butane Gas, Bulk; 21--Propane Gas, Bulk; 22--City Gas; 23--Subsidy for Agricultural Gas. Note: Percentages were rounded off.

5058

CSO: 3542/169

ALTERNATIVE ENERGY SOURCES STUDIED BY EASA

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 22 Jun 83 p 3

[Text] Ankara, Special -- Our country is said to have a solar energy potential equal to 66 percent of total Turkish energy consumption. The Turkish Electric Power Enterprise's Electric Affairs Study Administration (EASA) has compiled a data bank for use in projecting possibilities for taking advantage of solar energy.

Studies being conducted on new and renewable energy sources are projected on the basis of short-term and long-term utilization, according to information obtained from EASA authorities. Authorities say they are doing studies on local sources in an effort to overcome the energy shortage experienced by our country, concentrating on wind energy as well as solar energy.

The EASA reports reads as follows as regards solar energy:

"Eighty percent of the surface area of our country receives sunshine for between 2,400 and 3,100 hours. The fact that our country has a sunshine potential in excess of the 2,000 hours needed for economic utilization of solar energy raises the importance of solar energy. Our country's solar energy potential is estimated at 36 million usable 'TET' annually. That means 66 percent of our present annual energy consumption. The Solar Energy Data Bank has been compiled on the basis of measurements taken over many years for this purpose.

"Short- and long-term solar energy studies are planned, concentrating on such topics as passive and active home heating, solar homes, greenhouses, food drying, solar ponds and solar cells."

Wind Energy

The EASA report targets the shores of the eastern Mediterranean, the Black Sea and the Aegean as the most suitable locations for the building of wind-generated power plants, which is possible in 25 percent of our country. It also says that the building phase for solar cells and wind generators is at hand.

EEC CONNECTION, MEDITERRANEAN POLICY DISCUSSED

Measures Advocated

Nicosia I SIMERINI in Greek 3 Jul 83 p 9

/Editorial: "Cyprus and the EEC"/

/Excerpts/ We recently received the visit of Lorenzo Natali, vice president of the European Communities Committee. The purpose of the visit was to discuss the possibility of having a Mediterranean policy implemented by the EEC, part of which deals with consolidating closer ties between Mediterranean countries and community states.

Without disputing the significance of this action for the economic, political and social cooperation and development of the interested countries in the future, Cyprus today is in a disadvantageous position in its relations with the EEC.

The cause is the delay being noted in Cyprus' reaching the second and more important stage of the agreement of association with the EEC that leads to a customs union. Because of the delay our exports are being hurt, particularly our agricultural products, with the result that serious difficulties have cropped up over the disposal of basic agricultural products, while our agriculture too is being negatively influenced.

As in every economy, Cyprus' agriculture constitutes a very basic and also a sensitive production sector.

While prior to 1974 Cyprus was considered a purely agricultural country, because of the loss of large agricultural areas and the trend toward an expanding industrial policy, agriculture has lost its pre-eminence in the Cypriot economy.

Despite all of this, however, agriculture and the exports of agricultural products continue to constitute a basic aspect in our economy and for that reason the stagnation in our relations with the EEC constitutes a restraining factor. If we do not break this stagnation the situation will be aggravated even further with the future entry of Spain and Portugal into the EEC.

The fact is that the EEC remains a difficult negotiator. The EEC is continuing from the very time of its inception a common agricultural policy whose primary concern is the protection of both producer and consumer from the imbalance in supply and demand, as well as from price fluctuations on the international and domestic markets.

The difficulty becomes even greater if we taken into consideration the fact that the community remains self-sufficient in those basic products of ours such as potatoes and grapes and soon perhaps citrus fruit.

The first step to help solve our own problems remains the implementation of the agreement of association that will first of all remove the obstacles of EEC customs duties and restrictions, facilitating the disposal of our agricultural exports.

The problem, nevertheless, is not scheduled to be solved wholly with Cyprus' customs union with the EEC. Our problems will be diminished somewhat with the customs union but they will not be solved.

For that reason, parallel to the intensive efforts that are needed for us to join the EEC customs union as quickly as possible, measures must be taken to confront both new and existing difficulties in the agricultural sector and the agricultural exports sector. Such means include the following:

- Encouragement of production of both traditional and new products that represent increased demand in EEC countries.
- Implementation of new technological methods and scientific training of farmers, thus aiding in the decrease of production costs and in the improvement of the quality of our products.
- Development of a coordinated policy for the marketing of Cypriot products to EEC countries for their proper and more successful disposal.
- Improvement of our balance of trade not only through the increase of our exports but through the decrease of imported agricultural products (both processed and unprocessed) that Cyprus already produced.
- Discovery of new markets outside of Europe to absorb our agricultural products.

EEC Delegation

Nicosia 0 FILELEVTHEROS in Greek 8 Jul 83 p 1

/Text/ Strasbourg (APE)--For the first time in 10 years the Joint Parliamentary EEC-Cyprus Association Committee has awakened and is moving forward toward a genuine action by having European community representatives make an official visit to independent Cyprus.

Through a decision made yesterday, the Parliamentary Committee for EEC-Cyprus Association accepted the invitation of President of the Cypriot House of Representatives A. Ladas to visit the Cypriot Republic on 9-13 November.

Goals of the visit are the following:

- Improvement of Cypriot-EEC economic relations.
- Advice in finding a just solution to the Cypriot issue and ways for its real intervention in finding such a solution.
- Planning for more systematic contacts between the European and Cypriot parliaments.

The committee's decision constitutes an answer to the provocative remarks by Denktas about the establishment of a "Turkish Cypriot independent state" despite the contrary expressed view of all international organizations.

Support by Britain

Both Britain and Greece support Cyprus' customs union with the Common Market. This was stated by British Deputy Secretary of State for Trade Paul Channon in an exclusive interview with the Athens newspaper MESIMVRINI.

The customs union provides for the abolition of duties and percentage quotas and constitutes the first step for the entry of a country into the EEC.

The British deputy secretary of state was asked, "Do you believe that the customs union is the first step toward Cyprus' full entry into the EEC?" He answered as follows: "That is not the issue we are examining. I am not the secretary of state for foreign affairs and I would be extremely careful to touch upon that matter. However, I, as an official, do fully support Cyprus' customs union with the Common Market."

5671

CSO: 3521/387

OVERALL ECONOMIC CONDITIONS OF FAEROE ISLANDS DESCRIBED

Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 9-10 Jul 83 p 12

[Article by Jens Holme: "Excessive Fishing Gives the Faeroese Economic Headaches"]

[Text] But the Faeroese middle class lives on unworried because of low taxes and subsidies from Denmark.

The Faeroese economy is at the brink of collapse. The foreign debt amounts to 1.6 billion kroner -- 40,000 kroner per inhabitant, twice as much as the Danish one. The debt has more than doubled in the course of the last five years, and now corresponds to more than a half year's national income. The Faeroese gross national product is less than three billion kroner.

The advisory commission on the Faeroe Islands under the Prime Minister's department has recommended in its latest report on the economic development of the Faeroes that very strong economic measures be taken.

But the Faeroese do not seem to be worried. Roads and tunnels and large single family houses are being built, so that every empty-handed Danish building contractor would be green with envy. Because of the low taxes, the living standard is markedly higher than in Denmark, and it will probably continue. No one makes a secret of the fact that it is a result, among other things, of the Danish subsidy.

A Cozy Nest

Republican party member and high school teacher Zacharias Wang explains that while the average tax in Denmark is 45 percent of the gross national product, it is only 27 on the Faeroe Islands. There is no added value tax, but there are import duties on most of the imported goods.

According to Zacharias Wang, studies have shown that the tax pressure on low incomes is greater in the Faeroes than in Denmark. Consequently the tax on high incomes is considerably lower.

Wang characterizes the Faeroes as "a cozy nest for all profiteers." "The tax system is set up in favor of the upper class: the value of one's own home is

not taxed, there is no property tax, only a minimal tax on rent income, and a tax ceiling of 50 percent. Because of favorable writeoff arrangements, many firms, among them financial institutions, pay little or no taxes. Moreover, the Faeroes are a paradise for tax evaders. The authorities are lenient."

One Hundred Kroner per Dane

Denmark's support to the Faeroes amounted last year to 560 million kroner. This corresponds to a loss of a good 100 kroner per Dane and an income of 12,000 kroner to every Faeroe Islander. By comparison, every Greenlander received 40,000 kroner from Denmark. But the Faeroe Islands are definitely not just an expense in the Danish national budget. Faeroese exports bring foreign currency into the kingdom to help bring a favorable balance of trade, and the Faeroese import from Denmark brings a large part of the subsidy back by another route to the national treasury.

"The subsidies we receive from Denmark mean that we can waste public expenditures. We subsidize fishing to such an extent that people speak of the ruthless exploitation of ocean resources. The fishing fleet has now grown so large that there is an immediate danger of our means of existence being destroyed. If we did not have funds from Denmark to squander, no one would dream of following such a policy," Wang explained.

Harmful Fishing

The Faeroese fishing industry is maintained with the help of a complicated network of support arrangement. The fact that fishing is going badly and that the support arrangements have a directly harmful effect is not just a phrase from a political opponent of the nonsocialist government; it is confirmed by both Faeroese biologists and Danish economists. Fishing biologist Hjalte in Jakupsstovu from the fishing license office in Torshavn says that the stock and catch of cod and haddock are falling dramatically from overfishing.

After the golden years of 1975-76, when anyone who took the trouble to cast a net into the water could literally bring up a fortune, the crisis of 1977 began when the Faeroe Islands, like most of the other fishing nations, assured themselves of a 200 mile fishing limit. Most of the long distance fishing had to be stopped. The greater part of the fishing fleet was forced to go home and fish in home waters. Before 1977, the Faeroe Islanders caught more than 70 percent of their fish outside their own zone. The returning ships began to compete with the fleet of much smaller ships that had always fished in the Faeroese area. The result was overfishing, and many of the traditionally good types of fish are greatly threatened. The biologists point out that the public subsidy has made it profitable to fish far beyond what the stock can tolerate.

Concern

This year, 200 million kroner is budgeted to subsidize fishing, 18 percent of the total worth of the Faeroese export of fish and fish products, which make up 98 percent of the Faeroese total export.

"The maintenance of support to such an extent must give rise for concern," the advisory committee on the Faeroe Islands warned.

Hjalte in Jakupsstovu suggests that the Faeroese fishing fleet is one and a half times too large, and it is constantly being expanded.

As a replacement for cod and haddock, the Faeroese had put their confidence in whiting, which pass the Faeroese ocean area in January, February, and March on the way from the Arctic Ocean to their spawning grounds west of Great Britain, and again on the trip back in May.

Whiting have also been used in recent years as a means of exchange. Foreign fishermen have received permission to fish for whiting in Faeroese territory in exchange for Faeroese fishermen getting the rights to, among other things, fish in EEC waters and in Norwegian and Soviet territory. Up to now, whiting have mainly been used for industrial purposes, but there are big plans to utilize whiting for consumption. At any rate this was true up to this year, when the catastrophe hit. Probably because of changes in the currents, the whiting passed north of the Faeroe Islands.

Golden Salmon

While the Faeroe Islanders wait tensely to see whether the whiting will return to their normal route, they are investigating the possibilities of fishing for golden salmon. It is like an oversized herring, but in the salmon family. The meat has some excellent qualities, among which is that its binding ability, in contrast to other types of fish, is preserved after freezing and gives a fine, white minced meat combined with flour and eggs. The problem is, however, that golden salmon are not easy to catch. They move in very great depths, and the fishery biologists don't know how large the stock is.

But perhaps the greatest perspectives are in the plans for developing maritime agriculture. Attempts are being made to breed trout in floating nets in the Faeroese fjords. The climate, with its steady ocean temperature, is excellently suited for this, and in the long run an export income of 200 million kroner a year is expected.

For the present, the biologists advise saving the stocks in the ocean.

"We will hold back for a few years in order to do better later, Hjalte in Jakupsstovu said.

"The authorities must quickly establish a limit to fishing, possibly by introducing a concession system after the Norwegian model."

If the stocks are properly taken care of, the biologists think that the catch of bottom fish in the Faeroese area will be able to grow from the present level of a good 80,000 tons to 120-130,000 tons. This will require a cutback on fishing for a while, and such an adjustment will no doubt cause short term economic headaches, but it can at the same time be considered to be an investment in better fishing possibilities in the course of about ten years.

912⁴

CSO: 3613/157

FAEROE ISLANDS' UNION THREATENS TO CRIPPLE ECONOMY

Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 9-10 Jul 83 p 12

[Article by Jens Holme]

[Text] The relationship between sections of the job market are so tense that the chairman of the largest union, the Faeroe Islands Workers Union, thinks that a large conflict can quickly break out that will cripple vital sectors of the country.

"Visitors from other countries think that there cannot be large problems in such a little community. That the Faeroese labor market must be characterized by mutual understanding and harmony.

"But that is not the way it is at all," the chairman of the Faeroe Islands Workers Union, Ingeborg Vinther, said.

"The Faeroese wage earners simply do not enjoy the same social security as their colleagues in the other Nordic countries."

The highest priority of the Faeroese labor movement is to achieve unemployment insurance. The Faeroese workers must depend today upon social assistance if they cannot manage on their savings during periods of unemployment. For the same reason, no figures on the extent of unemployment are kept.

"The politicians say we simply have no unemployment. But the nicest thing to say about that is that it is a careless statement. Work in the fish factories is by nature strongly seasonal, and, for example, from Christmas to the middle of February there is generally nothing to do," Vinther said.

Moreover, the Faeroese, like the Danes, among others, have a relatively large number of young people who are ready to enter the job market but cannot find a job.

"We have repeatedly asked the politicians to initiate public employment, partly to take in young people, and partly to help those members who for the time being, or relatively permanently, are unemployed. But we speak to deaf ears."

Greater Effectiveness

For several decades, employers have been able to take advantage of low union consciousness.

All attempts at reform and improvement have failed because of firm resistance from the opposition. Only in recent years has the union movement built up the necessary effectiveness to have a showdown.

The employers have good support in the nonsocialist government consisting of the Union Party, the People's Party, and the Independence Party. The government is not just employer friendly. It consists for the most part of persons who are employers when they are not performing their civic duty.

Vinther finds that the sections of the labor market are on a collision course.

"The tone has become so sharp that sooner or later it has to result in a large conflict that will cripple essential parts of the sensitive Faeroese export sector."

No Trade Union Federation

The Faeroe Islands have no trade union federation to bring the Faeroese labor movement together, and the labor union structure is not completely logical. The Workers Union is, with about 7,000 nonprofessionally educated men and women in the fishing industry as members, the largest organization.

Other workers are divided among a fishing union with 3,000 members, a special women's organization, an organization for business and office workers, an organization for public employees, and organizations for professionally educated men in Torshavn and Klaksvik.

Professional Work Growing

Ingeborg Vinther has been the chairman of the Workers Union for three years. She says that interest in professional work among the members is growing rapidly. The Workers Union is cooperating with, among others, the Danish trade movement on the training of shop stewards. There is a dream of setting up a workers' technical institute on the Faeroe Islands. In the meantime, one gets along in a less elegant way. The Workers Union has bought Torshavn's youth hostel and is using it for courses in the winter.

Recently, cooperation has begun between the labor movement on the Faeroes, in Iceland, and in Greenland on practical questions and common preparedness for conflict. A cooperation that Ingeborg Vinther thinks will, in the long run, open large perspectives.

Agreements on the Faeroe Islands are for two years and have just been renewed. The employers are organized in the Faeroese Employers Association, the Shipowners Association, and Torshavn's Employers Association.

No Social Expenditures

In recent negotiations, the hourly wage was fixed at 54.19 kroner for workers in the fishing industry. This wage is somewhat in line with the Danish one. But the Faeroese employers get off considerably easier just the same if one considers that they are generally exempted from social costs, Vinther explained.

As has been said, they do not contribute to unemployment insurance. Pension arrangements such as the Danish ATP does not exist, either, and the employers are further exempted from paying sick leave. It is financed by the Faeroese national treasury. The coverage is only 80 percent of the time missed, and there is a three-day waiting period.

In the latest round of negotiations, the Workers Union has pressed strongly for the establishment of an educational fund. But the employers stand solidly against paying a contribution.

The statutes protect the employers against troublesome labor representatives. The employer can fire an elected representative twice in a row, and this is a right that several firms have used to deal with aggressive union workers, Vinther said.

There are also problems in working conditions. The work in the fish factories is hard and monotonous; the risk of industrial accidents is great. To be sure, there is safety supervision on the Faeroes, but it does not function well and has only a few means of enforcement. The number of industrial accidents is unknown, because the government keeps the statistics a secret.

Their Own Employers

Ironically enough, the Faeroese workers are to a certain extent their own employers. In many firms, the fellow workers have found it necessary to contribute large amounts to keep their jobs.

But the Workers Union warns strongly against this. "Experience has shown that economic participation does not give real influence. And the investments bring our members into an unfortunate double track in which consideration of the firm's interests must often take priority over their own wages and working conditions."

Effective Ways of Fighting

A comparison between the Faeroese and the Danish labor market does not come out definitely negative for the Faeroe Islanders.

The Faeroese labor movement has a weapon the employers have great respect for. In the fish factories easily spoilable raw materials are handled. Just a few hours of work stoppage can lead to the loss of millions. Ingeborg Vinther says that this is the reason why during the negotiations last year only a day and a

half strike was necessary in Torshavn and Klaksvik to get the employers to give in. Selective strike action is by the way the preferred method of fighting during periods of agreement as well.

The Faeroese have no right to work, and it is relatively risk-free to carry out worker reductions that violate the agreements.

All the workers in the fishing industry are organized. In accordance with the exclusion agreement in force, firms can only employ organized workers.

No Party Politics

Ingeborg Vinther is herself a Social Democrat, but she is very careful to stress that the Workers Union is not connected to any particular political party. Moreover, she is critical of her own party's position on conditions in the labor market.

"When the Social Democrats and the Republicans -- who also claim to be a workers' party -- are in opposition, there is no limit to what they will do for us. But experience shows unfortunately that the promises seldom are kept when they have influence in the government."

9124

CSO: 3613/157

AUTOMATION AT THOMSON-ANGERS PLANT CAUSES DISSENT

Paris L'USINE NOUVELLE in French 16 Jun 83 pp 70-71

[Text] In order to obtain lower production costs, the management at the Thomson plant at Angers has decided to progressively organize work in alternating shifts. A surprise: of the 1,000 workers concerned, 200 reject the new organization. A rejection as clear as unusual, and which is forcing management to study new solutions.

Two hundred workers of the Thomson plant at Angers who reject the switch to working in two shifts in their workshops: this is an interesting protest because it reveals the concerns of the primarily female workforce.

For 3 years the plant, which employs 2,000 people, has made a considerable investment in modernization of its production lines for color television sets, with a view to increasing production and productivity. Moreover, the firm depends a great deal on the upstream production of a Thomson subsidiary, Maugelec, which produces the chassis of the television sets and which is already working on two shifts.

In 1980 the management decided to progressively set up shift work on a volunteer basis for the 1,000 production workers at the Angers plant. Of these, 70 percent are women. At the end of 1981, an agreement reducing work hours, signed by the French Democratic Confederation of Labor [CFDT] and the General Confederation of Managerial Personnel [CGC] set up a 35 and a half hour schedule with no reduction in pay, as well as a bonus of 535 francs for those wage-earners who chose alternating shifts (6:00 a.m. to 1:30 p.m. and 12:30 p.m. to 8:00 p.m., with a half-hour break). There were 800 of these workers in May 1983.

The automation of a ninth assembly line will require the switch to shift working for the 200 remaining workers in August 1983. Notified by letter, these last are refusing. Among them, numerous women fear the consequences the new schedule may have on their family lives. Four shutdowns per hour, little imitated in the rest of the plant, have been taking place since 1 June. Management responded by threatening to institute lay-offs for the dissenting wage-earners: 120 wage-earners then accepted the new hours.

The CFDT and the General Confederation of Labor (CGT) denounced the "management ultimatum."

Such open rejection to the shift work mode of organization is rare. However, abandonment of a traditional schedule, the "9 to 5," is endured by the wage-earners as a worsening of working conditions and their social life. Commuting difficulties, night work, repercussions on family life often lead to an increase in absenteeism and turn-over.

Making Investments Profitable

Personnel management denies none of this. But "to run the machines longer" becomes necessary when a firm decides to automate its plants: work in two or three shifts thus makes investments profitable.

"The aim for Thomson is to obtain lower production costs than our competitors," explains Michel Boulain, personnel director of the firm. "However, we wanted to mitigate the effects of working in shifts: this means the considerable reduction in work time which has been brought about without a decrease in pay and which has, of itself, led to a 20 percent cost overrun."

The management of the firm, incidentally, has set up an original part-time formula, intended more particularly for women: 40 female workers could thus opt to work 1 day out of 2.

"We are ready to discuss," continued the Thomson spokesman, "new forms of reducing work hours which could free [female] workers from schedule constraints. But this has two conditions: the reduced hours must not be made up for, and the running time of the machines must be extended."

A meeting of the company committee will discuss these new proposals Friday, 17 June. Between now and then, as a means of appeasement, all lay-off procedures have been postponed.

12354

CSO: 3519/550

BRIEFS

FEWER THOMSON PERSONNEL IN PARIS--Alain Gomez, president and general manager of Thomson, is pursuing an ambitious goal and, in the short term, a costly one: to decrease the number of employees at the Paris headquarters on Boulevard Haussman from approximately 1,000 people to...300 people. His organizational model: Texas Instruments, whose techno-structure is as streamlined as possible. In order "to trim the fat from the excessive number of upper management offices," Alain Gomez has entrusted this task to the group's number two man, Noel Goutard, acting director since last February. When he has carried out this mission, Noel Goutard will take over operations management. In order to motivate the executives traumatized by these draconian measures, Alain Gomez has made a video-cassette, now being shown in all of the offices, in which he expresses his confidence in the group's products and personnel and appeals to their sense of responsibility. The theme: the need to create profit centers to reduce the deficit... [Text] [Paris L'USINE NOUVELLE in French 16 Jun 83 p 76] 12354

USINOR LOSSES IN 1982--The combined general meeting held 14 June 1983, under the chairmanship of Raymond Levy, has approved the accounts for the 1982 financial year. This period closed with a net loss of 4,986,757,137 francs, after 1,446,363,864 francs in net financing expenses, an appropriation of 1,310,492,096 francs for amortization costs, 417,123,429 francs in exceptional losses, and a net appropriation for the reserve accounts of 1,500,691,408 francs (cf. LES ECHOS of 13 April). The general meeting further authorized the board of directors to negotiate loans during a period of 5 years, in one or more instances, by issuing bonds, with a limit of 1.1 billion francs, and to undertake one or more bond issues within 5 years. These could be converted at any time into company stock. The subscription to these bonds will be reserved for the state. The maximum total amount of this or these issues will be 10 billion francs. The annual interest rate for the bonds issued will be 0.1 percent. [Text] [Paris LES ECHOS in French 15 Jun 83 p 6] 12354

CSO: 3519/550

ECONOMIC

GREECE

PER CAPITA INCOME DOWN

Athens I VRADYNI in Greek 16 Jul 83 p 1

[Text] The per capita income in Greece declined by \$ 400. Greeks have become poorer thanks to the "change": within one year the annual per capita income has fallen from the \$4,200 it had reached under the "New Democracy" to \$3,800.

Mr. K. Stefanopoulos parliamentary representative of the "New Democracy", yesterday accused in parliament the government's erratic economic policy of being responsible for the decline of the annual per capita income by \$400.

It is revealing the the Under-Secretary of the National Economy, Mr. D. Dimos-thenopoulos, who was present in the Parliament, did not react to Mr. Stefanopoulos' accusation.

12278

CSO:3521/386

TELECOMMUNICATIONS AGENCY OBTAINS LARGE FOREIGN LOAN

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 20 Jul 83 p 7

[Text] After the national refinery, the OTE [Hellenic Telecommunications Organization] also came out into the international money market and secured a \$200,000,000 loan, with favorable conditions, approximately similar to those under which Italian and Spanish public services obtained loans.

This was announced by the Minister of the National Economy Mr. Geor. Arsenis who added that now a new form of policy is being initiated which allows public services to resort to international money markets independently and without guarantees from the government, to obtain the resources they need for their investments. The minister also emphasized that the OTE loan is a proof of the Banks' greater response, insofar as they offered larger sums than those the Organization requested.

According to the declarations made by the Assistant Manager of the Bank of Greece, Mr. D. Khalikias, and the Manager of the OTE, Mr. K. Makropoulos, the loan was granted by a consortium of 14 international banks (American, English, Canadian and Japanese).

The amount of the loan has been set at approximately \$200,000,000 and it consists of U.S. \$186,000,000 and Pounds Sterling 10,000,000.

The loan runs for a period of 7 years and it has a 4-year grace period.

Interests on the loan are as follows:

- \$93,000,000 Euro-dollars with a 5.8% margin over the LIBOR, for the first 3 years and 3.4% for the remaining 4 years.
- \$93,000,000 from the American market with a PRIME RATE of interest increasing by 0.4% over the entire period of the loan.
- 10,000,000 English pounds with the interest rate applicable to the London market banks for English pounds, which will increase by 5.8% the first 4.5 years and by 3.4% for the remaining 2.5 years.

Those conditions are considered favorable under the actual market circumstances, and they correspond to similar conditions on loans obtained recently by the public services of other European countries.

It is worth noting the large number of banks which participated in this loan and which made it possible to increase the initially projected amount of the

loan (from \$160,000,000 to \$ 200,000,000 approximately) and lowered each bank's share of participation.

The interest displayed by the banks is related to the positive results of the OTE's economic management for 1982.

The OTE is one of the few public services which has appreciable annual revenues in foreign currency.

The government gave no guarantee on this loan.

12278

CSO: 3521/386

REVIEW OF BASES AGREEMENT'S BENEFITS, LIABILITIES

Athens MESIMVRINI in Greek 16 Jul 83 p 9

[Article by the "M" Economics commentator K. Kolmer in the column "Analysis":
"Economy Prevailed Over Ideology."]

[Text] The financial trade-off for the American bases remaining in Greece until May 30, 1989 is estimated at \$ 5.000.000 (nominal value) in long term credits for 1983, in military equipment supplied by Greece to America. After 1984, Greece will receive in exchange the equivalent of 7/10 of the nominal value of the defense "aid" given to Turkey.

This is what is foreseen by the Greco-American defense agreement signed yesterday. More precisely the agreement projects the following:

- 1 - The economic cooperation between the U.S.A. and Greece is a part of the whole defense agreement between the two nations. The economic compensations for American bases remaining in Greece have no relation to aid extended by NATO and other western organizations to our country.
- 2 - The financial compensations are directly related to the operation of the bases and to the so called "defense aid" given to Greece by the U.S., and indirectly to the tentative agreement of partial manufacturing (offsetting) of arms by Greece, the value of which will cover pending credits (FMS) to Greece.
- 3- It is not a case of a FREE defense aid but of a long term loan for the purchase of military equipment from the U.S.A. (FOREIGN MILITARY SALES - FMS).
- 4 - Should the defense agreement be suspended, for example if, because of a crisis in the Middle East, the defensive character of the American bases in Greece changes, the economic "aid" is cut off.
- 5 - Tax, customs duties, special privileges and other prerogatives of the American armed forces in Greece are maintained, but not penal extraterritoriality as well until an agreement is reached (no later than December 30, 1984) on whether Greece will renounce its right to tax Americans in Greece.
- 6 - A tentative, not binding agreement, is projected on industrial cooperation between the U.S. and Greece for the joint manufacturing of arms. Part of this production will be reexported to the U.S. and its value will cover past defense

credits which are due. Thus, purchases of armaments from the U.S.A. in the past will be balanced.

7 - Until December 30, 1984, the agreement about the "economic compensations" will be studied, and signed together with the formulation of the special agreement on industrial cooperation (offsetting).

8 - The agreement's and the compensations' duration is 5 years (up to 1987). The gradual phasing out of the bases will last another 17 months and, consequently, the gradual diminution the economic trade-off.

The agreement which was reached is "the least bad" one and, under a socialist government, consequently, the best that could be expected.

The following considerations constitute the advantages of the agreement:

- A huge suspense concerning the nation's orientation is removed. As it is, after the clarification of the EEC question and that of the bases, Greece definitely belongs (for the time being) to the West.

- The government, which has such few talents, will be undistracted and able to deal with the current and also burning problems of the country, for example the economy, which is tending to become an explosive issue for domestic developments.

- Defense credits are increased from a nominal \$ 250,000,000 to \$500,000,000 annually. At this point it must be noted that the nominal value does not have as much significance as its real counterpart in military equipment. For instance, if Turkey receives 50 F18 fighter airplanes worth a nominal \$ 1.5 billion, Greece will also have to receive 50 F18's worth \$1.5 billion.

The disadvantages of the agreement are the following:

- The purchase of 100 up to date fighter airplanes has not been definitely settled yet. It must be remembered that the Spanish socialist government recently (83.5.31) achieved the purchase of 72 F/A-18 Mc DONNELL DOUGLAS airplanes worth \$2.5 billion

- No rent was obtained from the bases. It must be remembered that originally the PASOK government demanded an annual payment of \$ 1 billion.

- It was not made clear - at least for the present - whether the bases can be used by the American RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCE.

The Greek-American agreement might include the 7/10 statute between Greece and Turkey but the QUID PRO QUO, one thing for another, has not been acknowledged in the sense of what bases are made available by Greece and what bases by Turkey? And here the Latin quotation applies "QUI NON PROFICIT DEFICIT."

In spite of this, it must be acknowledged that if an agreement had not been signed an eventual prolongation of the uncertainty would have had indirect but clearly negative repercussions on Greece.

- Aside from the need to find available currency, for the purchase of military equipment worth at least \$ 3 billion for the next 6 years, there would also have been a need for Greece to give assurances about not drifting away from the West.

- The international creditors of Greece, who are none other than the American, Japanese and European banks, would have hesitated to give loans to an already heavily indebted Greece (our foreign debt amounts to \$12 billion up to 1982) further burdened by immediate cash needs for covering debts and securing defensive equipment.

- There would have been an acceleration of outgoing capital with unpredictable consequences for the nation's balance of payments, which is already entering a very critical phase.

Consequently, rather than ideology, economic considerations - fortunately - prevailed amongst the PASOK government and the agreement was achieved. Thus the least bad is the best and everything else is nothing but inflated rhetoric from the PASOK.

12278

CSO: 3521/386

NEED FOR EQUAL SACRIFICES FROM ALL STRESSED

Lisbon POVO LIVRE in Portuguese 6 Jul 83 p 3

[Editorial by V.C.: "The Increases"]

[Text] The price increases, which have also been reflected in staple items, are here. They were, are, and will be inevitable for some time. There is no reason to waste a lot of time justifying them, although it must be admitted that in some cases, really good explanations were lacking.

While that reality may be accepted as a given, it also should not be forgotten that for the great majority of Portuguese, the general increase in the cost of goods means not just that their standard of living is stagnating, but that it is declining. And that it is affecting retired people, pensioners, those on fixed incomes, those working for someone else, and those who invest.

The situation is breeding perceptible uneasiness and explains why, in statements by our political leaders and by those analyzing us from abroad, there is always a reference in one form or another to the need to strengthen the democratic institutions and an expressed desire to see them function better.

Everyone is subconsciously aware of the danger of a deteriorating economy, the social tensions to which it leads, and the other negative aspects that grow and spread along with it. Underlying it is a degree of fragility in the system and the awareness that there are already people who are stirring in preparation for crises that they can see coming 4, 12, or 25 months from now. The crisis syndrome is perhaps the only thing for which we really make plans and on which the greatest share of energy and creativity is expended.

All of that compels us to engage in a few reflections.

Among other things--and in a very significant way--social democracy means solidarity among people. When it becomes necessary for most Portuguese to put up with the effects of a belt-tightening that is not pointless, and when one more section of the middle class is affected and disappears, it is time for us to see whether the costs of austerity are being equitably distributed.

Each of us bears a share of the responsibility for seeing that they are. It is not up to the government to take all the initiatives and find all the ways of

correcting aberrations and eliminating abuses. The share of responsibility falling on each individual may take various forms of social intervention: warnings, advice, censure, criticism, or action.

Simple observation shows that a certain number of people apparently have access to easy money (from the parallel economy?) and that there are instances of shocking ostentation. It is known that payments are made without a receipt being issued so as to evade taxes, that contraband products are acquired, that second and third jobs are provided for people who, in the nature of things, cannot fulfill all those obligations (there are limits to anyone's capabilities), that cases of totally unjustifiable absenteeism are viewed with indifference or benevolently tolerated, and that there exists the granting and receiving of "favors" which represent privilege for some to the detriment of others and are the distinguishing feature of an underdeveloped society.

Tax evasion, socially unjust profits, and the poor productivity and quality of those unprepared for the positions they occupy are misfortunes that are going to have their effect on all the citizens. Someone has to pay for them. They also represent socially objectionable behavior, even more so when their result is to push people over the standard-of-living threshold separating them from poverty. This is where the social democratic principle of solidarity comes in. We have it in our power to prevent much of that behavior from taking place--by increasing the extent to which we intervene.

The government coalition consists of two parties that chose as one of the main planks in their platforms and their election campaigns the fight against corruption, abuses, nepotism, economic offenses, crime, and the marginal society and, simultaneously, defense of the authority of the democratic state. They adopted those stands not only because they were the correct ones but also because of the feeling that they corresponded to the will of the people and were being demanded by the people.

This only increases the responsibility of the government and its majority.

As far as austerity is concerned, they must set the example. The appointment and selection of individuals must always be based on standards of competence and scrupulous honesty in the matter of using positions of public trust for personal advantage. The sale of sinecures to the highest bidders, the paying back of favors or the taking of personal revenge at the expense of the public interest, and the politicization of matters outside the political realm would be totally inconceivable.

As far as remuneration in the public sector is concerned, care must be taken--as long as no stop has been put to the profusion of collateral benefits (a means always chosen for proceeding shamefacedly and deceitfully with salary increases and one which, once adopted, immediately escapes all control and creates situations of relative injustice)--to make such proceedings totally open and aboveboard.

A people's difficult moments are overcome only through collective commitment and with the assent of the overwhelming majority of the citizens. But those

conditions are possible only if some do not feel like sons while others feel like stepsons--if there is a generalized perception that the benefits and costs are being distributed fairly and seriously. In those conditions, [no] success will be enjoyed by the false prophets huckstering an instant prosperity that is not within just anyone's reach, much less that of the admirers of Marxist totalitarianism.

That assent also requires a climate of change, determination, and action that will shatter apathy and give rise to new hope.

11798

CSO: 3542/165

GOVERNMENT AVERTS TRANSPORT STRIKE BY RAISING WAGES

Lisbon A TARDE in Portuguese 5 Jul 83 pp 1, 7

[Editorial: "Government Gives in to Transport Unions"]

[Text] The government has yielded flagrantly in its first clash with the unions, which had scheduled a general strike against state-owned transportation enterprises for today. Not wanting to make use of the plan for alternative transportation, which the Democratic Alliance used with great success, the Socialist leaders wound up agreeing to overall wage increases that are from 3 to 5 percent higher than those proposed by the previous government. This means that social dialogue is beginning in the worst way possible: the government is displaying such weakness in the face of the union confederations that in the future, it will not be able to adopt any attitude other than that of submission.

Moreover, those surrenders in the field of wage increases are plainly contrary to the intentions expressed by the government in its program and made clear by the minister of finance.

It should be recalled that an 18-month plan for economic and financial stabilization with emergency features had been announced and that it had also been announced that growth in purchasing power would be contingent on the priority assigned to the austerity policy.

The increases by means of which the government has "averted" today's strike against Carris and the CP [Portuguese Railroad Company] will naturally be extended to Transtejo, the subway system, and the National Highway Company. Unfortunately, they already show clearly that there is a lack of support by one sector of the government for the intentions expressed by Ernani Lopes.

The question that immediately arises is this: how are those wage increases going to be paid, and by whom?

Since it is known that the public enterprises in question have accumulated deficits totaling millions and millions of contos--a fact also referred to, incidentally, in the government program--how will it be possible to bear the burden of such expenses?

If the previous government said that the maximum that could be allowed in the way of wage increases was 17 percent in general--and certainly less in the case

of the state-owned transportation companies because of their large deficits--and this government is saying that the country's situation is much worse than Balsemao and Salgueiro said it was, how is it possible to grant higher wages?

If we remember that fuel prices went up a few days ago and that the national budget makes no provision for increased appropriations to offset higher expenditures, we can only conclude that the government is preparing a brutal fare increase.

In the case of the CP, the rise in total wages will come to an additional 1.6 million contos per year. In the case of Carris, an additional amount of over 600,000 contos will be required.

Is the government willing to pass on to the citizens in general--to the public that uses mass transit--the expense it has incurred in order to avert the strike? For the benefit of a restricted occupational group?

Is that the austerity policy? How is it possible in such a way to contain the budget deficits? And control inflation?

For the sake of the national interest, about which there was so much talk when the "center bloc" was being formed, we hope that a clear stand will be taken.

11798

CSO: 3542/165

BRIEFS

SHIPYARD IN DESPERATE STRAITS--They are considered to be the best shipyards in the world for ship repair. They are located in Margueira, on the south bank of the Tejo, and they employ about 7,000 workers who have been on strike for a month now, demanding payment of back wages. We are talking about LISNAVE [Lisbon Shipbuilding] which, due to the worldwide crisis, has come down to a billing volume of 5 million contos per year (half of which were generated in 1981); that is not enough to take care of all of the annual fixed costs which come to about 11 million contos, broken down as follows: 5.5 million for manpower costs, 3 million for interest, 1.5 million for raw materials and services, and 1 million for general expenditures and depreciation. The company's coffers are completely exhausted, it is overdrawn at the bank, and, due to a strike, it is unable to get any job orders; it has now lost an opportunity to do repair work equivalent to earnings of 1.1 million contos. Here is the conclusion: There is every indication that the only solution will be to close LISNAVE down, with all of the bad consequences deriving from that. But there is another matter of concern that comes up right away: The possibility that there might be physical clashes between the forces of law and order and the workers who quite wrongly prevent the departure of various foreign vessels that are in the docks of the shipyard, such as Finnish, Dutch, and Greek vessels in particular. Action filed with the Lisbon court found LISNAVE guilty and ordered the company to employ every means to get the vessel "Doris" to put to sea. In view of this fact, the enterprise found itself forced to involve the PSP [Public Security Police] in the case and the latter is now studying ways of getting the vessel released. [Text] [Lisbon TEMPO in Portuguese 7 Jul 83 p 24] 5058

FOREIGN INVESTMENTS RISING IN 1983--The IDE (direct foreign investments) authorized by the Foreign Investment Institute for the first half of this year came to 7,462,800 contos in other words, an increase of 92.8 percent compared to the same period of time in 1982. According to statistics published in the magazine INVESTIMENTOS E TECNOLOGIA, published by the Institute, the amount of foreign exchange represents more than four-fifths of the authorized IDE, coming to 6,058,000 contos. Similar to what happened in earlier years, this time, foreign investments show a predominant expansion of the activities of enterprises already existing in Portugal (43.5 percent) followed by the establishment of new enterprises (22.9), of stabilization investments (16.2), and acquisitions (4.5). It is however significant to note the fact that the amount authorized for the creation of new enterprises (1.7 million contos) is twice the amount during the first half of 1982. The EEC countries accounted for 45 percent of the authorized IDE, with particular emphasis on France (25.1 percent) and the United Kingdom (8.9). Among the countries outside the EEC, we first of all note the United States with 10.4 percent, followed by Spain with

7.9. The authorized investments are channeled primarily to the banks and other financial institutions (36.4 percent), basically for increases in capital; another thing that is significant is the volume of investments earmarked for wholesale trade (906,000 contos) and restaurants and hotels (630,000 contos), as well as metal mineral mining (673,000 contos). [Text] [Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 15-21 Jul 83 p 18] 5058

DOMESTIC, FOREIGN LOANS AUTHORIZED--The cabinet met yesterday in S. Bento and decided to authorize the finance and planning minister to issue two domestic loans to finance public investments in the total amount of 28 million contos, as well as a depreciable foreign loan up to the amount of DM40 million, intended to finance the continuation of the development of the flood control and irrigation projects in the Mondego Valley. For one of the two domestic loans (FIP-83), amounting to 15 million contos, treasury obligations will be issued with a value of 1,000 escudos, each, to be subscribed by the public as of 3 October. The other loans, a short-term loan, "second series," in the amount of 13 million contos, is specifically intended for credit institutions. The full cabinet meeting, which will be resumed next Tuesday, also decided to approve a special cooperation agreement with Angola in the area of tourism and hotel industry, as well as requests for legislative authorization for speedy discussion and voting by parliament which yesterday passed the bills pertaining to the regulations for asylum and the status of refugees [Excerpt] [Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 8 Jul 83 p 1] 5058

PUBLIC ENTERPRISE FINANCING--The total financing required by state-owned enterprises for 1983, excluding imports of petroleum and cereals, comes to 200 million contos. Those financing requirements by the public enterprise sector were the reason for the refusal by the former minister of finance, Joao Salgueiro, to sign the executive orders approving the documents relating to nine of those enterprises. [Excerpt] [Lisbon O DIABO in Portuguese 5 Jul 83 p 15] 11798

BANK EARNINGS UP--Excluding the Bank of Portugal, Portuguese banking institutions as a group reported a net income of 16,193 million escudos from 1982 operations, or 48 percent more than in 1981. Those figures, elucidative in themselves, become even larger if we add to them the large amount allocated to depreciation and reserves. The result of that addition, which constitutes the financial result for the institutions, exceeds 45 million contos. For example, the General Deposit Bank alone reports earnings of over 9 million contos. Despite the growth in overall profits, Portuguese banks are still struggling with serious problems created specifically by their pronounced excess liquidity. The fact is that since 1981, the commercial banks as a group have been paying out more in interest charges than they have been collecting on their outstanding loans. [Text] [Lisbon O DIABO in Portuguese 5 Jul 83 p 15] 11798

EMIGRANT REMITTANCES UP--Remittances from emigrants totaled 17,104,000 contos in January, for an increase of 36 percent over the amount remitted during the same month last year, according to the Bank of Portugal. The bulk of the remittances by Portuguese emigrants came from residents of the European OECD countries (701,000 contos). Remittances by Portuguese emigrants in the United States and Canada totaled 3,336,000 contos. Residents in the rest of the world remitted 3,067,000 contos in foreign exchange in January [figures as published]. [Text] [Lisbon O DIABO in Portuguese 5 Jul 83 p 15] 11798

WAGE CEILING REMOVED--The government has decided to revoke the decree establishing a "wage ceiling" on collective bargaining contracts. As is known, that ceiling had been set at 17 percent. The action seems to have been taken by the government as a way of forestalling the Communist Party, which had expected to debate the matter in the Assembly of the Republic this week. [Text] [Lisbon O DIABO in Portuguese 5 Jul 83 p 15] 11798

WAGES DOWN, TAXES UP--Between 1975 and 1983, real gross wages showed a drop of over 10 percent because of the fact that prices rose at a faster rate than nominal wages, while during the same period, real taxes rose by 91 percent, according to a study released by the CGTP-IN [General Federation of Portuguese Workers/National Intersindical]. [Text] [Lisbon O DIABO in Portuguese 5 Jul 83 p 15] 11798

EEC ASSISTANCE--The EIB (European Investment Bank) is going to lend Portugal 7 million contos as part of its financial aid in preparation for Portugal's membership in the EEC. That financing will be provided at the normal rate of interest, and it will be given full priority in September. It was approved by the Community's Council of Ministers this past 21 June. According to the Bank of Portugal, the fact that the proceeds of the loan to Portugal will be available to the country, added to remittances from emigrants and tourism earnings (which traditionally increase considerably during the summer months), makes it possible to look forward to the next few months with "some tranquillity from the standpoint of funds and the external payments to which the country is committed." [Text] [Lisbon O DIABO in Portuguese 5 Jul 83 p 15] 11798

CSO; 3542/165

EXCHANGE RATE GUARANTEE TO STIMULATE INVESTMENT

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 22 Jun 83 pp 1, 7

[Article by Yener Kaya: "New Exchange Rate Guarantee for Investment-Oriented Imports"]

[Text] The Finance Ministry and the Turkish Industrial Development Bank are working together, it was learned, in an effort to resurrect the exchange-rate guarantee formerly applied to imports for investment incentive purposes. It is argued that the exchange-rate guarantee applied since the first of the year to the importation of investments intended for exportation on the basis of incentive certificates should now be converted into an exchange-rate guarantee system for the importation of all investments whether intended for export or not.

According to circles involved, Finance Ministry authorities and officers of the Turkish Industrial Development Bank have stepped up their on-going efforts for the adoption of such a decision, intended to alleviate employment problems in investments stagnating because of the lack of an exchange-rate guarantee.

Meanwhile, a top official noted that the difference in interest in the guaranteed exchange-rate difference contemplated for stimulating investments other than the export guarantee will be higher than the interest difference received on investment credits on the basis of incentive certificates and said he thought investors would welcome such a decision.

As known, the exchange-rate guarantee for investments based on incentive certificates went into effect with publication of the annex to Decree No 25 on Protecting the Value of Turkish Currency in the RESMI GAZETE on 12 January. It was asserted when the decree became effective that 6,627 public projects in the 1983 annual program would benefit.

Moreover, the new interest decree to become effective 1 July makes a 2.75 percent increase in interest rates on "Exportation Guaranteed Investment Credits," offered by the Turkish Industrial Development Bank or the Commercial Bank and applicable to rediscount limits and advance procedures. A top official, asked whether the 2.75-point increase in the low interest rate applicable to guaranteed export investment credits, bringing it to 12.75 percent, had anything to do with the exchange rate guarantee, replied in the negative and said that the interest rates to be applied to non-export guaranteed investments would be higher than the revised 12.75-percent interest. Meanwhile, certain top-level bank officers whom

we interviewed after hearing that there was going to be an exchange rate guarantee for imports to stimulate investments maintained that industrialists would be able to take "a deep breath" if such a decision were adopted and said, "We have been hoping along with the industrialists for such a decision. And we had heard that these efforts were in progress. I think there will be a recovery in investments if this decision is adopted."

8349

CS0: 3554/348

MEASURES EYED TO HALT INVESTMENT RESOURCE WASTE

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 22 Jun 83 pp 1, 7

[Text] Ankara (DUNYA) -- New measures are being developed to prevent the waste and ensure optimal utilization of resources and state funds in investments. Under consideration are additional incentives for entrepreneurs raising net resources higher than the projected incentive rate for the purpose of making incentive elements effectual in selective investment areas.

In a report prepared by the SPO [State Planning Organization] "Select Committee on Investment and Export Incentives" in its endeavors related to the Fifth 5-Year Development Plan, utilization of existing resources without waste is treated as follows:

"In a rather large number of the investments realized during the years when an import-substitution policy was in effect, it is possible to see, because of inappropriate physical plants initially, low capacity owing to certain bottlenecks and, therefore, latent capacity in much machinery and plant. In any case, although existing statutes by extension encourage investments to get rid of bottlenecks of this kind, it would be appropriate both to eliminate the incentive table clause and to introduce more attractive incentives."

The Select Committee developed the following proposals appropos optimal utilization of resources:

--"The progress of investments based on incentives and allowed to take advantage of incentives must be monitored closely and followed up.

--"If it were possible to set the duration of projects accurately by means of a project office or some other system, incentives should be offered for the earliest possible completion of investments by developing a premium system on the basis of terms.

--"Highly extensive studies should be conducted appropos existing plans and programs in conjunction with economic policy, with incentives envisaged for the investment areas and sectors identified as the result of these studies. In this way, it may be possible to shift resources to the areas identified instead of the overly-broad incentive talbes.

--"A supplement may be added to the net resource-credit rates being applied as though engraved in stone. The existing scarcity and inadequate distribution in credit resources may be partially alleviated by allowing the entrepreneur who puts more of his net assets at stake than the set rate to benefit from supplemental incentive elements for each point over."

The SPO Select Committee also drew attention to the inadequacy of the feasibility reports which serve as basic documents in decisions related to investment incentives. The committee, acting on the view that inaccurate feasibility reports harm the entrepreneur and waste state resources, called for revisions to ensure that these reports are examined at the time of application for incentives against detailed and factual standards.

8349

CSO: 3554/348

LEADER OF FAEROESE INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT ATTACKS DENMARK

Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 13 July 83 p 8

[Interview with Erlendur Patursson, Faeroe Islands independence advocate, by Jens Holme]

[Text] "That guy Patursson should start to settle down a bit. The Faeroese can't get along without Denmark anyway. Just think how much the taxes would rise. There is hardly anyone who would want that."

The taxi driver, a Dane who has lived on the Faeroe Islands for 19 years, warmly defends the commonwealth on the 15 kilometer trip from Torshavn to the old episcopal residence, Kirkjubour, which now remains as a colorful sight for tourists.

I am to meet the very personification of the Faeroese independence movement, the Republican Party's grand old man, Erlendur Patursson, who will be 70 in August. A member of the Lagting almost without a break since 1954, and by no means an emeritus, on the contrary, still deeply engaged in the cause of liberation by international law of the Faeroe Islands from Denmark.

I am let out just behind the ruins of the half-finished Magnus Cathedral, which was to have been the cathedral and a monument to Norwegian supremacy in the North Atlantic in the Middle Ages. But the construction was given up in the middle of the 1300's after almost a half century of building.

Erlendur Patursson receives me in front of his characteristically Faeroese house of black wood, red painted windows, and grass on the roof. Today there is something that is seldom on the Faeroe Islands, garden weather, and we are seated at the coffee table in a pleasant nook. The sun shines in the fields and glistens on the roaring sea, and sea gulls crap in our hair and down our necks -- which is supposed to mean good luck -- could it be more beautiful?

But the mood changes suddenly when I confront Erlendur Patursson with the taxi driver's arguments.

Unforgivably Stupid

Question: Are the Faeroe Islands ready to get along without Denmark?

Answer: It is lucky for you that we are outside. For if we had been inside in the room, I would have said, "There is the door. Get out!" Because the question is unforgivably stupid. The Faeroe Islands are the richest country in the world in relation to the number of inhabitants.

We have 275,000 square kilometers of ocean under our control within our 200 sea miles of the fishing limit. The sea is full of fish, and perhaps there is oil and gas to be found there, who knows? Besides this, we can develop agriculture and improve both farming and fishing products. If we want to, we can attain an export of 3-4 billion kroner compared to the present one of only a billion.

The Faeroese are an imaginative people. Just as effective as the Danes.

Question: But what holds you back? Breaking away is plainly not the most important issue now? Is it the rise in taxes people are afraid of?

Answer: Yes, perhaps as far as the well-to-do are concerned. We have a tax system with very little progression. The rich pay relatively little in taxes and they are sure they are the ones who will pay if we break away from the commonwealth.

The Union Party represents this section of the population, and as you know, this party is strongly in favor of keeping the ties with Denmark. They say that if we don't receive help from Denmark, the sick will just lie there helplessly, the children will be illiterate, and the poor will just have to go their way. They stand things on their heads and claim that it is the well-to-do who want to cut the bonds to Denmark.

False Speech

But this is false speech. And an improper way to sell our worth, self-confidence, and independence.

For what is really happening? The economic support from Denmark is used 90 percent for schools, social security, and hospitals. Most of the money is paid out in wages and goes to the shops and from there back to the merchants in Copenhagen. Three-fourths of the Faeroese imports come from Denmark.

The ones who really become rich from the connections between the Faeroes and Denmark are the well-to-do on the Faeroes and the businessmen in Copenhagen. Why should ordinary people with average incomes in Denmark pay for this commerce?

Question: Does Denmark pay the Faeroese upper and middle classes to remain in the commonwealth?

Answer: Yes, we do not pay according to ability. We are sent money from the Danish taxpayers so that we will not realize our national desires. The moment the support stops, no one will be able to see any reason to preserve the commonwealth. It has no other real content, you see, than the economic one. I have heard you have a government that is eager to save. Here is a good place to start cutting.

Question: Well, that sounds very good, but why the effort to free the Faeroes? You save money and still have equal rights and are an independent part of the kingdom?

Answer: Watch your words. There can never be talk of equality when the one side has five million inhabitants and the other only 40,000. That is completely unrealistic.

The North

If we get free from Denmark, we can hope, on the other hand, to become an equal part of the North, in which each country can decide independently, and where borders will disappear. It is a question of individuality and national identity.

Question: What is so special about the Faeroese?

Answer: They are an independent people with their own culture and their own language, but with a remarkable destiny in many centuries that ended with our becoming incorporated into Denmark in connection with the constitution of 1849. In the beginning, the Danes tried a conscious policy of making the country Danish. Our language and individuality were suppressed. But then the little David rose up against Goliath. And since then, Goliath has become more cooperative. Now it is more a matter of what David wants. Raw power can no longer be used. Instead, they try to persuade us with the help of flattery and cunning.

Plebiscite

Perhaps you remember that we seceded from the kingdom by a plebiscite in 1946, but the Danes did not want to recognize the results of the plebiscite. We are still an integral part of the Danish realm and will only get all our rights as a people when we are allowed to take care of ourselves.

Question: You put a lot of weight on connections with the North and on work in the Nordic Council, but is it anything more than fancy speeches and noncommittal declarations?

Answer: Well, yes, one can probably say that the dynamics of Nordic cooperation have stagnated. They began to go downhill as early as when the Nordek idea had to be given up. Now Denmark is about to be lost in the EEC and a coming political union. We have to look at reality. For the time being, Denmark will not leave the EEC, and this membership is blocking further Nordic

integration. Such a recognition is necessary to take part in blazing new paths in Nordic cooperation.

The Three Small Ones

We already see that Norway, Sweden, and Finland are trying to come closer together. And the Faeroe Islands, Iceland, and Greenland began cooperation a few years ago. There seem therefore to be three Nordic groups, Denmark, which has fallen away, the three large ones, and the three small ones.

On the Faeroe Islands and in Iceland all the political parties warmly favor cooperation between the three small ones. We have many common interests to take care of, not the least of which is fishing. Greenland is still just coming along on quarter power. Greenland has told us they want first of all to end the membership in the EEC. But when this comes about, I believe that something serious will begin to happen.

Question: Is there an alternative or an addition to Nordic cooperation, and how far will it go?

Answer: It is an addition and a practical cooperation. There is no question of anything supranational, if that is what you are thinking about.

Question: Can the political work for independence avoid becoming a personal antagonistic relationship toward Denmark and the Danes?

Answer: I think so. I think the Danes are pleasant, free-thinking, and open. Here we have much to learn. But it is my impression that in Denmark there is no interest at all in what is happening up here. The Danish press focuses onesidedly on Greenland. If it deals with the Faeroes, the subject is almost always the connection with the EEC and with fishing. You aren't interested in us. So what do you want with us?

9124

CSO: 3613/157

FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING PROCESS EXAMINED IN NEW BOOK

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 13 Jul 83 p 7

[Commentary by Aage Deleuran]

[Text] Professor Erling Bjøl's book, "Who Decides?" has just been published by the Judicial and Economic League's Publishing House. The book, which is part of the series from the Danish Foreign Policy Institute, deals with the foreign policy decision-making process in Denmark.

Denmark joined the Atlantic Treaty and Denmark joined EC. Denmark opposed the deployment of foreign forces, but Denmark agreed to the unified command. Who makes the decisions concerning these matters that are so vitally important to the nation? Folketing does, is the answer, and it does so on behalf of the people and there was even a popular referendum when it came to European policy. But who are the real decision makers? What is the process that precedes these turning points? These are questions that have been of interest to Erling Bjøl for a long time and he seized the chance when Jens Otto Krag so unexpectedly resigned to get his hands on someone who must know the answers to help him write them down. As outside lecturer at the Institute of Political Science in Aarhus in 1973, Krag assisted in clarifying the political decision-making process, but Krag was unable to free himself from his active participation for many years in politics. He could not transform himself into an observer and evaluator. He retreated step by step as Bjøl pressed him with questions and his tape recorder. Before Bjøl was finished, Krag's death put new restrictions on the book. But even so, the book shows to a large extent how the author learned from Krag's considerable experience and his assessments of people and events. The presentation is supplemented by others who were involved and is also based on interviews with many others who must remain anonymous in part. It is not that easy for government officials to speak out about their chiefs and colleagues.

It can come as no surprise that no simple answer is given as to who decides or who has decisive influence. Decisions are marked by circumstances--external and internal--in the government, in Folketing or in the party.

And it goes without saying that developments leading up to a decision are often shaped or influenced by the Foreign Ministry and its key people. At one time the royal family played a role. That was the case in 1914 in connection with laying mines and to some extent it was the case during the occupation. In our day this does not happen. Bjøl must content himself with a note that at times royal visits are used for taking care of purely dynastic family interests. In every government and in each party there is a small group that is interested in and actively participates in the formation of a foreign policy concept. This does not have to be the foreign minister. When Hans Hedtoft wanted to lead the country into the Atlantic Treaty Organization, Foreign Minister Gustav Rasmussen felt that this would be like signing the nation's death sentence. But that did not prevent him from signing the treaty on behalf of Denmark and Gustav Rasmussen was enough of a professional diplomat that he remained without hesitation in that post from Knud Kristensen's government to Hans Hedtoft's. It is not always those with the greatest expertise or the strongest beliefs that facilitate decisions. Prior to the Social Democratic decision to elect NATO membership, Hedtoft asked Frode Jakobsen, who was anxious to join, not to say anything in the party's decision-making bodies, but he placed great stress on having old Kristian Bording, who was very highly regarded but knew nothing about foreign policy, speak out about his positive views on the subject.

The man who is prime minister can be very important in making decisions, but that is not always the case. When H. C. Hansen became foreign minister Hedtoft kept in the background. H. C. Hansen knew nothing about foreign policy, but he relied on Nils Svenningsen, who had just become director of the Foreign Ministry and had a strong background in his activity during the occupation and who according to Bjøl gave this office the strongest influence for a decade since the days of the legendary Peter Vedel from the previous century. When Krag became foreign minister, the minister's post gained in power--Krag apparently felt that he had enough experience to act on his own--and Svenningsen was replaced by the young Paul Fischer. Krag retained his influence on foreign policy when he became prime minister. Per Hækkerup traveled around a lot and he resigned after the formation of the red cabinet in anticipation that there might be a use for a new Social Democratic leader. That is probably why Krag named K. B. Andersen as foreign minister in the certainty that there would be no question of any rivalry or lack of loyalty. K. B. Andersen stayed on under Anker Jorgensen, whose character Krag esteemed very highly but who was so uncertain in the area of foreign policy in the first years that Krag was evidently disappointed that he had never been asked for advice. Anker Jorgensen can act on his own, as everyone must have realized as time went by. Of his relations with the foreign minister, Bjøl notes that he felt "distate" for Kjeld Olesen's style, whatever he means by that.

Obviously there is a large gallery of people in Bjøl's book, which will thus make a contribution to the writing of history. However this involves an expert's attempt to uncover the decision-making process and although the personalities may be decisive, many other things are involved too. Bjøl

goes back to the last century and via World War I and the occupation, he arrives at the postwar period and its big Danish decisions. He goes into the foreign service in depth and evaluates the importance of the activities of foreign ambassadors, which are often a result of personal characteristics. He reports Folketing's relationship to foreign policy, which has been marked in the postwar years by mounting interest by the parties and individual members in world affairs. While in the past, the Foreign Policy Board did not play a large role--H. C. Hansen would read them a few notes and that was the end of that--it has become a more important factor, even though in decisive situations, the government is apt to call in party chairman or at least the representatives of parties whose national loyalty is beyond question. Equally important is the Market Committee, which has become an important function in Folketing after Denmark joined EC. For good reasons, Bjol has not included the fact that in the last session of Folketing there was another tightening of the conditions under which the government can represent the country in dealing with its European partners. This kind of parliamentary body is probably unparalleled in any other EC member nation.

Naturally enough, the mood of the voters plays a large role for politicians. Krag was concerned about the outcome of the popular referendum on joining EC. Bjol rightly calls attention to the fact that the attitudes primarily noticed by politicians come from party officials and these certainly do not always represent the will of the people. The representative system gives those who are active and enthusiastic an advantage over those who will make up their own minds, and know what they want but do not participate actively in the activities of voter groups. Both in this country and elsewhere, there have been quite a few examples of districts that have nominated candidates who did not have a very solid base in the population, but represented the views held by only a small minority. There is scarcely any doubt that the present Social Democratic group lies more to the left of the political spectrum than the majority of Social Democratic voters. When one also has a party leader who in Bjol's words is apt to take a stand on the basis of his feelings and superficial arguments, there is something wrong.

Against the background of the events at Christiansborg in recent months, when the Social Democrats have mustered a majority that actually wants something different in the way of security policy than the government--the missile issue--what Bjol has to say about Folketing's foreign policy attitudes is interesting. He has a tendency to view parliament's role as one of erecting barriers and seldom views it as taking the initiative. He mentions an example when a majority not only controlled but formulated a foreign policy position, the parliamentary resolution of 19 January 1940 which expressed a determination to defend the nation--as a response to Stauning's defeatist New Year's speech. If Bjol had been able to include it, the missile debate would have given him even stronger examples. He is content to note that such an initiating role is hard to reconcile with the principles of parliamentarianism and is more at home in a system like the

American one which has a stricter separation of power between the legislative and executive branches. There are many items in Bjøl's book that are well worth going into more deeply.

Bjøl comes full circle and scarcely leaves a stone unturned. He was greatly inspired by the introverted Krag, who never seems to have said much, but whose participation, if it could have been carried to its final conclusion according to the original intention, would have made the book unique. But even in its abbreviated version, the book is very informative and its easily understood format should gain it a place outside the works of experts who want to find rules and systems that control the decision-making process. There is no schedule for how Denmark formulates its foreign policy or makes vital national decisions. Bjøl's conclusion is that in most cases decisions are made in the intersection between what is recommended by the relevant officials in the Foreign Ministry and what is acceptable to the Social Democratic Folketing group, primarily. The central politicians, the prime minister, the foreign minister, the defense minister and the market minister, have an arbitration role between these two groups and, to simplify things greatly, Danish foreign policy is formed in an interaction between the office chiefs of the Foreign Ministry and those Social Democratic back benchers who are interested in foreign policy. Making allowances for this oversimplified format, that is the way it has been in the periods--and they have been long ones--when the country has had a Social Democratic government. But does it also apply to a government that is in the minority and has Social Democrats who are opposed to a party leader who so often gives free play to his feelings and has no one who is capable of keeping his feet on the ground?

6578

CSO: 3613/154

INTERNATIONAL MEETING ON EEC MEMBERSHIP

Athens RIZOSPATSIS in Greek 19 Jul 83 p 1

/Text/ A 3-day international meeting on the subject "EEC -- Experiences and Prospects for Disengagement" opened yesterday at the KKE House meeting hall in Perisso. The meeting was organized by ESAK-S /United Antidictatorial Labor Movement-Cooperating/, DIKEVE /Democratic Movement of Merchants, Handicraftsmen and Businessmen/ and the "Panepistimoniki" /University/, in cooperation with the KKE Eurodeputies. The meeting was opened by K. Marangoudakis, ESAK-S vice president, while S. Kourouzidis, secretary of the "Panepistimoniki," delivered a short speech.

Yesterday's meeting was devoted to political and military developments in the EEC. Speeches included those by Alf Lomas, a British Labor Party Eurodeputy, who talked about the militarization of the EEC; Gens-Peter Bode, a Danish Eurodeputy, who spoke on the development of EEC institutions; and Comrade V. Efraimidis, KKE Eurodeputy, who discussed the integration policy. The dozens of questions and comments that followed the speeches provided the opportunity to clear up a whole series of questions on the above-mentioned issues.

Alf Lomas, the British Labor Party Eurodeputy, analyzed the reasons for the increase in the militarization of the EEC ("European unity," covering of the economic crisis, opposition to the peace movement) and he especially stood up against the attempts for a joint armaments policy and an increase of the EEC naval forces. He stated, "We have to stand up with all our might against the EEC efforts to get involved in defense and armaments...To the contrary, we have to convince the governments of the member states and NATO to answer the peaceful proposals made by the United Nations, the non-aligned countries and the Warsaw Pact."

Danish Eurodeputy Gens-Peter Bode, of the people's movement for the disengagement of his country from the EEC, stressed, "What we are afraid of is the salami-cutting methods in the selling out of small pieces of national independence every week, every 2 weeks. By using these methods, those defenders of the EEC in our country have succeeded in making all sorts of changes in the 10 years that we have participated in it." The Danish Eurodeputy, who made a special analysis of the issue of the "political cooperation" of the joint EEC political actions and the strengthening of the authority of the Eurodeputy, also gave many facts on the general and genuine opposition by the Danish people to the "political consolidation" of the EEC.

Who Has Changed?

KKE Eurodeputy Comrade V. Efraimidis, who analyzed the reactionary nature of this integration, stressed, "Without interceding in any way to change the nature and aims of political integration, the prime minister now talks about 'a Europe of peoples' and about 'a Europe of the workers.' Is this political naivete or delusion? We are obliged to respond negatively." Comrade Efraimidis made a short report on the major phases for political integration of the EEC (Tindemans and Genser-Colombo plans, Stuttgart proclamation, etc.), revealed the aims and the prospects of the so-called "European Union" as well as the EEC stance against socialist countries and in favor of reactionary regimes. He concluded by analyzing the reasons for the ever growing and increasing mass and political struggles for the disengagement of our country from the EEC.

Attending the international meeting were many members of the KKE Central Committee and the KNE /Greek Communist Youth/ Central Council; KKE Deputies Kappos and Marodoglou; P. Makris, mayor of Kaisariani; St. Logothetis, mayor of Nikaia; K. Nikolaidis, mayor of Vyron; N. Paximadas, mayor of Petroupolis; as well as representatives of the Agrarian Party headed by its secretary, Mr Selianitis; M. Pytharoulis, president of ESAK-S; G. Manolakos, president of OTOE /Federation of Greek Bank Employees Organizations/; Th. Papamargaris, president of the Employees of the Bank of Greece; Katimertzis, president of OVSE /expansion unknown/; university professor Rokos; many representatives of mass groups, municipal councilors, trade union officials, etc.

5671

CSO: 3521/390

POLITICAL

GREECE

POSSIBLE FALL GOVERNMENT RESHUFFLE

Athens ELEVETHEROTYPIA in Greek 18 Jul 83 p 1

/Text/ Having gotten rid of the bases problem --once the bases agreement was initialed-- the government is now turning all of its attention to internal matters that relate to the recovery of the economy, confrontation of the unemployment situation, improvement of public administration and satisfaction of social needs, particularly in the fields of welfare and health.

The above was mentioned by a government source who has linked the handling of a more dynamic internal policy to the possibility of an immediate, although limited, government reshuffle or to changes in the bank administrations.

Referring to published reports and to widespread rumors of the past few days to the effect that it is very possible that Prime Minister A. Papandreou will carry out a "mini" government reshuffle on his return from Kerkyra, the same government source told ELEVETHEROTYPIA, "This fall and we will then see."

The government source added that the prime minister --who is being accompanied by President of Parliament I. Alevras-- is concerned with the implementation as quickly as possible of those measures the government has already taken on the major domestic issues and is studying those files that relate to institutional changes in various areas, such as the health bill that is scheduled to be put before parliament at the end of July.

5671

CSO: 3521/390

MITIGATED POPULAR SATISFACTION ON AGREEMENT REPORTED

Athens ELEVTHERTOTYPIA in Greek 18 Jul 83 p 3

/Excerpts/ The initialing of the bases agreement is the issue of interest to most Greek citizens even though 3 days have elapsed since the announcement of the agreement.

Wherever one goes, to bus stops, on buses, or coffeehouses, "watering spots" of the politically-inclined, in the underground passage of Omonoia Square or on the Propylaia, one observes that the issue of the bases and the bases agreement is the primary topic of conversation.

What is the opinion of the Athenians? Do they or do they not consider the agreement a positive step for our country? Do they consider the planning proper? Do they have reservations and what kind?

In an attempt to provide answers to the above questions, ELEVTHERTOTYPIA went out into the streets of Athens and contacted dozens of people of every age group and sex and put the following question to them: "As a Greek citizen, how do you feel about the agreement over the American bases?"

The answers given were varied. Almost all, however, had one point in common. Men and women, workers and students "agreed" that beyond political considerations, the Greek people must stand by the government "because the time element for the withdrawal of the bases is an important fact."

From the "mini" reporting job --if, of course, you can call it that-- it appears that most Athenians believe that the bases agreement that the government succeeded in getting is "the best that could be gotten today."

Many also expressed a reservation, in other words to what extent the 1988 government will respect the law of the land and will move forward toward the withdrawal of the bases. On this point they stressed that they would have liked something more binding for the government that would exercise power after a 5-year period.

Pro and Con

Organizations, municipalities, associations and many mass groups, through their announcements and resolutions, are taking a position on the big bases issue,

either hailing or condemning the initialing of the agreement with the United States.

Coming out in favor of the initialing is the president of PASEGES /Panhellenic Supreme Confederation of Unions of Agricultural Cooperatives/ who "expresses the feeling of national pride that particularly prevails in the agricultural cooperative circles of the country." Also, PASK /Panhellenic Militant Workers Trade Union/ of businessmen, handicraftsmen and merchants of Salonica.

Coming out against the agreement is the EEDYE /Greek Committee for International Detente and Peace/ that calls for demonstrations with regard to this matter. Also, the EEDYE of Salonica that is today organizing a rally in front of the statue of Venizelos. Also, the Union of Workers and Employees of the Pharmaceutical Industry of the Attiki Basin, as well as the municipal council of Nikaia and the Agrarian Party of Greece.

An announcement by the Communist Youth of Greece stresses that "with the initialing of the American bases agreement the people's mandate that was expressed both in popular struggles and in the 1981 elections has been ignored."

5671

CSO: 3521/390

POLL ON UNION WITH SPAIN RAISES POLITICAL CONTROVERSY

Initial Poll Results

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 2 Jul 83 p 1

[Text] According to what can be concluded from an EXPRESSO/EUROEXPANSAO poll conducted in continental Portugal during the second half of June, more than one fourth of the Portuguese people would favor a political union between Portugal and Spain. In effect 26 percent of the almost 600 persons who were interviewed responded affirmatively to the question, "Do you believe there should be a political union between Portugal and Spain with the same head of state and prime minister for both?" More than half (59 percent) came out in favor of maintaining the Iberian status quo and 15 percent did not know or did not want to respond (see chart).

This poll was conducted within the framework of a study concerning the current state of Luso-Spanish relations which we will publish in next week's "A Revista" section. We will also publish the complete poll at that time. We have now revealed the most significant results from this enquiry.

The study EXPRESSO ordered shows a strong fluctuation of values when the "region" and "education" variables are analyzed in the response to the question of political union between the two Iberian nations (see chart). In effect, the desire to abolish the Portuguese-Spanish borders is strongest (31 percent) in the northern coastal area (more or less in Minho and Beira Litoral) while that feeling is shared by only 15 percent of those interviewed in the southern interior (the Alentejo more or less).

As for the education level of those interviewed, we see that the Iberian feeling has deeper roots among the less educated. The Iberian option is the choice of 29 percent of those whose education does not go beyond the primary level and 24 percent of those who studied after the fourth grade but did not go beyond the fifth year [corresponding with our ninth grade]. On the other hand, only 6 percent of those who completed high school or university level studies think in the same manner.

Significantly, this study also suggests that the idea of a political union with Spain is rejected more among the economically well off than among others. We will analyze these and other data in the next edition.

	TOTAL	REGION				EDUCATION		
		North Coastal	North Interior	South Coastal	South Interior	Primary	5th Year	High School or more
Yes	26	31	23	24	15	29	24	6
No	59	55	53	64	69	52	71	82
Do not know	15	14	24	12	16	19	5	12
Do not respond								

Identity Crisis Deplored

Lisbon O DIA in Portuguese 5 Jul 83 p 1

[Text] From time to time, some responsible people touch the wound that explains all the ailments afflicting the national body politic. The crises (the leadership and economic crises), the absenteeism and corruption are nothing more than the result of that larger wound which is causing a hemorrhage that is sapping the energy we need. Anyone with doubts, or who absolutely refuses to accept the truth, must have been appalled by the results of the poll the EXPRESSO published last weekend. One fourth of the Portuguese questioned admit they favor a political union with Spain with the same head of state and the same prime minister...

My God, what this means!... How will we be able to raise vital national solidarity to the highest degree during such unfavorable times?... Where does the blame lie and who is responsible for ending (this country's) renowned stirring and heroic feeling that, through the centuries, explained our survival as an independent, sovereign people that is spread throughout the Earth?... Have we arrived at the end of our long walk through history?....

This is an identity crisis in its aspects and expression. Brusquely and hastily amputated, the state has made this terrible trauma reverberate in each citizen's conscience. The children no longer recognize the ancestral home. This is the greater drama. It, undoubtedly, [means] that for many, it is permanent exile, simply waiting for the end, indifference or adapting themselves to the confusion they believe is inevitable.

If this crisis continues, the other crises will fatalistically continue to grow...

Balsemao Attacked, Treason Charged

Lisbon O DIABO in Portuguese 5 Jul 83 pp 1, 5

[Editorial by Vera Lagoa: "High Treason"]

[Text] The newspapers recently ran an interview Mr Eanes gave to the Spanish newspaper LA VANGUARDIA in which the president of the republic let it be clearly understood that the idea of forming a federation with Spain would be something (for him) to consider.

It is now Mr Pinto Balsemao's (whom we unfortunately had as prime minister) newspaper that ordered and published a "poll" which, according to that periodical, reportedly shows that (and I quote) "one fourth of the Portuguese people want a political union with Spain."

These are two facts that, coming from where they do, cannot be disregarded either because of the joint treachery they show or by the high treason they contain.

The question put by the former prime minister's newspaper is clear in its intention and malice. Here is the question: "Do you feel there should be a political union between Portugal and Spain with the same head of state and the same prime minister for both?" To such a question (I quote) "26 percent of the almost 600 interviewed" responded affirmatively.

If we take for granted the scientific seriousness of such a poll and the "strict conditions" which allowed the "desire" of "almost 600 persons" to be extrapolated into the overall desire of the Portuguese, I then ask, with what legitimacy can someone put the nation's very independence and sovereignty in doubt? This is to say that to ask such a question is already, in and of itself, an act of treason.

That is what Mr Balsemao's, the former prime minister's, newspaper did. And, apparently, it did it with impunity.

A few days ago, an agent of Nicaragua's Sandinist regime passed through Lisbon on a publicity campaign for his regime which is so much to the liking of the ill-starred former prime minister's weekly and the Left in general.

I recall a sentence from what I read in the newspapers concerning this matter. As a matter of fact, this particular sentence served as a banner headline in some of the newspapers. It read, "Sovereignty is not discussed, it is defended."

By copying Salazar (who said the same thing many years earlier in reference to Portugal), the Sandinist was limiting himself, in the end, to stating a basic value, a natural concept that exists within all men, with the exception of the degenerate traitorous scum. For these people, dogmas and borders are only those of their personal interests and sordid egoisms.

Thus, it seems that the treachery of April (to which the money and ideological internations and the East simultaneously opened their doors) has not yet accomplished its task.

With all the overseas provinces abandoned to Russian imperialism and the oil multinationals (with a trail of misery and a number of deaths that are infinitely bigger than those of the "unjust war" that "it was necessary to end"), it is now necessary to auction off the remaining rectangle.

Little by little, they are instilling in the desperate minds of those who were "liberated" in April and are now near hunger and at the mercy of a corrupting and corrupt state, the idea that the solution lies with having Portugal absorbed by Spain!

That is all that was left!

It does not surprise me that such an indignity should go through Mr Eanes' head. Did he not just now decorate some of the most aberrant and criminal protagonists of the April farce with the (oh, irony!) "Order of Freedom?"

It also does not surprise me that the boss of the EXPRESSO, a member of the Trilateral, the Bilderberg Group and other money internationals allows his business sheet to be the vehicle chosen for the most despicable treason. Can it now be advantageous to the husband of the Spaniard Mrs Mercedes and eminent skier of the Guadarrama, who is in good measure responsible for the economic, financial and moral downfall of the nation during the last few years, to make his "work" disappear in the fragmented belly of neighboring Spain?

Can it be that we, "in this country", have lost the sense of honor, patriotism, independence and dignity and that no one is going to raise his voice to punish the traitors who, I well suspect, are preparing the last act of the "liberation" of April which is the political disappearance of Portugal as a free and independent nation (or remainder of a nation).

"Noble people", poor people! "Courageous nation", it is time to scream out loud, "to arms"! And grab hold of them.

9935

CS0: 3542/161

SOARES' PCP DISMISSAL: COURAGEOUS DECISIONS NOW NEEDED

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 25 Jun 83 p 3

[Editorial by Jose Antonio Saraiva]

[Text] Monday in parliament, while responding to communist deputy Carlos Carvalhas and after having called to mind that the PCP [Portuguese Communist Party] had improperly tried to join the last elections' winning majority, the prime minister told him, as one would tell an undesired houseguest, "I ask you to get out of this majority because you are not needed."

The episode would not have been in the least abnormal if, hours before, when presenting the government's program, Mario Soares had not asked the opposition for a "political and social truce" and if, of all the opposition parties, the PCP were not the strongest, the most capable of provoking political instability and the only one with real possibilities of promoting large scale social agitation.

In other words, if Soares wanted a truce, the first party with which he would have to have cordial relations with would be the Portuguese Communist Party.

From what we saw, it will be difficult for this to happen.

Another problem arises, however. If the prime minister were not Soares but someone more calculating and less emotional, would it be possible for this government to have good relations with the communists?

Or furthermore, can a government that does not include the PCP ever expect good will and complacency from it?

The answer is no.

It is no because until the day when the Communist Party enters a ministry and is forced to compromise and give up thing, its internal balance will not change and there will be no changes in its leadership.

It is for this very reason that the PCP's rejection by the system offers Cunhal an unattackable argument, that of being able to accuse of treason

and subjugation to the enemy all those who struggle within the party for liberalization and an opening up.

If the democratic game turns the communists away, how can you accept that a communist will fight for democracy?

With the question put this way, there are only two ways of facing the PCP, either as an ally or as an enemy.

That is, either the PCP is allowed to enter the government, with the belief this will make it change, or the PCP is kept out of government, with the advance knowledge there will be tenacious opposition.

Mario Soares understood it was not possible nor convenient for the nation to form a government which included the Communist Party.

It was his right to do so.

But we must then expect the necessary courage and determination from him to face up to the communist opposition.

It is of little interest, in addition to being useless, to speak of truces.

It is of no interest at all to put off measures because of fear they will provoke agitation or conflicts.

From this point on the government will have to act not in relation to the opposition but in relation to itself.

No matter what decisions it makes, the PCP will always be at war with it.

Since this is how it is, it is preferable that Mario Soares has the initiative and not Alvaro Cunhal.

That is, it is preferable to have the prime minister's office challenging the communists and choosing the moment for confronting them than to give the communists the privilege of choosing the moment for attacking the government.

9935

CSO: 3542/159

BALSEMAO SEEN ADUMBRATING POSSIBLE POLITICAL RETURN

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 1 Jul 83 p 2

[Editorial]

[Text] Pinto Balsemao is a satisfied man. He says it openly or leaves it understood in various places during the long interview DIARIO DE NOTICIAS published in its Sunday edition. This interview is a work of undeniable importance for understanding the many aspects of our recent history. He left the government under the cross fire of all the opposition parties (which would be normal) and of all the social partners, which is less natural if we keep in mind just how close the positions of certain employer federations were with those of the pre-Balsemao Democratic Alliance [AD]. His CDS [Social Democratic Center Party] allies found him worthy of direct or surreptitious resistance, he was forced to resign--more so than being forced to choose resignation--in the framework of the longest and consuming opposition a party leader was ever subjected to within his own party. He was removed in an almost cruel way from the positions he held in the PSD [Social Democratic Party] leadership. He does not, however, feel as though he has been defeated.

He is bitter, of course, of the betrayals he feels he was the victim of. The way things evolved politically during the last months proves that, in reality, these were not mere ghosts or a simple matter of a persecution complex. However, can everything be boiled down to betrayals? The former prime minister, with a clear conscience, does not even ask himself about the origins of the controversies his governments raised in such different sectors as the CIP [Portuguese Industry Confederation] and the CGTP [General Federation of Portuguese Workers] during the last two and one half years. In the stock taking interview, Pinto Balsemao favors listing those actions he describes as positive, without giving any particular prominence to some errors that must have been committed during the longest mandate a prime minister has had since democracy was restored in Portugal.

Pinto Balsemao places the constitutional revision on top of the list of achievements realized during his tenure in office. He says, "That is what I am proudest of." At the same time, and somewhat unexpectedly, the former prime minister defends the presidential system. "The present system of government is neither fish nor foul." It is without a doubt Balsemao's most controversial statement and one which creates the most bewilderment.

The truth is that the constitution revision, which it is good to remember only took place a year ago, does not increase, but rather, attempts to decrease the powers of the president of the republic. Neither the revision the former prime minister is so proud of (which was the product of negotiations with the PS [Socialist Party]) nor the initial AD proposal (this was surely the "desirable" one although it was impossible [to obtain] since the Alliance did not have the two thirds parliamentary majority) were aimed at altering the system in the way Balsemao now foresees it. What is this brusque change due to? What makes the former prime minister now defend what he, or his deputies in his place, fought against only one year ago? No one would like to have to admit that the parties responsible for revising the constitution sacrificed principles simply to "disarm" the current president. In the same manner, no one would dare accuse Balsemao of having brought this question to the fore in order to defend himself by faulting the system. Other, for now suspect, goals may underlie that particular problem. The future will tell. If anything was made clear in Balsemao's interview (beyond the fact that he does not feel he has been defeated), it was that he also does not resign himself to the condition of being a political retiree. A return can be hammered out between two points of time.

9935

CSO: 3542/159

PS' LABOR LEFT ABSENT IN MOTION OF CONFIDENCE

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 27 Jun 83 p 4

[Text] In a communique distributed after the vote on the government's confidence motion, the Labor Left socialists declare that they have no faith in "the governmental solution found, which is based on the support of the Right, when a wider balance should have also been attempted on the Left".

The supporters of the Labor Left motion, headed by Marcelo Curto, reaffirm they will not oppose the present government, "respecting the decision made by the PS's National Committee". However, they could not be demanded to vote affirmatively for the government's motion of confidence, which is the reason for their decision not to be present.

They also state in the same communique that they think the motion Mario Soares will put to the PS's fifth congress "does not correspond with what should be demanded of him in clearly defining the alternatives and the party's future." From their point of view, "it is an unnecessary repetition of the threats arising from the crisis we are experiencing", insisting "in a disproportionate way on a party motion to a government solution which the party has already adopted by a majority vote."

They add that "the PS's autonomous course or course direction cannot be seen" in this motion. It "foresees the party's autonomy vis-a-vis the government but it contradictorily subordinates the PS's objectives to those of the government."

Moreover, "it foresees the decentralization of the PS's local and regional bodies; yet, in practice, it reenforces the centralism of the national bodies", it affirms "the legitimacy of diversity within the PS, but nods in a contradictory manner by strengthening the party's internal discipline."

The Labor Left takes the opportunity to explain and develop some points of its motion. It defends "a democratic left bloc which would find workable solutions to the immediate problems of the Portuguese people."

BRIEFS

PASTORA APPEAL TO SOARES--Eden Pastora, the rebel Nicaraguan commander, appealed to Mario Soares for support against the Sandinist government. "Commander Zero" said in an interview broadcast yesterday by National Spanish Radio that he was "especiallly" counting on the help of the Portuguese prime minister. When DIARIO DE NOTICIAS contacted the prime minister's office, it was unable to get any statement on the matter. Pastora asked for help from "the world's democratic forces" especially from "companionario Mario Soares who struggled energetically against dictatorships of the Right and of the Left." He denied in the interview having said he was going to give up the armed struggle against the Sandinist regime and he specified that the goal of the cease-fire had been to renegotiate conditions of support. In the meantime, he acknowledged not yet having received tangible support, although he has "serious" promises. He noted that the assistance from the United States comes from politicians. [Text] [Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 1 Jul 83 p 3] 9935

PS, PSD TEMPORARY LEADERSHIP--Tuesday, the PS [Socialist Party] parliamentary group will elect its new leadership to be presided by Walter Rosa. This is a temporary solution which will last until October when the next legislative session will begin. This temporary solution was due to Sottomayor Cardia's refusal to assume the leadership for the time being. Four vice presidents will be elected with Walter Rosa. They are: Luis Saias, Almerindo Marques, Carlos Laje, and Jose Niza. Meanwhile, the PSD [Social Democratic Party] leadership was able to pass through its parliamentary group a proposal adjourning the election of a new leadership also until October. As a result, Vitor Crespo, Fernando Condesso, Lemos Damiao and Cardoso Ferreira, who were elected before parliament was dissolved, temporarily remain at the head of the social democratic benches. This was the formula the PSD found in order not to openly jeopardize Vitor Crespo, its semi-official candidate, and, moreover, avoid a confrontation between the parliamentary group and sectors that are proposing Salgueiro's candidacy. This solution was approved by the PSD parliamentary group with 20 votes in favor, 18 against and 3 abstentions. [Text] [Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 25 Jun 83 p 4] 9935

CARRILLO MOUNTS INTERNAL PCE OPPOSITION

Madrid ABC in Spanish 1 Jul 83 p 23

[Article by M. Bernal]

[Text] The 3-day long tense and bitter marathon confrontation between "pro-Gerardo" and "pro-Carrillo" members ended at 0600 hours yesterday morning at daybreak with almost two-thirds of the Central Committee of the PCE [Spanish Communist Party] supporting the reformist line of Gerardo Iglesias, the secretary general.

During this vital debate the purpose of which was to outline the course to be followed by the 11th congress in December, the real issues already under discussion were, on the one hand, the guidelines of communist strategy in the near future and, on the other hand, the power structure within the party. Taking this a step further, it could be thought that they were trying to determine the nature, the identity of the PCE which has followed a somewhat slack, if not erratic and ambiguous course under the auspices of Carrillo during the transition years.

The Gerardo Iglesias team and the "followers" of the former secretary general had both assessed perfectly well the significance of this meeting and they staked their all on it right until the last moment. The "inflexible" sector, now tightly knit around Carrillo went to great lengths with the usual dialectic tricks in a desperate attempt to spoil the moment of victory for "Gerardin." When the debate was already lost and the die was cast, Carrillo's supporters, through their "standard-bearer" Jaime Ballesteros, who still holds the post of deputy secretary, tried to throw a monkey wrench in the works by proposing an alternative to Iglesias' report. But the reformers did not fall for this trick and Carrillo and his supporters, the most illustrious members of the apparatus, called it a day and withdrew from the Preparatory Commission for the congress.

The proceedings and results of the meeting lead us to draw a whole series of conclusions and implications. The first, and most obvious, is that Carrillo has lost and that he has lost definitively. He is the main victim in the intertwining conflicts which, partly "thanks" to him, have thrown the party into convulsions during the past 10 years.

Back in the 1960's, Carrillo stole the Eurocommunism of Claudin and Semprun "before they had secured a copyright on their idea" and later he claimed that it was his own invention. With the old "lampedusian" formula of introducing some changes while everything remains the same, he was trying to win the professional and university sectors, the most lively nucleus of the PCE in transition. And so he won a victory at the Ninth Congress with his Eurocommunist fiction. But hardly anybody was deceived and already during the 10th Congress he was opposed by the reformers who were genuine Eurocommunists. He went on to win two more battles but it was a very close thing: he pushed the "rebels" into the Central Committee--Zaldivar, Jaime Sartorius, Segura, Lerchundi--and later, foundering in the catastrophe of 28 October [General Election Day] he tried to "perpetuate" himself provisionally through Gerardo Iglesias. A "full house" hand as time would show. The best minds of the PCE and the most reformist elements, stayed at the top--Sartorius, Claret, Camacho, Palero and, above all Enrique Curiel acting as the brains. "Gerardin" endorsed that choice, the only possible one, and strangely enough he was also joined by the "recycled" members of the old guard such as Sanchez Montero--at one time Carrillo's alter ego--Romero Marin, Lucio Lobate...Carrillo was left with the remnants of the apparatus and with his praetorian guard. He has been forced to turn to his usual backers, the inflexible and authoritarian faction which stands close to "real socialism" as they say. In other words, to the USSR. The only thing left to him is the always gratifying self-indulgence of feeling that he has become a scapegoat. That and to go on being a nuisance.

The second conclusion is that the balance of forces has undergone a 180-degree turn. Until Iglesias was elected, Carrillo had two-thirds of the Central Committee and the reformers the rest. Today, the opposite is true. The former leaders has become the "loyal" opposition with all its implications.

Third conclusion: now for the first time ever, the power structure and, in the final analysis, the reformist strategy have a chance to become clearer.

Fourth conclusion: Only the fight starts again at the top for control of the General Secretariat with Sartorius as the epicenter, will Carrillo have a chance of seeing the conflict drag on and the PCE could become a token party for good. Or it could break up.

8796

CSO: 3548/461

DEL CAMPO ASSESSES IMPACT OF INTERNAL PCE CRISIS

Madrid YA in Spanish 1 Jul 83 p 7

[Commentary by Salustiano Del Campo: "The Communist Crisis"]

[Text] The meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, which ended yesterday in the early hours of the morning, raises several points of interest besides the personal conflicts. These conflicts exist and came to the surface as a result of allowing members of the media to be present during the debates but the reasons for these conflicts are far more real than it would appear at first sight. Even the generation gap is a factor although it remained in the background because some of the old communists have sided with Gerardo Iglesias and with the young leaders.

Since the conference held in December last year, the party has regained 1 million votes in the municipal elections and the Socialist Party has noticeably departed from its program. This was to be expected even before the party came to power but one could not have foreseen that the changes would be so obvious so soon. At present the PCE finds itself with a parliamentary representation far smaller than its popular support and, with the shift to the Right by the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers' Party], it could initiate a new strategy of expansion. And this is the first issue on which the official position and the position of Santiago Carrillo are at variance with the latter, strangely enough, advocating now, at least in part, that which he opposed not so long ago. The current secretary general feels that the loss of popularity of the ruling party will increase the number of those who vote for his own party and that these prospects, together with a wise manipulation of the mass movements, could result in Felipe Gonzalez needing to cooperate with the communists. People are openly saying that this could happen in 1986 but in private they admit that the deterioration of the situation could result in communist ministers being appointed during the current legislature. Some will oppose the move, no doubt, but the advantages are more than the disadvantages and there is nothing as persuasive as power. In this process, the PCE would start by acting as a sort of critical conscience of the Left--the Jiminy Cricket that Carrillo talks about--and would end by becoming integrated in the government which is its most cherished dream. Meanwhile the PCE would pursue a sensible policy to attract the party members who left its ranks giving them again their past hopes of making gains. For Santiago Carrillo, on the other hand, the fact that he is no longer in a position of power has helped

him to think about his recent political experience. "Without analyzing the transition," he acknowledged in his report, "there cannot be nor will there be a definition of a clear-cut Eurocommunist project nor can one understand what happened on 28 October." It is not by accident that Iglesias summed up his negative opinion with regard to that process without mincing his words: "We asked the country to choose between a democratic front and involution. The country's answer was to give an absolute majority to the PSOE and four deputies to us." This is very hard but it is true. On the other hand, it is not so certain that the best thing for the PCE is to do now what it failed to do on that occasion.

A communist recovery, which until a few months ago seemed very difficult to achieve, is now something possible because the ruling party had departed so much from its electoral program. This party will also follow with interest the question of internal discussions among communists because their outcome could bring a big surprise. For the time being, and with the reservations called for by the situation, the existence of two clear-cut positions within the PCE--one of critical support and another of confrontation--is less of a blessing for the PSOE than one would be initially inclined to believe.

8796

CSO: 3548/461

PSOE 'ZIGZAGS, CONTRADICTIONS' SHAKE MADRID CREDIBILITY

Madrid DIARIO 16 in Spanish 30 Jun 83 p 5

[Commentary by Jose Luis Gutierrez]

[Text] Readers, it is distressing to observe how again and again human beings show themselves to be inherently incapable of learning from outside experiences and warnings, and always require their own misfortunes to correct erroneous decisions and mistakes.

The parallelism that is observed between the postures of the government and the party in power and those of that prodigious and fleeting fiction of the UCD, is astonishing.

The chaotic centrist dispersion - each leader to his own side - was then justified by those in charge of the party as a simple reflection of the healthy internal pluralism of a scrupulously democratic party.

In the case of the socialist government, the zigzagging and the contradictions are also the order of the day.

I am not referring, readers, to the hasty retreat of the PSOE on some questions such as NATO, or even more flagrantly that of the Civil Guard (I still remember the fierce parliamentary socialist pressuring of the then Defense Minister Agustin Rodriguez Sahagun, to move toward the demilitarization of the Civil Guard), the corps that is now unequivocally a militant part of the socialists.

At various intermediate levels of the government one can already detect the same stupid, suicidal obstinacy that characterized some periods and some of the men in the centrist collective, an attitude in this case modified and enlarged by the ignorant, near-sighted and pigheaded arrogance of some of the government spokesmen.

Example: Already over the temperate walls of Moncloa the gloomy cloud of "UCD-ization", "the suarezation" is gliding threateningly around its perimeters. Adolfo Suarez was systematically harassed by the then opposition leaders, who accused him of isolating himself in the protective maternal cloister of the palace, surrounded by his loyal subjects and remaining silent before the parliament. Precisely the same thing that is already beginning to occur with President

Gonzalez. Seven months in power and Gonzalez Marquez, who was in other times the brilliant and outspoken member of parliament, now in the presidency continues virtually without having appeared at the speakers platform. He let pass by the incident of the "Rumasa case", that of the hasty signing of the Latin-American agreements, and more recently, the "great debate" on foreign policy, opting for the most comfortable solution, protecting himself with the obliging comfort of the absolute majority, leaving everything until September.

The NATO case is especially serious and could become a 'test' question for President Gonzalez. Amazement, surprise and astonishment are today the most widespread reactions among political observers to Felipe's incomprehensible statements to the socialist group in parliament, indicating that the government will not come out either in favor of or against the NATO referendum. This affirmation seems to be an exact copy of the cowardly, eccentric and inhibited attitude of the Suarez government when faced with the famous Andalusian referendum and its absurd little issue.

What is happening, readers? The socialist government, whose members are undoubtedly responsible, sensible people, are taking notice of, and now suffering the consequences of, the runaway demagoguery, of which they made use in the most recent past. During their years of opposition and struggle for power, nothing stopped them from promising unattainable goals if in exchange their ballot boxes were going to reap some electoral benefit. The senselessness of the 800,000 jobs, the cited case of the Civil War, the FACA plan and the formerly offending F-18's and NATO are just some chapters in a very long etcetera, which show up to just what point the PSOE leaders stuffed their mouths with promises that were impossible to fulfill.

However, what is alarming is the attitude of these same leaders toward the demands of public opinion about their election promises.

It is worrisome that the only strategy that the socialists seem to have is, in synthesis, the same one that gave them such good results during their years of opposition: dividing up the roles -- Guerra 'the tough', Felipe 'the moderate' -- to say one thing here another there, always according to the nature of the audience. Readers, to govern is to choose. And as this absurd and dizzying push-pull of contradictory declarations continues -- i.e. NATO -- the government is going to lose its credibility in torrents, not only at home, but also in international circles, where our astonished neighbors are watching Vaudeville.

9730

CS0: 3548/462

LETTER DETAILS SOCIAL MOTIVATIONS FOR HUNGER STRIKE

London ISCININ SESI in Turkish 13 Jun 83 p 24

[Text] Comrades,

On 9 April 1983, blue and white collar workers in our organizational unit got together and planned a hunger strike. This strike is still in effect. We undertook this action for specific demands, and we would like to explain what we are doing.

In the aftermath of the shock created by those who died in Zonguldak as a result of labor-related crime as well as by the attitude of the bourgeoisie, a series of events began among blue and white collar workers.

On 10 April, meal prices in our work unit rose 100 percent for blue collar workers and 50 percent for white collar workers. We began to react strongly. We sought a solution. Some workers started ranting and raving. Others remained silent, hesitant because of the atmosphere, but agreeing nevertheless that something absolutely had to be done. So we all said, "Let's not eat the meals; let's show them our economic demands!" All blue collar workers told us that they too would support our action and not eat.

On the first actual day of our strike, 40 percent of the blue and white collar workers did not eat meals. At lunch time, we all took bread and cheese and set up big tables in the yard for your job site.

These tables became the scene of far-reaching political discussions. We talked about the reasons for labor crimes, our union problems, the Higher Education Council laws, the new political parties law, issues regarding women, and the situation of our comrades in prison. We laid fascism out on the table. Those workers who had avoided joining the discussion at first slowly joined in by citing examples from their daily lives.

The employers began sending memos and issuing warnings. They started reminding white collar workers about the law. They advised us not to set up big tables, but said that we did not have to eat the meals if we did not want to. They constantly told us that specially assigned people would be getting involved with this incident and weeding out the instigators. First they

said that we were committing a political crime and that martial law was therefore taking an interest in the incident. Then they told us that we did not understand the economic situation, that the cost of living was high and that these meal prices were even cheap. They warned us, "Don't be a tool in the hands of others; we know who they are and they are going to be punished."

The workers have learned something from all of this. They have learned that there is nothing to fear and nothing they cannot do if they stick together. At this point, they have started asking questions: "Why haven't we received the bonuses and pay differentials that we were supposed to get two years ago?" Of course, those responsible are replying that they do not know and that we should go ask the government and the Supreme Juridicial Council.

From the onset of our effort, we blue collar workers recognized the white collar workers and understood their problems. We began seriously watching the situation of political prisoners. We also understood the problems of the students. Naturally, the employers were not standing around and doing nothing. They had a few people secretly investigated. They had some workers fired and others switched to different job locations.

As a result of this incident, it has become apparent to the workers that they need to organize--but under a revolutionary organization. They have said that they want to learn about the central organs of the party that is leading them in their struggle. As of now, blue and white collar workers are no longer eating together, but they are still sitting together talking. Because a law against setting up big tables for meals has been enacted, nothing is eaten during lunch hour.

What do other revolutionaries think about all of this? One group's remark was: "Today is not the right time for this incident. You have no idea what fascism is. You're stirring up agitation and pushing the masses. Let's first shape up our key elements, and then we'll move into action." Another group critical of our action commented: "You were right to act, but you went about it the wrong way. Your demands will not become known through such meetings, nor will they get far by having everyone at the markets and fruit stands saying 'We are holding a boycott.' What you should have done was send your demands to the necessary places with a long list of petitions."

Well, comrades, you know what we are doing. We are also distributing communiques. Some parties and groups are calling us opportunists. They seem to have forgotten their struggle against fascism and are only fighting against us now. We have started speaking with some of the Mensheviks. Rapprochement is taking place, but slowly. They are constantly asking about our central organization.

Just remember that the flower that was thought to have wilted without ever blooming in the early summer will bloom every autumn from the rain of Labor?

SOVIET SUBMARINE MAY HAVE INTRUDED, LOST SONAR BUOY

Foreign Submarine Holds Advantage

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 27 Jul 83 p 5

[Article by Dan Axel]

[Text] Danish ships and planes in Greenland do not have a reasonable chance of locating submerged foreign submarines in Greenland waters.

This emerges quite clearly from a "Report on Submarine Observations Off Greenland," which Defense Minister Hans Engell sent to Folketing's Defense Committee after at least one foreign submarine was spotted in Disko Bay 14 days ago.

"Although the foreign submarine may have left the territory as early as 13 July (the search got under way on 15 July, Ed.), the effort that was ordered in is regarded as both reasonable and necessary in order to demonstrate a determination to maintain sovereignty," Hans Engell wrote in the report.

"But with the airplanes and ships available to us, the chance of locating a submerged foreign submarine in the territory is extremely limited," said the defense minister, who called off the search on 19 July.

The conning tower of a submarine was observed at close range by a town official in Akunak--16 nautical miles east of Egedesminde--while he was out fishing. Egedesminde police have also reported that at least five Greenland boats made observations in the period 11-13 July which suggested the presence of a submarine in Disko Bay.

A reconnaissance plane from the Danish Fishing Inspectorate and the inspection cutter "Adleq" were immediately set in to search for the sub, while the inspection ship "Ingolf" with a helicopter did not reach the area until 18 July.

Even after questioning witnesses of the submarine's passage in Disko Bay, it was not possible to determine the nationality of the submarine, but it

is certain that it slipped inside the territorial limit. All the observations were made in an area at least 25 nautical miles inside those limits.

"And the presence of a foreign submarine in the positions reported would thus be a clear violation of Danish sovereignty," the report said.

The submarine that was spotted 2 days later--on 15 July--in waters off Nanortalik has not been identified either. The search there was called off on 18 July.

Buoy for Ocean-Going Soviet Sub

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 28 Jul 83 p 3

[Article by Michael Rastrup Smith]

[Text] The metal cylinder that a Greenland fisherman found recently in Godthabs Fjord is a Russian submarine radio communications buoy. This was determined by Greenland Command, which has investigated the buoy since it can contain an explosive charge.


According to Greenland Command, the buoy came from an ocean-going Russian submarine. The buoy is sent up from the submerged submarine to a position 5 or 6 meters below the ocean surface. It is held fast there by a wire running from the submarine.

The submarine is then able to communicate with its home base without coming to the surface. As a rule the communications are sent over long waves.

"I will not rule out the possibility that the buoy could come from one of the submarines that was reported in Greenland waters recently," said Lieutenant Colonel B. W. Ledertoug of Defense Command. "But it could also have been lost in South Greenland and driven northward, since there is an ocean current running up along the west coast of Greenland which originally comes from the east coast.

"There is an expert on the way to Greenland now. He will take a closer look at the buoy, which could contain a charge meant to destroy it. When the buoy has been examined, it will be sent to Denmark with one of the lighthouse service ships, since we don't dare send it by plane due to the danger of explosion."

B. W. Ledertoug said that the presumed explosive charge is intended for situations like the present one. If the buoy pulls loose, the explosive charge would normally sink it.



The sketch shows a nuclear-powered ocean-going submarine of the Victor class, which is known to operate in the North Atlantic. The submarine is communicating via a radio buoy. The arrow on the little map shows the spot at the mouth of Godthabs Fjord where the buoy was found by a Greenland fisherman.

First NATO Atlantic Fleet Visit

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 29 Jul 83 p 3

[Text] NATO's standing Atlantic force, consisting of 6-8 frigates and destroyers from various NATO countries, is visiting Greenland for the very first time. Greenland Command denied that the visit had anything to do with the two Soviet submarines that were found near Greenland's southwest coast recently.

6578

CSO: 3613/162

EXPANDING MARKET SOUGHT FOR ARMORED VEHICLES

Paris L'USINE NOUVELLE in French 16 Jun 83 pp 67-68

[Article by Patrick Piernaz: "Arms: How Can More Be Exported?"]

[Text] "But what country can afford to get such arms?" That is the question that a visitor to the Satory exhibition (the 9th by that name) cannot help asking, as he discovers the latest products of specialized French industry: the AMX 40 tank, MATRA [Mechanics, Aviation, and Traction Company]'s Mistral air defense system, Thomson's Shahine-Shelter, Panhard's Sagaie 6 x 6 vehicles.

The land weapons industry, like others, is experiencing the effects of the solvency crisis among international clients. In Belgium, in particular, our correspondent reports, the losses of the FN [National Arms Factory] are being attributed to the difficulties certain governments are encountering in financing their weapons orders. In France, however, the situation is still far from being dramatic. Especially if one looks at the total cost of the orders for war equipment placed by foreign countries: for 1982, 41.6 billion francs, or an increase in constant francs of 11 percent compared to the orders recorded in 1981 (that year they reached the sum of 33.8 billion francs). This total is even 8.5 percent higher than the average of the last 8 years.

Yet nobody in the ranks of French industrialists is hanging out the flags. First of all because the nature of the contracts does not involve all the suppliers equally. It is easier today to sell a missile battery than a series of heavy tanks! Then because they all know that in future they will have to do at least as well in exports and not expect any miracles from the French state, in spite of the military planning act that does nevertheless plan to devote 283.5 billion francs to traditional arms between 1984 and 1988. An act assuming a 6.2 percent inflation rate in 1984 and an average rate of 5 percent in the following 4 years. Rates considered optimistic especially in military production, in which price fluctuations are often higher than inflation.

More than ever, it is exports that can assure the work load of enterprises and arsenals. This is a well-known fact within GIAT, the Land Weapons Industrial Group (17,000 persons, 10 industrial centers), which cannot make do with delivery of the 450 AMX 30 B2s to the French army while awaiting the order, around 1990, of the new EPC tank, which will probably be equipped with a SAMM [Motorized Machines Application Company] oil and air suspension that is the

only one of its kind in the world.

At Satory, GIAT showed the AMX 40, which incorporates the AMX 30 B2 advances (COTAC [expansion unknown] automatic firing system) and those of the AMX 32 (mechanically welded turret permitting firing while in motion) and which has two other major advantages: a supercharged 1,100 horse-power engine and a 120-millimeter (compared to the AMX 32's 105 millimeter) cannon. Improvements which in conjunction with the relative lightness of the AMX 40 (43.5 tons) will still not be more than it will take to make equipment not selected by France an indispensable export item for clients who appreciate the label "French Army."

Nevertheless, the example of Panhard, which exports 95 percent of its output and has long since succeeded in offering light armored vehicles modified solely to meet foreign needs, should give rise to optimism. Panhard, an affiliate of Peugeot-PSA [expansion unknown], today employs 850 persons for revenues of 750 million francs and has already sold 5,000 vehicles for export to 40 different countries. Which has not prevented its selling one of its last-born, the ERC 90 Sagaie device, to the French army.

At Satory, Panhard showed three six-wheeled ERCs with three new turrets designed and built by SAMM (Motorized Machines Application Company), in particular the TTB 190 turret equipped with the GIAT 90 F4 cannon capable of launching rocket-propelled shells and of being equipped with semi-automatic loading. Claude Manche, marketing director of SAMM's turret-arms division, bases many hopes on this type of equipment: "We are aiming at the top of the line in performance and automation both for new items and the updating of old French and foreign equipment." His objective is said to be actually to bring his division, which presently accounts for 10 percent of SAMM's revenues (total revenues: 350 million francs in 1982), up to the same level as the other divisions: electrohydraulic (55 percent) and aerospace (35 percent).

This ambition is explained by the importance of the world market for turrets, estimated at 3,000 units a year (exclusive of the USSR but including the USA) at a cost of roughly 2 million francs per turret. The four principal French manufacturers -- Creusot-Loire, GIAT, Hispano-Suiza, and SAMM -- would like to share this market among themselves. "Especially since at a time of economizing, the reequipment market, for new turrets on unused old chassis, is proving particularly promising," explains Claude Manche. A trend strengthened by the emergence of new needs, such as the necessity of transforming ground defense vehicles into an anti-aircraft version by means of a turret carrying a double-barrelled cannon or a missile-launcher. General staffs are all pointing out the necessity of strengthening this type of defense.

It is precisely close range anti-aircraft defense that Hispano-Suiza has in mind: it has designed a turret intended to receive MATRA's Mistral SATCP [very short-range surface-to-air missile]. At Hispano-Suiza there is no regret at having been chosen by MATRA, in charge of operations, as a result of a call for bids in which the principal manufacturers were competitors for a market that could rise by 400 to 500 systems over a period of close to 10 years.

Hispano-Suiza's other war-horse is the anti-tank vehicle turret, affording unequalled crew protection. This is a "superstructure" turret, on which manufacturers worldwide are working. On this point, the Hispano-Suiza Mars 90, equipped with a 90 millimeter F4 cannon with automatic feed and ejection is in the vanguard of world technique. "But we do not sell this equipment directly to the ultimate customer; that is up to the French manufacturers of light armored vehicles, Panhard, Renault, and Lohr," explains Yves Closson, director of the nuclear and arms division of Hispano-Suiza.

Renault Industrial Vehicles has mounted this turret on the VBC [expansion unknown], a version of the VAB [Forward-Area Armored Vehicle] model. For export sales, the Equipment division of Renault Industrial Vehicles (one of the company's few areas of profit) has established a joint sales affiliate with Creusot-Loire which has already exported close to 800 vehicles.

"Our entire trade strategy centers around a basic vehicle, the VAB, and all its derivatives: the VBC, a mortar-carrying vehicle, the VAB with MATRA's SATCP...all equipped with reliable Diesel motors that have demonstrated their ability for trouble-free performance in the worst temperature conditions in the Gulf countries that have adopted them," states Emmanuel de Villoutreys, in charge of Middle East sales. He now hopes to conclude the contracts under negotiation with the United Arab Emirates, which are at present conducting lengthy comparative tests.

But in the area of light armored vehicles, it is becoming increasingly necessary to reckon with a small Alsatian builder, the Lohr Company, located at Hangenbieten, near Strasbourg (500 persons and 230 million francs in revenues with 70 percent in exports), which now does 50 percent of its business in military business, whereas a few years ago it produced only industrial vehicles. Its two star products: the personnel carrier for airborne troops (300 units sold to the French army), and the tank-carrier of which 100 percent are exported (1,000 units sold), a figure which places Lohr in the very forefront of European ranks.

This firm, which demonstrates that entering the arms markets is less costly than claimed, is about to pull off the hat-trick by launching out into the light wheeled or tracked armored vehicle market. Among the models introduced, the RPX 90 is equipped with the brand new Hispano-Suiza Mars 90 turret. "This vehicle, competitive as to mobility, armament, and munitions-carrying capacity, should sell about 150 units over the next 3 years, in the Middle east and in South America," calculates Philibert d'Hotelans, Lohr export trade director.

The Satory exhibition, unlike the one at Le Bourget for aeronautics, is not the place usually chosen for announcing orders. This year, an exception proves the rule. Manurhin will have no complaints about that. Indeed the state has just unfrozen the first slice of 5,000 Apilas infantry anti-tank missiles, which will later be complemented by an order for 16,000 units. A piece of good news that will perhaps not be enough on its own to get trouble-plagued Manurhin going again, but should persuade foreign armies to confirm their purchase plans under negotiation. At Manurhin, they are ready for mass production: 1,000 per month at first, and later 5,000 per month if sales go as predicted.

MILITARY OFFICIALS COMMENT ON SAINT-CYR REFORM

Type of Training

Paris DEFENSE NOUVELLE in French 2nd Quarter 83 pp 29-30

[Article by Colonel (Ret) Maurice Bonnefond: "Reform at Saint-Cyr"]

[Excerpts] We announced in our issue No 32 the reform of the program of education at the Special Military School of Saint-Cyr. This reform, which went into effect with the class of 1982, increases the duration of studies to 3 years, "so as to combine realistic and in-depth training with general training of the highest level."

We submit, for our readers' reflection, two judgments among others.

The first is by "Pere Systeme" [Class Leader] Colonel (Ret) Maurice Bonnefond, secretary of the "General Frere" Class (1948-1950).

The second is by Colonel (Res) Puy-Montbrun.

What was recently decided on by the minister of defense is, in effect, the end of the Saint-Cyr that we have known.

What, then, is the Saint-Cyr that is disappearing?

It is the institution, created after the war, that trained us.

I believe it is my duty, though, to call attention to a stumbling-block that is to be avoided and that I see taking shape through certain studies by "committees of the ESG [Higher War College]" (1981)--i.e., to wish to "pull things out by the roots," to kill "tradition." At a time when the minister of armed forces has created committees of draftees that participate actively in the life of the units, at a time when any soldier can address the minister directly, it seems aberrant to me that some are forbidding the senior classman and the class leader from speaking directly with the commander of the school (see the ESG report).

At a time when the West is dying because it has renounced all its moral values, there is talk about throwing onto the scrap heap, pell-mell, all the traditions of the "Speciale"--traditions that are living ones, thanks to the "pupils"--on the pretext that they are--bothersome! People are daring to speak of trade-unionism (cf the same ESG report) with regard to the senior classman and the class leader. In our time, though, we had far more important activities in this area than at present (I can testify to this), and I appeal to our revered "Poireau," General Bondis, who will be able to certify that our attitude was never that of the trade-unionists. Doesn't this represent, rather, a disturbing disappearance of sense of humor? By "taking ourselves seriously," inopportunistly and in the bad sense of the term, haven't we, in our era, ended up losing not only this sense of humor (appropriate to intelligent people) but also the sense of the most elementary tolerance?

Didn't Saint-Exupery write, in "The Little Prince": "Rites are necessary!"?

I think, quite to the contrary, that while our "class life" did not always make us students who were "comfortable" for the "Strasse" (but the "Strasse" knew at the time, intelligently, how to "play the game"), it effectively helped to train us, to make us good officers, disciplined in the service and later in the troop corps and combat units--and solidly welded and united in peacetime also. This is the cohesion, still maintained, of the class!

Training at the School is not, in my view, just pomp and militarism, in more or less large proportions; it is above all a spirit !

Reasons for Changes

Paris DEFENSE NOUVELLE in French 2nd Quarter 83 p 30

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel (Res) Puy-Montbrun: "Saint-Cyr, for What Training?"]

[Text] This reform is going to arouse a lot of criticism, achieve some satisfaction, some bitterness, convulsions and hopes. But I will be brief, since DEFENSE NOUVELLE can give me only half a page.

Why 3 years? In order to "combine realism and high-level training."

1) The realism seems poorly achieved to me. Three years, like the Ecole Polytechnique? But if the Ecole Polytechnique students effectively begin by spending 4 months in an EOR [Reserve-Officers School] school, leaving it as officer cadets and exercising their command during the next 8 months, it is precisely because this first year at the Polytechnique constitutes the essential military period, not to say the only one, of their career. The Polytechnique as a military school furnishes practically no more cadres to the Army. It provides high-level civilian organizations of the state, the private sector and the corps of armament engineers with military status, but with duties that are those of engineers, not combatants.

The Special Military School has no vocation other than to furnish cadres to the Army. If it is thought that direct integration into the ESM [Special

Military School] deprives the future officer of irreplaceable experience, "at the outset," of the barrack room, of a mixing with the Picard peasant, the Bordeaux winegrower, the Lyon truck driver, the Thionville metalworker and the MA from the Rennes faculty, then the Saint-Cyr student should go into his troop as a private. He would take the common basic training, would become a squad corporal, would command his combat group for 4 to 6 months. He would see what a good regular-army master sergeant is capable of, or a Saint-Cyr lieutenant back from "application" school; or, more surely, he will know what a draftee officer-cadet is.

Then, coming to Coetquidan to learn the tradition and receive the training of an officer, he would already know, with his sergeant's stripes (cavalry or artillery), what troop life is like, and if he does not yet know what he will have to do when he goes back to it as a lieutenant, he will at least know what he must not do.

2) The high-level training. Isn't it an aberration in vocation, a mistake in the development of the officer-cadet's training, to give the young Saint-Cyrian high-level training from the outset?

The vocation of a Saint-Cyrian is first of all to be a section chief or platoon leader. It is a matter of training chiefs, exemplary leaders of men, responsible for the health, morale and operational capacity of the men--leaders for combat units, aiming at combat.

If Saint-Cyr is to train officers as others train engineers, salesmen or embassy attaches, then there is no longer any Saint-Cyr.

Recently, a big reporter from a mass-circulation newspaper, one who covered the landing in Europe, Indochina, Algeria, said to me: "Officers are not like other people. If the day should come when they are like the others, there will no longer be an army. Just as there will be no church the day priests give up their cassocks."

"High-level" training at Coetquidan means inculcating in the Saint-Cyrian the desire to "succeed" in his career, to spend it taking courses and accumulating diplomas, many of which have nothing to do with his vocation and his mission. I recently met a young paratroop captain who in September 1983 is going to enter the "Sup Elec" [Higher School of Electricity]! Two years, for a diploma that will never be of any use to the Army. For him, yes, to be sure, if he wants to quit the Army. What kind of a game are we playing?

11267
CS0: 3519/546

GREEK OFFICERS IN CONTROL OF U.S. INFORMATION COLLECTED AT BASES

Athens ETHNOS in Greek 16 Jul 83 p 5

[Text] Greek officers of the signal corps will take charge from now on of the control of information collected by the electronic transmitters of the Nea Makri American base.

As it has become known, this paragraph is related to the military procedures package of the framework agreement and it regulates the new valid formula on the subject of Nea Makri base information.

The same sources add that the information from the American transmitters will be evaluated by the echelon of Greek officers and it will be forbidden to relay to the Pentagon information material related to nations with which Greece has friendly relations.

It must be noted that the Nea Makri base is linked to the Turkish Loran stations which coordinate their information as to wider geographical areas.

Total national control is imposed more particularly on the Hellenikon American base, which is being reconverted now to its original mission as a unit for air transport.

As is known, that base changed its character 10 years ago, on the basis of paragraphs 8 and 12 of the former agreement, granting uncontrolled privileges to the American armed forces in that area.

With those paragraphs, the Hellenikon base had been turned into a base of operations for the "Pa-Pa" and "B2" type of airplanes without any knowledge of the Greek Army Staff.

According to rumors, part of the payment of the "Psi 16" will be made with arms manufactured in Greece, such as the automatic "G3" rifle of the EBO [Greek Arms Industry] in which Americans are interested because of its low cost. Approximately the same conditions are being created also for the American tank "M60", which is intended to reinforce Greek armored units.

12278

CSO: 3521/385

COMMENTS ON CURRENT RUMORS OF MILITARY LEADERSHIP CHANGES

Decisiveness Seen Needed

Lisbon O DIA in Portuguese 27 Jun 83 p 13

[Text] According to Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa, the new government must either reappoint the present heads of the military services or replace them "in the shortest time possible." The analyst for Radio Renascenca emphasizes: "A decision may be the equivalent of weakness; a postponement may entail political costs."

Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa upheld that thesis while pointing to the need for the government to implement the recent National Defense Law, which makes the Armed Forces subordinate to the political power. He said that keeping or replacing the heads of the military services in accordance with the law "is an issue just as important--or more so--as the wording of the directives that will implement that law."

Concerning the permissible time limit for deciding to keep or replace those leaders, he also said that "the problem is not legal, but political," since "it is more than just an interpretation of the law--it involves the government's political will." In the opinion of the former minister, a prompt decision on this matter by the government "would be a visible signal of authority in the direction of the Armed Forces themselves."

He added: "In fact, it is undesirable for the latter to be involved directly or indirectly in relationships between organs of sovereignty and... their possible conflicts." He also said that on the other hand, "it is imperative to resolve this uncertain and transitory situation and ensure a secure position for the heads of the military services."

Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa concluded by saying: "In a word, the government would benefit by giving a public indication of its constitutional powers in the basic area represented by the Armed Forces."

On the other hand, Melo Egidio, Armed Forces chief of staff, said he was not aware that the government intended to undertake or propose the replacement of heads of the military services. Egidio made those statements on his return from Great Britain and the FRG, where he had visited U.S. troops stationed in those countries.

Melo Egidio had met first, however, with Mota Pinto, the new minister of defense, and he asserted that during their meeting, "the question of the heads of the military services was not even discussed." In that meeting with the deputy prime minister, according to Melo Egidio, the only matter discussed was the new legislation in connection with the National Defense Law, "a matter which is being handled by the Armed Forces General Staff but which requires the participation of the Ministry of Defense as far as certain aspects are concerned."

Hidden Goals of Rumors

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 1 Jul 83 p 17

[Commentary by Guilherme d'Oliveira Martins]

[Text] With undisguisable nervousness, several voices are being raised with the demand that the minister of defense appoint new heads of the military services. The only thing is that those persistent voices are not those of the government's supporters, but of its harshest critics, who are thus appearing in the curious role of advisers to that "perverse" government. There are two possible explanations: either they have accepted the situation or they hope to have a decisive influence on the steps taken by the new rulers. After all, political events can be created in many different ways--and it is always more convenient to do so from outside, where one is free of commitment and responsibility.

It is obvious, however, that the voices making these demands have not suddenly converted to the opinions of their adversaries. They are firm in their convictions and their objectives. They are therefore trying to put the government in an awkward position--between the inheritance left by Freitas do Amaral and the AD [Democratic Alliance] and the "advantage" of stirring up points of conflict with the president of the republic. What it boils down to is that this government's opponents would like to see a resumption of the institutional quarrels--which would serve to erode the cabinet's credibility and the support it needs. It would be demonstrated, basically, that the notions of consensus and democratic compromise are of no use and that bipolarization has many more potentialities. On that basis, a reconverted PSD [Social Democratic Party] could gradually become the harbinger of a new conservative bloc. Rekindled institutional guerrilla warfare would then be the starting point for a new phase of preparation for the independent presidential candidacy of the AD's heirs--involving a progressive marking of boundaries in relation to the PS [Socialist Party] and Mario Soares. In that scenario, some of the PSD's current leaders would be left behind, but this would even help clarify strategies and forms of action.

And what if an attitude of compromise and dialogue prevails? Then the charge of halfheartedness will be an easy one: betrayal of the memory of the departed leader will be unmistakable and identification with the enemy obvious. The candle of discontent in the PSD will be lighted. Heads may roll, and perhaps even discord will appear in the very legions preparing for the presidential candidacy of Mario Soares.

That explains the zeal of those who are being so insistent with Mota Pinto. When it gets right down to it, the important thing is not which choice is made,

but proof of the government's steadfastness or fragility and the demonstration that the AD has retained its strength--to the point that there are matters it can control at this moment. Whatever the government decides, it can therefore not escape being the target of sharp criticism: "damned if it does and damned if it doesn't"--condemned either for halfheartedness, compromise, or hesitation.

Insistence on the matter is therefore a way of fogging up the political climate, either by poisoning relations between the two coalition parties or by stirring up the same old institutional guerrilla warfare--which some people are afraid to see buried.

It will be said, however, that Mota Pinto is between a rock and a hard place--caught between demonstrating his consistency as the former national representative of General Soares Carneiro and coming to terms with the party that provided the most votes in electing President Eanes. It will also be said that the difficult relations in the past between the president of the republic and Mario Soares have become irreversible despite the good-naturedness and open mind of the present prime minister. All of this has been understood by opponents to the right of this government. That explains the offensive directed at the existing glass houses. The only thing is that the Armed Forces are not in fact a toy to be easily manipulated. They are a genuinely active institution. This means that the Armed Forces General Staff is not a board of directors that can be fooled with and dominated. In the past two centuries, after all, there has not been a coup d'état without the involvement of uniforms and barracks. The dictatorship established in 1926 was itself overthrown only when the captains, sick of war, decided to take to the streets just as their grandfathers had done through General Gomes da Costa or Artillery Maj Sidonio Pais. Hence the danger of transforming military stirrings into an extension of agitation in the parties and the government. Hence the need to make decisions in military matters that are aimed at ensuring the independence of the Armed Forces and a genuine, accepted, and consensual subordination of the military power to the civilian democratic power. This so as to avoid the kindling in Portugal of a military controversy: one which, fortunately, has been fueled only (since 1976) by sectors in the extreme minority. We cannot return to the wretched tradition of a century of liberalism, with on-again, off-again pronunciamientos and the military divided by the quarrels of the parties, lodges, and generals. It is true that there are those who do not mind playing with fire, but it is a good idea not to forget our very unedifying history in those areas. Because of that, may we have the good sense not to relight dangerous fuses that might rapidly transform our political life into something unwholesome and incendiary. Unless, of course, we want to disinter the reckless, turbulent, and unpredictable spirit of General Saldanha--the man who probably headed the greatest number of coups in this land of ours with its mild customs and its continuing reverential fear of uniforms.

11798
CSO: 3542/158

NATION'S NEUTRALITY IMPOSSIBLE GIVEN SOVIET PRESSURE

Madrid ABC in Spanish 1 Jul 83 p 15
[Editorial]

[Text] Along with economic recovery, the key political Spanish question in 1983 is the Atlantic Alliance problem; that is, whether Spain should become a full member of NATO or should break away from that organization.

Strictly speaking this is a matter of as much importance as is our unemployment or our inflation: not just because it affects Spain's historic place in the world but because overcoming the crisis depends to a great extent on our effective integration into the West.

One of the most revealing texts on this crucial matter is that which appeared yesterday as an editorial in the morning newspaper EL PAID in which the abandonment of the Alliance is advocated, and the government is arrogantly called upon to free Spain of the threat of westernization.

For this reason this text seems to us to be revealing and of a most peculiar interpretation: precisely because it does not reflect the prevailing opinion of the Spanish Left, nor of the government party, nor of the divided Spanish Communist Party [PCE] but coincides, point by point, with the positions and interests of one of the two superpowers.

The independent morning newspaper advances three arguments: that the Spanish Socialist Workers Party [PSOE] government has become a weak government, submerged in a sea of confusion and incapable of making a decision; that Spanish public opinion is against the Alliance; and finally, that if within the government the pro-Atlantic stand (headed by Boyer) should win out the only cohesive force within the Spanish left would again be the PCE.

Those are three assumptions without basis, undemonstrable and unworthy of a reputable newspaper. So let us review the three arguments.

First. Concerning the first assumption (the president's confusion and incapacity to make decisions) one must admit, on the contrary, that the present government is beginning to close the gap between the reality of power and the ramblings of a group. Perhaps it is reaching the conclusion that in an interdependent world, democratic Spain today lacks the capability of guaranteeing its

security outside of NATO. Some or many PSOE leaders would perhaps like Spain to be located at the mouth of the Indus, or to have orange trees cover the Pyrenees. But the PSOE has come of age, it is in power and must patriotically correct the Utopian formulations of its youth. The commitments made by the PSOE date from before 1981. They go back to the times of the visit to Moscow and of the photo in AURORA.

It is that level of commitments which EL PAIS advocates in its editorial: one which was assumed in its inexperienced youth, commitments to the USSR rather than to the voters. These agreements are like those made with the POLISARIO Front. In these columns, little inclined to applaud socialism, we are going to recognize that Felipe Gonzalez has the capacity to make corrections: that is what distinguishes a politician, ready to take risks, from the author of book covers [Sic] who hurls insults from the first row of seats at the bull ring. Besides, this is also what differentiates patriotism, which is a sense of the nation's interests, from party platforms. Felipe Gonzalez, who is an enlightened and quick-witted southerner, understands that Spain cannot be separated from the European democracies and has begun (we do not yet know what direction this will take) a period of reconsideration. In view of that attitude of the prime minister, a rigorous analysis is needed, not sly insults. Spain is a middle sized power with a decisive geographic location: theoretically it could close the Mediterranean and provide or deny Europe a strategic space of considerable value in the event of a Soviet attack.

Spain cannot remain neutral because, today at least, neutrality would require a deterrent factor which we do not have: our own autonomous nuclear force. Nor can Spain aspire within NATO to compare its situation with that of the French because to do so it would need to have a few simple items such as atomic arms, armoured divisions in German territory and full strategic integration with the military apparatus of the Alliance under the Brussels Treaty. Felipe Gonzalez has had the political instinct and the personal courage to understand, after 6 months of discovering what it is like at the vertex of a state, that in this nation there will be no industrial reconversion, no labor recovery, no brake on inflation, no foreign trade or monetary stability without a coherent diplomatic and military policy. Therefore, the policy of trial and error and adjustment followed by the head of the government is not evidence of confusion but of capability to face facts. We who oppose the reelection of Felipe Gonzalez in 1986 feel an obligation to recognize that this is so.

Second: Public opinion is against the Atlantic Alliance. This is not true. Spanish public opinion does not know what the Atlantic Alliance is. Nor does it know what an integrated steel industry is, nor alternate sources of energy, nor the structuring of primary education. In all of these disputes and others, Spain is gambling on its future as a free developed nation, and with regard to all of them the majority of Spaniards have only a vague, approximate and largely unreal conception. EL PAIS knows, just as the socialist government does, how much hypocrisy and disdain for popular sovereignty there are in these public opinion polls conducted among an exemplary and patient population which is just emerging from a long tunnel of misinformation, hackneyed phrases and silence. Those of us who have defended democratic freedoms and respect for personal dignity will denounce ceaselessly the indecency of pollsters with tape recorders asking a farm hand of Trebujena his opinion on the installation of Pershing missiles. This is a mockery and we will get back to that subject.

Third. If within the socialist government the western tendency (which perhaps is not headed by Boyer as EL PAIS says but by the president himself) wins out, the credibility of the left would be limited to the PCE. It is here that all the apparent circumspection of the editorial breaks down because not even Alexandrov, pseudonym of the senior editor of PRAVDA, would be so retrogressive as to defend the concept of a "proletarian party" being compromised with the military interests of a foreign power.

The fundamental question is clear: between now and 1986 we will witness a rise in East-West tension, brought on by the recovery of the West and the problems of succession in the USSR. Both sides are going to play it hard and to the hilt. The Atlantic party in Brussels has explained the gravity of the situation to Spain and Spain will probably become conscious of that reality. It is not impossible that our integration in the EEC might be linked with our stand on the so-called "double decision" on the Atlantic. Meanwhile, the great powers play their cards. One of them has lost ground in Spain, in Spanish public opinion and even among the Spanish Left. But it still has enclaves in strategic points in our society: specifically, in a newspaper enterprise of liberal ownership, with a respectable directorate and a professional editorial staff, but which without batting an eye inserts every imaginable distortion on instructions from its publishers who persist in remaining faithful to a totalitarian concept of Europe.

Well, one must say that the matter is not too important. EL PAIS is not, and the government knows it, the Big Bertha cannon nor the "Invincible" aircraft carrier. It is a leisure boat following an erratic course carried by the winds with a slanted rudder and variable displacement whose whims will not change the European defense nor the course of the stars.

9204

CSO: 3548/460

NEW GOVERNMENT CHANGES STAND ON LOS TREATY PROVISIONS

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 14 Jul 83 p 7

[Article by Pal Nordenborg]

[Text] The Norwegian government has adopted a new stand on the exploitation of resources in international areas that is different from what previous Norwegian governments have stood for, according to Foreign Minister Sverre Strøm's speech at the Ocean Rights Conference in Oslo yesterday.

Concerning the articles in the UN's Ocean Rights Convention that apply to the area of the international ocean bottom, Foreign Minister Sverre Strøm said on behalf of the Norwegian government that "it should be accepted that the special application of the principle on the common inheritance of all people that is built into the convention should not be the only one that can be applied."

The foreign minister also said that it would be difficult to achieve an effective international rule "on the basis of a majority decision that comes in conflict with the vital interests of some of the few states that have the necessary technical and economic means of availing themselves of the resources on the ocean bottom."

Created a Stir

Foreign Minister Strøm's statement created a stir because he also spoke for other solutions than allowing the natural resources that occur outside national jurisdiction to be exploited by the countries in common. It has been the official Norwegian line in such questions precisely not to accept other principles. This applies to the ocean bottom, the sea, the air, and outer space as well.

A large question mark was also placed after his assertion that the vital interests of leading industrial countries come into conflict with an international ocean bottom regulation. This is at variance with a widely-held Norwegian opinion that the exploitation of natural resources is not to be primarily for the good of the poor countries.

Afterwards, Foreign Minister Stray said to the press that there is no doubt that Norway will ratify the UN's ocean rights convention. He said that the government would introduce a bill to the Storting on this in about a year's time.

Jens Evensen

Ambassador Jens Evensen's speech, which followed directly, was in strong contrast to the foreign minister's. Evensen claimed that the rich, Western industrial countries with the U.S. in the lead are paving the way for a confrontation between north and south with their arbitrary behavior. "We are facing an extremely disturbing situation and must find a solution before it is too late," Evensen said.

The first not unexpected confrontation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union occurred during an American dispute in which the former ocean rights negotiator, Richardson, whom President Reagan fired, strongly defended the convention, while the Democratic congressional representative, John Breaux, attacked the convention and argued for its rejection.

The Soviet ambassador from Moscow, Igor Korosovsky, quickly entered the discussion and accused the U.S. in strong words of wanting to create chaos and disorder. This was rejected by both Breaux and Richardson.

9124

CSO: 3639/150

OPPOSITION NEWSPAPER CRITICIZES GOVERNMENT ON NEW LOS POSITION

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 15 Jul 83 p 14

[Editorial]

[Text] Foreign Minister Svenn Stray has created doubt on Norway's position on the text of the treaty on the UN's ocean rights convention that already has been adopted by a large majority. Norway voted for it also. In his speech from the government to the international ocean rights conference now taking place in Oslo, he said that "it should be accepted that the special application of the principle of the common inheritance of all people that is built into the convention should not be the only one that can be applied."

This is a remarkable statement. If he means by this that Norway should adopt another means of achieving a common exploitation of the ocean bottom resources than the one in the ocean rights convention, he has thrown out not only all the work Norway has done in the nine years the work to get this convention has taken. He is also bringing Norway toward a break in the international rules on how a country acts in relation to a treaty it has signed but not yet ratified. The Vienna Convention on treaties says very definitely that no country can sign a treaty and then combat its goal afterwards. It is now wrong for the foreign minister to consider other possibilities he sees for realizing the principle of common human inheritance.

The foreign minister's statement was even more remarkable in light of the fact that directly afterwards he said that he could not imagine that the Storting would not be in favor of Norwegian ratification. This creates the impression that a bill on this matter is something that the government will regretfully present to the Storting and that will, regretfully from the government's point of view, be adopted.

The part of the ocean rights convention that has caused opposition in a handful of industrial countries such as the U.S., Great Britain, and West Germany, among others, is the article that has to do with mining the ocean bottom. The criticism of the decrees the convention binds the countries to has been rejected at the Oslo conference. It must also be of interest to the Norwegian government that the Reagan administration's deputy chairman during the final negotiations, Leigh S. Ratiner, stood out as a warm advocate of an international ocean bottom

rule if it just works properly.

He went so far as to say that with the exception of a handful of Western countries, the U.S. included, an ocean bottom rule would work well. If it worked, the others would adopt it as well, he said.

The reasoning behind such an argument is painfully clear. Bankers and investors, whom this expensive technology is so dependent upon, want the greatest possible security. Bilateral arrangements or a minitreaty as the basis for development and production in areas that can be legally disputed are much too great a risk. Hardly any American business managers or stock owners would take the chance of being brought to court if their company goes out on its own.

The White House is a capricious adviser. It literally does not always pay to listen to advice from there. Industrial interests connected to the ocean bottom and the products there couldn't care less about Reagan's ideologies when their best profits are concerned.

Besides, the adopted convention has already given so many special advantages to Western industrial interests that this is not the time to create further conflicts. What we need now is a renewed positive Norwegian stand on the adopted convention's spirit, in agreement with a broad Norwegian opinion. Norway has least of all reason to whine. Nor does the U.S. Those who have gotten the least are, as so often happens, the poor countries.

9124

CSO: 3639/150

EXPERT URGES SEARCH FOR MINERALS ON JAN MAYEN SEA BOTTOM

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 14 Jul 83 p 7

[Article by Pal Nordenborg: "Norway's Next Golden Continental Shelf?"]

[Text] Has Norway gotten a new golden continental shelf, not with oil and gas, but with minerals from the sea bottom? The place in question is the volcanic island, Jan Mayen, where Norway has recently established its economic zone and shares its own developmental area of the northern part of the Atlantic ridge with Iceland.

The materials that in all probability will be found are multimetaledd sulphides, very rich, which appear in columnlike formations. These pillars, which can be up to a thousand times richer in metal content than the already known manganese nodules at great ocean depths, were discovered a few years ago by American researchers. The deposits are formed in volcanic areas and have been detected among other places in the Pacific Ocean near the Galapagos and off the coast of the state of Washington in the U.S.

Conrad G. Welling, a leading American expert in civil and military marine technology and a participant in the Ocean Rights Convention in Oslo this week, told ARBEIDERBLADET that there is every reason to assume that deposits of this type are also found in the volcanic areas by Jan Mayen. He said he could say this with great certainty, even though the area has not been explored.

"The findings that have been made up to now at four different ocean bottom areas show richer deposits where the volcanic activity is greatest, as in the Pacific Ocean," he said. The first indications are that the deposits are richer there than in areas with less volcanic activity, as in the Atlantic Ocean.

"But," Welling said, "I am optimistic about the possibilities of finding deposits in this area as well. I can only encourage Norway, as I have Japan and other countries, to get started in this research and development work," he said.

The Technology is There

The existence of the multimetaled, sulphide columns has only been known for three or four years. As soon as a commercial deposit is found, recovery can begin, according to Conrad G Welling. But many factors play a role in the determination of the time to begin such an operation, he thinks. The most important factors are how quickly the world's economies can recover and the developments on the metals market.

But according to Welling, the technology for such mining exists. What is lacking is information on the purely physical qualities of the mineral columns.

The newly discovered mineral formations arose when underground water at 300-400 degrees in volcanic areas collided with cold water at depths down to 2,200 meters. In addition to metals such as zinc, lead, and copper, they probably also contain profitable amounts of silver.

No Legal Problems

An important point about sea bottom minerals that now have been discovered is that they are also within the national economic zones of 200 nautical miles. This means that development here cannot create discoverers' problems such as occur with the manganese nodules that are found at great ocean depths beyond the individual coastal state jurisdiction. Some ocean rights researchers think that when the international law is clear, technology in place can be put to work on the deposits.

Welling will give an orientation on the new mineral columns this afternoon at the Oslo Conference's special seminar on mining the ocean bottom. This seminar is specially for Norwegian shipping and connected industries and their opportunities in the mining of the ocean bottom.

9124
CSO: 3639/150

SCIENTISTS CRITICIZE AIR QUALITY POLICY

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 27 Jun 83 pp 90-91

[Article: "Pollutants Are 'Measured Away'." Environmental scientists report on shortcomings of Bonn's air quality policy.]

[Text] "Weak points of air quality policy"--one of the causes for the resignation of Duesseldorf Minister of Agriculture Baeumer--are the subject of a study which the International Institute for Environment and Society presented in West Berlin early this month. Excerpts from the "depressing" summary by the scientists:

Although the Federal Republic of Germany--compared to other European countries--has the most and strictest laws with regard to clean air, has developed the strongest enforcement apparatus, carries out the most extensive permit procedures for large-scale polluters, in the period since 1970 there has been no success worth mentioning in its air quality policy.

The total amount of SO₂ emission, which decides air quality, has remained constant between 1970 and 1980. Improvement in the local immission situation (SO₂ and other pollutant air charges) frequently were obtained only through widespread dispersal of pollutants. This shifting around of the problem with the help of constructing high chimneys ("high chimney policy") has significantly contributed to the dying of forests even in regions far from industrial areas.

Only a few specialists can still keep track of the abundance of regulations pertaining to air quality, and their interaction. Their administration is especially overtaxed when it comes to implementing the "latest technology."

Ever more elaborate measuring activities to establish air quality or air pollution, respectively, are balanced only by weak orientation toward problems and solutions. The Federal Republic possesses a super-modern network of immission measuring. However, this advantage is only insufficiently utilized for uncovering and rapidly solving problem situations. It can be shown in numerous individual cases that, through a certain selection of measuring sites, actual air pollution amounts are "measured away."

Cooperation between the administration and citizens' initiatives concerned with the environment is relatively insignificant and underdeveloped in confrontations with massive polluters. Examples from other countries show impressively that stronger cooperation with citizens' initiatives has a positive effect on the enforcement power of environmental authorities engaged in quarrelsome confrontations with massive polluters.

At present, there is no realistic hope that the EEC member states will be able to contain the widespread air pollution... EEC policy in the area of air quality so far has led essentially to the establishment of the "smallest common denominator."

More extensive demands were usually not implemented, or only with great time delays, in the member states concerned. Therefore, present EEC air quality policy can generally only be classified as a "symbolic policy" in which costly programs are enacted for the public, but no appropriate and adequate measures for their implementation are taken.

At the same time, there is a tendency noticeable among the EEC member states to transfer decisions on air quality policy to the "higher" (and not very transparent) level of the EEC in order to postpone necessary measures in one's own country.

For these reasons, "going it alone" on a national level can be a useful means in environmental policy to speed up the normally lengthy decision-making process of EEC institutions. The Federal Republic could be such a "trailblazer." Previous experience has shown that regulations on environmental policy have always been "booster shots" for EEC environmental policy. No economic disadvantages became apparent among the trailblazers.

For the future, it must be feared--because of the diagnosed weak points in the air quality policy of the Federal Republic and its EEC partners--that national environmental policy will be rather helpless when confronted with upcoming new challenges in other areas of pollution.

Particularly in the case of nitrous oxide, which is on the increase in almost all EEC member states, the level of scientific knowledge--compared with the "well-known SO₂"--is substantially lower; the possibilities of technical solutions are more costly. And lastly: in the case of nitrous oxide emissions, environmental policy will have to deal not only with power plants, but also with the automotive industry.

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SEWAGE, INDUSTRIAL WASTE SPARKS MARMARA COAST CRISIS

Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish 22 Jun 83 pp 1, 15

[Text] HURRIYET NEWS AGENCY -- Swimming has been banned at the Gulf of Izmit, which is becoming a dead sea owing to industrial waste and sewage. While swimming has been banned officially east of the Bayramoglu-Cinarcik line, it is understood that the Gemlik-Mudanya and Bandirma shores have also become dangerously polluted. The northern Marmara and the area west of Kapidag Peninsula from Erdek to Canakkale have been declared clean.

The Kocaeli governor's office has had sea-water samples taken at 14 points along the shoreline falling within the provincial boundaries. The samples were examined separately by the Turkish Scientific and Technical Research Organization laboratories at Gebze and the Public Health Laboratory in Izmit, and 12 samples were found to contain coli bacilli at a level to endanger human health. Noting that when coli bacilli are found, it is an indication of the presence of raw sewage, experts said, "When the number of coli bacilli in 1 liter of water reaches 1,000, it becomes dangerous to human health. This water also contains other bacteria besides coli bacilli. We have reported the situation to the Kocaeli governor's office."

Governor's Ban

The coli bacillus counts found during the analyses were: 4,300 at Eskihisar in Gebze, 2,400 at the Darica Municipal Beach, 1,500 at Bayramoglu Beach, 4,600 at Hereke Landing, 4,600 at Karamursel Beach, 1,500 at the Yarimca Sailing Club, 4,600 at Tutunciftlik Landing, 11,000 at the Eregli Village Ferry Landing, 11,000 at the Ulasli Ferry Landing, 11,000 at the Degirmendere Fruit Market and 930 at the Halidere Ferry Landing. The coli count within the Karamursel-Yalova district boundaries was 430 and it was 230 in the Kirazliyali area at Gebze. Swimming was not banned at these two points.


Kocaeli Governor Hikmet Gulsen said, "We have banned swimming at 12 locations where the coli bacillus count was found at a dangerous level. Municipal employees and local officials were informed that swimming is not to be allowed at these places. Signs will be erected on the shore indicating that swimming is forbidden."

Samples of sea water taken at Yalova and Cinarcik where many summer homes and resorts are located also indicated a dangerous level of pollution. Yalova District official Orhan Aykan announced that swimming would be forbidden along the shore from the Siteler area in Yalova past Cinarcik to Esenkoy. Many people swim in these areas, however.

As a result of sea-water analyses requested by the Bursa governor's office, it was found that the Gulf of Gemlik is also badly polluted. Bursa Deputy Governor Halit Tokullugil announced that swimming had not been banned officially at present, but "No Swimming" signs would be erected at Mudanya, Kursunlu, one section of Kucuk Kumla and Buyuk Kumla, and at the Gemlik and Karacaali landings.

Clean Sites

It is understood as a result of the analysis that the area west of Kapidag Peninsula from Erdek to Canakkale is clean. Also, it was determined that the northern shores of the Sea of Marmara are not yet dangerously polluted.



Swimming has been banned as dangerous to human health in the Gulf of Izmit east of the Bayramoglu-Cinarcik line as the result of analysis of sea-water samples.

Key:

1. No swimming allowed
2. Polluted but swimming allowed
3. Clean

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